JUDGEMENT
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(1.) The petition is directed against order date 1st June 2015 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Mathura in Case Crime No.50 of 2015 , State v. Sandeep Dutta and others under Sections 3/7, Essential Commodities Act and Sections 420, 379, I.P.C., P.S. Shergarh, District Mathura, by which the application under Section 451, Cr.P.C. for release of vehicle (Tanker) belonging to the petitioner being Registration No.PC-12-Q-8645, was refused on the ground that the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate does not have the jurisdiction to interfere in the matter for the reason that proceedings under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act has been initiated and the State Government is the competent authority.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order on the face of it is erroneous as the State Government is no longer the competent authority for ordering release of vehicles.? The words "State Government" under Section 6-C has since been substituted by the "Judicial Authority appointed by the State Government"? In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision rendered in Shyam Singh Kushwaha v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 4 AllLJ 658. The court in para-11 considered and explained the legal proposition of law in following terms:
"11. From a joint reading of the aforesaid provisions it is evident, without any ambiguity, that whether a prosecution is launched or not, District Magistrate has got the power to order for confiscation of the essential commodity, packages etc. and also the vehicle in which, it was being transported, in case of contravention of any provisions of any of the control order is made under section 3 of the E.C. Act in respect of any essential commodity. The parent provision of section 6-A (1) has to be read in conjunction with section 6-A(3) of the E.C. Act, which provides that where no order of confiscation is passed, or where under the order passed in appeal, under section 6-C, or where the person charged with offence under the E.C. Act is acquitted, then the owner of the commodity or the person from whom it has been seized is to be returned the sale proceeds of the essential commodity. The natural corollary is that the vehicle and the packages, covering, receptacle etc. and the vehicle, animal, vessel or conveyance has also to be returned to the person, who is entitled for the same. Harmonious construction of the aforesaid two provisions section 6-A (1) and 6-A (3) yield to such a conclusion. Under section 6-C, an order of confiscation can be challenged in an appeal. The said sub- section has been subjected to various amendments from time to time, which has been noted by the lower revisional court in the impugned order dated 5.2.2011, Annexure No. 2. Initially, an appeal against confiscation order under section 6-A(1) lay before the Session's Judge. Subsequently, by amending Act 18 of 1981, for a period of 15 years, appellate power vested with the Session's Judge was transferred to the State Government by the legislature and hence appeal against confiscation under section 6-A(1) used to be filed before the State Government and were heard and decided by Secretary Food and Civil Supplies, Government of U.P., Lucknow. The amendment however, was for a fix term of 15 years and was infused with life on 1.9.1982 and, consequently, it lost it's efficacy on 31.8.1997. From that cut of date, the appeal against confiscation again became maintainable before the learned Session's Judge concerned. Since power to hear Essential Commodities Act cases was conferred on Special Judge (E.C. Act) and, therefore, under section 6-C of the E.C. Act, Special Judge (E.C. Act) became the appellate authority. In view of provisions of section 6-E, the Collector as well as Special Judge, can order for confiscation and release and consequently, there remains no doubt that learned Special Judge (E.C. Act) had got the power to order for release of the vehicle pending confiscation proceeding before the District Magistrate. This legal aspect is more than evident by a bare reading of section 6-E, whereunder following words have been incorporated "such essential commodity is seized pending confiscation under section 6A, the Collector, or, as the case may be, the State Government concerned under section 6C shall have, and ...........". The words "State Government", as noted above has been substituted with the words "Judicial Authority appointed by the State Government" and, therefore, the law as it stands today is that the District Magistrate or the Judicial Authority under section 6-C, Special Judge, E.C. Act, can order for such a release."
(3.) It is further contended that the Supreme Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat, 2003 AIR(SC) 638 was of the view that there is no use of keeping seized vehicles at the Police Station for a long period.? Para-15 of the said judgment reads as follows:
"15. In our view, whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep such-seized vehicles at the police stations for a long period. It is for the Magistrate to pass appropriate orders immediately by taking appropriate bond and guarantee as well as security for return of the said vehicles, if required at any point of time. This can be done pending hearing of applications for return of such vehicles.";