- (1.) Heard Sri Gaurav Kakkar, Sri S.D. Goswami, learned counsel for petitioners in support of their respective petitions, Sri Vimlendu Tripathi, learned A.G.A and perused the records.
(2.) Since common issues are involved in both the writ petitions, facts stated in Writ Petition No.6198/2015, is treated as a leading petition. Sri Tripathi, learned A.G.A. submits that there is no factual issue involved in the present petition, he does not propose to file any counter affidavit, instead has filed materials like police report and other documents, which are taken on record to which learned counsel for petitioners, have no objection. Thus, in terms of the Rules of the Court, both the petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment at the admission stage itself.
(3.) The moot question is whether petitioners could be proceeded under the provisions of U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 on the basis of a solitary case. The issue has arisen amidst the following backdrop. 1. The petitioner was confronted with a show-cause notice dated 16.12.2013, under Section 3 of U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (for short "the Act"), indicating his involvement in Case Crime No.125/2013, under Sections 307/120-B/34 IPC, P.S. Kotwali Nagar, Saharanpur, alleging that on 7.6.2013, he inflicted serious fire-arm injuries to the son of informant, which led to the filing of the charge-sheet. The petitioner contested the notice. The A.D.M. (F.R.), Saharanpur on 11.11.2014 confirmed the notice and passed an order of externment against the petitioner for six months. The petitioner unsuccessfully preferred an appeal on 27.1.2015. Challenging the orders dated 11.11.2014 and 27.1.2015, petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 2. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Act, the essential pre-requisite is that a person must be a "goonda" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, which in terms of the definition read with clause (i) thereof, indicates plurality of offences. Elaborating his submission, he contends that the word "habitually" in the context of Section 2(b)(i) of the Act, connotes repeat offences, thus it would be an antithesis to apply the provisions of the Act on the basis of a solitary case. He relies on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar and others, 1984 3 SCC 14and a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Imran @ Abdul Qudus Khan v. State of U.P. And others, 2000 CrLJ 1328. 3. Learned A.G.A. while opposing the submissions, contends that it is not the number of offences, but the impact of the crime, generated from a case that would determine the applicability of the provisions of the Act. He places reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Salem Hasan Khan, 1989 AIR(SC) 1304.;