- (1.) Criminal Appeal No. 3777 of 2002 has been filed by appellants Gyasi and Balkhandi and Criminal Appeal No. 3876 of 2002 has been filed by appellants Thakur Das, Hansraj and Dillan.
(2.) Since both the aforesaid criminal appeals arise out of a common judgment, as such, the same are being disposed of by a common judgment.
(3.) Challenge in these appeals is the judgment dated 6.9.2002 passed by learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mahoba in Sessions Trial No. 12 of 1999 and 11 of 1999, arising out of Case Crime No. 198 of 1998, Police Station Kulpahad, District Mahoba whereby the appellants were convicted as under:- (i) For the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C., all the appellants were convicted and sentenced with imprisonment for life and also with fine of Rs. 5,000/- each. With default stipulation of six months additional rigorous imprisonment. (ii) For the offence under Section 147 I.P.C. all the appellants were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year each and also with fine of Rs. 5,000/- each. With default stipulation of three months additional imprisonment. (iii) For the offence under Section 148 I.P.C., all the appellants were convicted and sentenced with imprisonment of one and a half year and also with fine of Rs. 1,000/- each. With default stipulation of three months rigorous imprisonment. (iv) For the offence under Section 201 I.P.C., all the appellants were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and also with fine of Rs. 1,500/-. With default stipulation of four months rigorous imprisonment. (v) For the offence under Section 3 (2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, all the appellants were convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and also with fine of Rs. 5,000/- each. With default stipulation of six months rigorous imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. However, appellants Thakur Das and Dillon were acquitted of the charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act and all the appellants were acquitted of the charge under Section 120-B I.P.C.;