Anil Kumar, J. - (1.) HEARD Sri Radhey Shyam Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Vinay Bhushan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for opposite parties No. 1 to 4 and perused the record.
(2.) SRI Vinay Bhushan, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that petitioner has not explained delay and laches thereby challenging the impugned order dated 3.10.1975 passed by opposite party No. 4/Consolidation Officer, Lambhua, District Sultanpur, so the present writ petition liable to be dismissed on the said ground.
(3.) AFTER hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the record, the position which emerge out that petitioners have not given satisfactory explanation rather no good ground has been given by the petitioners for approaching this Court at the belated stage so in view of the said fact as well as the law as laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy : (2012) 12 SCC 693, the relevant portion quoted herein below : - - "The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondent's explanation and condoned the delay by observing that there were some laches on the part of the counsel but the respondent cannot be penalised for the same. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard -and -fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay." In Collector (LA) v. Katiji : (1987) 2 SCC 107 this Court made a departure from the earlier judgments in which strict interpretation was placed on the expression "sufficient cause" and observed: "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -that being the life -purpose for the existence of the instruction of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: ORDINARILY a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. EVERY day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. WHEN substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non -deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. IT must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice -oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even -handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step -motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note -making, file -pushing, and passing -on -the -buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant -non -grata philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression 'sufficient cause'. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even -handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits." ;