- (1.) VINEET Saran, J. The petitioner was a Cashier working with the respondent-Bank. On the basis of a complaint made by one Noor Mohammad on 29-9-1987, the respondent-Bank issued a charge-sheet to the petitioner on 22-3-1988. The charge against the petitioner was of temporary embezzlement of a certain amount which was said to have been handed over to the petitioner by the complainant and had been deposited by him, not on the date when it was handed over but, on a subsequent date. Relying on the enquiry report, on 19-1-1990, the disciplinary authority passed an order imposing the punishment of removal of the petitioner from service. The appellate authority rejected the appeal of the petitioner on 23-4-1990. Against the said orders, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 13242 of 1990. On the ground that while rejecting the appeal no reasons had been assigned by the appellate authority, this Court allowed the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 17-5-1993. The matter was thus remanded back to the appellate authority for deciding the same afresh by a reasoned order, after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. By order dated 14-2-1994 the appellate authority again rejected the representation/appeal of the petitioner on the same grounds by which the earlier appeal had been rejected. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate authority, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 15263 of 1994. By judgment and order dated 26-4-2004, this Court again allowed the writ petition. After summarizing the contentions of the petitioner, for the second time, the matter was remanded back to the appellate authority to be decided afresh. The relevant concluding paragraphs of the judgment and order dated 26-4-2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 15263 of 1994 are quoted below: "it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that since the entire enquiry proceedings were vitiated on the following grounds: (a) the complainant was not examined, as is mandatory under Circular dated 20th June, 1987 wherein it is provided that cross-examination of the complainant is must (b) petitioner was permitted by the enquiry officer to cross-examine the witness including witness MW-1 on the next date vide order dated 19th September, 1988 however on 26th October, 1988 when the petitioner refused to cross-examine the MW-2 which according to the petitioner, is totally misconceived and contrary of the earlier order passed by the enquiry officer. The right of the petitioner to cross-examine the witness MW-1 could not be taken away, (c) the 2nd notice before imposition of the penalty had not been issued to the petitioner, which is mandatory (d) the punishment imposed is not commensurate to the charges levelled against the petitioner. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the said questions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The matter is being remanded to the appellate authority to decide the appeal afresh strictly in the light of the order of this Court dated 17th May, 1993 after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and after looking into the record in the presence of the petitioner. It is clarified that the contention raised by the petitioner, as noticed by this Court, shall necessarily be dealt with by the appellate authority while deciding the said appeal individually by means of the reasoned order. It will be open to the petitioner to raise such order pleas as he may be so advised. Since the matter is old, the said exercise may be undertaken by the appellate authority within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the Board of Directors. With the observations, referred to above, this petition is allowed. No order as to costs. "
(2.) AFTER the decision of the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioner submitted his representation before the appellate authority, alongwith the copy of the judgment. By the letter dated 10-9-2004, the decision of the Board of Directors (appellate authority) dated 23-7-2004 was communicated to the petitioner, whereby the appeal of the petitioner had again been rejected. The punishment imposed on the petitioner was "removal FROM SERVICES WHICH SHALL NOT BE A DISQUALIFICATION FOR FUTURe EMPLOYMENT". Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of the respondent-Bank, the petitioner has filed this writ petition with the following prayers: " (a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 19-1-90 (Annexure No. A) and order dated 2-7-04 (23-7-04) communicated vide letter dated 10-9-04 (Annexure No. 1); and/or, (b) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service by maintaining his continuity in service and with all consequential benefits; and/or, (c) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay the back wages to the petitioner with interest @18% p. a. ; and/or, (d) to issue any other writ, order or direction which may appear just & proper in the facts of the case; and/ or, (e) to award cost of the petition to the petitioner. " I have heard Sri Rakesh Bahadur, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri J. N. Tiwari, Senior Counsel assisted by Sri A. K. Saxena, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank and have perusal the record. The respondent Bank is a Regional Rural Bank established under the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. The functioning of the Bank, as well as its management and staff, are to be governed by the provisions of the said Act. To give effect to the provisions of the Act, Section 30 gives power to the Board of Directors of the concerned Regional Rural Bank to frame regulations (with the previous sanction of the Central Government ). Under the said provisions, the respondent-Bank has framed Aligarh Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1981 (for short 'regulations of 1981) which deal with the terms relating to the conditions of service of its staff. Having been framed under the Act of 1976, the Regulations of 1981 would thus have statutory force. The regional rural banks established under the Act of 1976 are also governed by the instructions and circulars of the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD ).
(3.) BY its circular dated 20th June, 1987 the NABARD had issued certain instructions to all the regional rural banks. The said circular was to be treated as guidelines for conduct of the disciplinary proceedings against the employees of the regional rural banks. The provisions of the said circular shall be referred to while dealing with the issues raised in this writ petition. Sri Tiwari urged that the circular or the guidelines of the NABARD would not be binding on the respondent as the bank has its own Service Regulations of 1981 which would govern the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the staff and employees of the bank. Sri Rakesh Bahadur, however, disputed the same and submitted that the circular would be binding on the Bank in so far as the said instructions were not inconsistent with the Regulations of 1981. In this regard reliance has been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Chandra Mohan Nigam, AIR 1977 S. C. 2411. In the said case the Court was dealing with a case of compulsory retirement and the question was as to whether the instructions issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs would have status of statutory rules or not. In this background, the Apex Court held that "it is sufficient for our purpose that these instructions do not violate any provision of the Act or of the rules. Rule 16 (3), being a rigorous rule, vis-a-vis a Government servant not himself willing to retire under Rule 16 (2), has to be invoked in a fair and reasonable manner. Since Rule 16 (3) itself does not contain any guidelines, directions or criteria, the instructions issued by the Government furnish an essential and salutary procedure for the purpose of securing uniformity in application of the rule. These instructions really fill up the yawning gaps in the provisions, and are embedded in the conditions of service. These are binding on the Government and cannot be violated to the prejudice of the Government servant (see also Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1968) 1 SCR 111: AIR 1967 SC 1910 and Union of India v. K. P. Joseph, (1973) 2 SCR 752 : AIR 1973 SC 303.;