- (1.) WE have heard learned Counsel for the appellant.
(2.) THE contention of the appellant which is an Insurance Company is that the deceased Harish Babu Rawat was not injured in the accident and he died in some other manner. We find from the impugned order that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has recorded the finding about the injury caused to Harish babu Rawat in the accident. On the basis of the statement of a witness Vikram Singh coupled with the post -mortem report of Harish Babu Rawat. The statement of Vikram Singh has been enclosed as the first Annexure to the supplementary affidavit. In the examination -in -chief, Vikram Singh has stated that he was present in the tempo at the time of accident and that he also received injuries as a result of the accident. These two facts have not been challenged at all in the cross -examination and, therefore, the presence of Vikram Singh at the time of accident in the tempo is admitted. Vikram Singh has also testified that Harish Babu Rawat was travelling in the same tempo at the time of the accident and that he received injuries as a result of the same accident. In the cross -examination on this point, there is merely a suggestion to the witness Vikram Singh that Harish Babu Rawat was not travelling in the tempo. The suggestion has been repelled by the witness. The trial Court has believed the testimony of this witness. We do not find any good reason to hold that the trial Court was not correct in relying upon this witness. Leaned Counsel for the appellant has argued that this witness Vikram Singh had given a different story in another statement given by the witness recorded else -where. This argument cannot be sustained in absence of putting the previous statement of the witness to him during the cross -examination and giving the witness an opportunity to explain, as required by Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872 for ready reference, the said Section is reproduced below: 145. Cross -examination as to previous statements in writing. - A witness may be cross -examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.
(3.) THE next argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is about the defence of contributory negligence. Learned Counsel has invited our attention to paragraphs 11(d) and 14 of the written statement. The only pleading in these two paragraphs is that the driver of the three -wheeler was also “negligence”. This is a mere conclusion or impression of the person filing the written statement. “Negligence” is a name/nomenclature of some sort of activities of a person in a single abbreviated and concluded form. The conclusion can be drawn only on the basis of full described activity of person attributed to be a negligent, such as, driving on the wrong side of the road, driving under intoxication, driving too fast under adverse traffic condition, etc. We find total lack of description of facts in the written statement which would go to indicate such negligence. Pleadings must contain facts and not merely the conclusion of the person submitting the pleading. It is only after pleading necessary facts which could lead to the inference of negligence, that those fact can be proved. The burden of proving contributory negligence is upon the person alleging the same. There can be no proof without pleading.;