- (1.) THE issue which is both interesting and significant that needs to be decided in these petitions is whether the goods manufactured and marketed by the petitioners as mosquito mats/coils or refills would fall under entry titled "pesticides and insecticides" in the notifications issued under section 3-A of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (for short, "the Act" ). Above three writ petitions have been taken up together and decided finally at the admission stage itself since all the respondents are represented by their respective counsel as contemplated under chapter XXII, rule 2, second proviso, Allahabad High Court Rules, "rules of the Court, 1952". Parties have exchanged pleadings by filing counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit and there is no dispute on relevant facts. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the question raised for adjudication in these writ petitions is the same and all the writ petitions may be decided by a common judgment. For convenience, we will wherever necessary, refer to the facts of the case of Writ Petition No. 1214 of 2005 [knight Queen Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of U. P. through Institutional Finance Secretary, U. P. Shasan, Lucknow] for the sake of convenience. Case of the petitioners : Contention of the petitioners is that in view of the notifications in question the goods manufactured and marketed by them, namely - "mosquito mat/coil or refill", fall under the goods covered by entry "pesticides and insecticides" and, therefore cannot be subjected to tax as an unclassified item under section 3-A (1) (c) of the Act. THE dispute is with respect to articles sold on or before September 1, 2001 and relates to the assessment years 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001, 2001-2002 (up to August 31, 2001 ). In order to appreciate the controversy, it may be useful to first reproduce section 3-A of the Act and it is as follows : " 3-A. Rates of tax.- (1) Except as provided in section 3-D, the tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be levied, - (a) on the turnover in respect of 'declared goods', at the point of sale to the consumer at the maximum rate for the time being specified in section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 or where the State Government, by notification, declares any other single point or a lesser rate, at such other point or at such lesser rate; (b) on the turnover in respect of goods, other than the goods referred to in clause (a), at such point and at such rate, not exceeding fifty per cent, as the State Government may, by notification, declare, and different points and different rates may be declared in respect of different goods; (c) on the turnover in respect of goods, other than those referred to in clause (a) or clause (b), at the point of sale by manufacturer or importer at the rate of ten per cent. (2) Every notification made under this section shall, as soon as may be after it is made, be laid before each House of the State Legislature, while it is in session, for a total period of not less than fourteen days, extending in its one session or more than one successive sessions, and shall, unless some later date is appointed, take effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette subject to such modifications or annulments as the two Houses of the Legislature may during the said period agree to make, so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder except that any imposition, assessment, levy or collection of tax or penalty shall be subject to the said notification or annulment. (3) Where the State Government has declared any point or rate at which the tax payable by a dealer under the Act be levied under clause (b), clause (c), clause (c-1), clause (d) or clause (e) of sub-section (1) as it existed immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 2000 and such declaration is in force on such commencement, such rate or point of tax shall continue to be in force after such commencement, until modified or rescinded. " THE tax is thus, payable at the rate mentioned in the relevant notifications issued by the State Government from time to time under section 3-A of the Act which have been filed as annexures 9, 10, 11 and 12 to the writ petition. (i) (Matter in Hindi ). (ii) "english Translation of Government Notification No. T. I. F.-2-2376/xi-9 (251)/97-U. P. Act-15-48-Order-98, dated 23rd November, 1998. In exercise of the powers under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 3-A of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV of 1948) read with section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1904) and in supersession of all previous notifications issued in this behalf, the Governor is pleased to declare that with effect from 1st December, 1998, the turnover in respect of the goods mentioned in column 2 of the List below shall be liable to tax at the point of sale specified in column 3 of said List at the rate specified against each in column 4 thereof. List M stands for sale by the manufacturer in Uttar Pradesh I stands for sale by the importer in Uttar Pradesh 1-62. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63. Pesticides and insecticides M or I 5% 64-70. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (iii) "english translation of Kar Avam Nibandhan Anubhag-2, Government Notification No. KA. NI-2-101/xi-9 (231)/94-U. P. Act-15-48-Order-2000, dated 15th January, 2000. In exercise of the powers under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 3-A of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV of 1948) read with section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904 (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1904) and in supersession of all previous notifications issued in this behalf, the Governor is pleased to declare that with effect from 17th January, 2000, the turnover in respect of the goods mentioned in column 2 of the List below shall be liable to tax at the point of sale specified in column 3 of said List at the rate specified against each in column 4 thereof. List M stands for sale by the Manufacturer in Uttar Pradesh I stands for sale by the Importer in Uttar Pradesh 1-60. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61. Pesticides and insecticides M or I 5% 62-66. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (iv) "ka. NI.-2-2596/xi-9 (51)/99-U. P. Act-15-48-Order- (37)-2001 dated August 27, 2001. In exercise of the powers under clause (a) of section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. 15 of 1948), the Governor is pleased to direct that with effect from September 1, 2001, no tax under the said Act shall be payable on the sale of the following goods : 1-4. . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Articles for destroying and repelling mosquitoes, whether they are used by electricity or not. " THE expression used in notifications mentioned at serial No. (i), (ii) and (iii) is identical namely "pesticides and insecticides" and there is no specific entry relating to the goods sold by the petitioners namely mosquito mats/mosquito coils or refills. According to the petitioners, goods sold by them are "insecticides" for following reasons : (i) Articles/goods sold by the petitioners, though used as household articles, is none the less house hold "insecticides" which fact is also mentioned on their products. (ii) THE chemical composition used in manufacturing the goods in question (though widely known and popularly understood as mosquito repellent) is allethrin which is an "insecticide". (iii) Whatever may be the trade name, the petitioners are using chemicals for manufacturing the finished goods which have been treated as "insecticides" under the provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968 and photostat copies of the certificate of registration of the licence issued under section 9 (4) of the Insecticide Act, 1968 have been placed before us. THE said certificate has been issued by Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Agriculture and Co-operation) Directorate of Plant Protection, Quarantine and Storage. A perusal of it leaves no scope of doubt that allethrin which is used in the product sold by the petitioners is "insecticide". (iv) Insecticides Rules, 1971 provides for the manner of labelling. Relevant rule 19 (4) of the Rules read - " 19 (4) THE upper portion of square, referred to in sub-rule (3) shall contain the following symbols and warning statements : (i) insecticides belonging to category I (extremely toxic) shall contain the symbol of a skull and cross-bones and the word "poison" printed in red; (a) 'keep OUT OF THE REACH OF CHILDREN'; (b) 'if SWALLOWED OR IF SYMPTOMS OF POISONING OCCUR, CALL PHYSICIAN IMMEDIATELY'. (ii) insecticides in category II (highly toxic) shall bear the word 'poison' printed in red and the statement 'keep out of reach of children', shall also appear on the label at suitable place outside the triangle; (iii) insecticides in category III (moderately toxic) shall bear the word 'danger' and the statement 'keep out of reach of children' shall also appear on the label at suitable place outside the triangle; (iv) insecticides in category IV (slightly toxic) shall bear the word 'caution'. " THE labelling/packing of the products in question is as per the aforequoted rule 19 (4) of Rules relating to insecticides. (v) D-Trans 'allethrin' and 'pallethrin' are used in manufacturing the goods which have been described as household 'insecticides' on their products as per the statutory requirement under the Insecticides Act. (vi) Learned single Judge in the case of Trade Tax Revision No. 334 of 1996 connected with Trade Tax Revision No. 338 of 1996, Commissioner of Trade Tax, U. P. v. Priya Distributor, Ghaziabad vide judgment and order dated February 20, 2003 following the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1994] 92 STC 117 (Orissa) and the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Transelektra Domestic Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1993] 90 STC 436 held that products in question (mosquito mat) is 'insecticide' and liable to tax accordingly. Special leave petition against the said judgment and order has been dismissed vide judgment and order dated February 23, 2004. (vii) In the absence of any specific entry relating to mosquito repellent/mosquito destroyer and at the same time there being an entry mentioning 'insecticides and pesticides', it cannot be said that an ordinary person will not ordinarily understand the product of the petitioners falling under category of the 'insecticides and pesticides'. According to the petitioners it could have been entirely different if the Schedule provided for two entries, namely, 'insecticides and pesticides' and also mosquito repellent/mosquito destroyer because in such a situation articles in question would fall in the category of mosquito repellent/mosquito destroyer as also held by the apex Court in the case of Sonic Electrochem v. Sales Tax Officer [1998] 111 STC 181; STI 1998 SC 63. Case of the respondents : THE above contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners have been repudiated by Sri S. P. Kesarwani, Advocate, representing the respondents on the basis of the pleadings contained in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit, sworn by Rajesh Kumar Jain, Deputy Commissioner (Assessment), Ghaziabad, relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced : " 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In the instant writ petition the petitioner has taken the stand that mosquito repellent coil and mats sold by him are insecticide and not the mosquito repellent (unclassified item ). THE following facts and evidences available on record clearly demonstrate that the mosquito repellant coil and mats are not insecticides or pesticides but repellent and thus are unclassified item liable to tax at 10 per cent : (a) THE petitioner applied for registration under section 8a of the Act in 'form 14' wherein in column 7 he has mentioned the commodity traded as 'mosquito repellent mats/coils etc. '. Similarly under section 7 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Central Act') the petitioner applied for registration in 'form A' wherein in column 16 he has mentioned the purchase and sale of 'mosquito repellent mats/coils, etc. '. THE registration under the Act as well as under the Central Act were granted to the petitioner for trading of the aforesaid commodities. THE registration numbers of the petitioner under the Act and the Central Act are UPTT No. GC-0060571 dated August 6, 1998 and CST No. GC-5035410 dated August 6, 1998. A true copy of the registration application certificate dated April 2, 1998 'form 14' under the Central Act and registration certificate dated January 2, 1999 'form B' under the Central Act are being annexed to this counter-affidavit and marked as annexure Nos. CA-5 and CA-6 respectively. (b) Under rule 41 (1) of the U. P. Trade Tax Rules, 1948 (hereinafter refers to as 'the Rules') the petitioner regularly filed monthly returns in 'form 4' wherein he had clearly mentioned the commodities sold by him as 'mosquito repellent mats/coils, etc. '. THE petitioner always accepted the aforesaid commodities traded by him as repellents and not as insecticides or pesticides. True copies of monthly returns in form 4 all along with its annexure I for the months of March 1999 (relating to assessment year 1998-99), June 1999 (relating to assessment year 1999-2000), May 2000 (relating to assessment year 2000-01) and April 2001 (relating to assessment year 2001-02) are being annexed as exemplars and marked as annexure No. CA-7, CA-8, CA-9 and CA-10 respectively. (c) Under rule 41 (7) of the Rules the petitioner filed annual returns dated December 6, 2000 (assessment year 1998-99), dated January 16, 2002 (assessment year 1999-2000), dated January 6, 2003 (assessment year 2000-01) and dated February 19, 2004 (assessment year 2001-02), wherein in columns 6 and 23 he disclosed the class of goods dealt in as 'mosquito repellent mats/coils/liquid and machine, etc. '. Here also there is no allegation or whisper of the commodities sold by the petitioner to be insecticide or pesticide. True copies of form ST-47 submitted by the petitioner under rule 41 (7) of the Rules for the assessment year 1998-99 dated December 6, 2000, assessment year 1999-2000 dated January 16, 2002, assessment year 2000-01 dated January 6, 2003 and assessment year 2001-02 dated February 19, 2004 are being annexed to this counter-affidavit and are marked as annexure No. CA-11, CA-12, CA-13 and CA-14 respectively. (d) THE aforesaid commodities 'mosquito repellent mats/coils, etc. ' were imported by the petitioner from outside the State of U. P. through 'declaration form for import' under the Act (form-31) and in all such forms the petitioner disclosed the commodities imported by him for sale in the State of U. P. as 'repellents' and not insecticides and pesticides. True copies of declaration form No. F/ff-0423785 (relating to assessment year 1998-99), No. F/ff-0423788 (relating to assessment year 1999-2000) and form No. F/ff-4179800 (relating to assessment year 2000-01) are being annexed to this counter-affidavit and are collectively marked as annexure No. CA-15. (e) THE petitioner has always been selling the commodities in question as 'repellent' and not as insecticides or pesticides and the buyers has always been purchasing the aforesaid commodities as 'repellents' and not insecticides or pesticides which fact is further evident from the own invoices of the petitioner. True copies of invoice No. 297 dated March 14, 2001, invoice No. 308 dated March 16, 2001, invoice No. 314 dated March 17, 2001, invoice No. 330 dated March 23, 2001 and invoice No. 332 dated March 23, 2001 are being annexed to this counter-affidavit as exemplars in which the petitioner has mentioned the commodities in question as 'repellent' and not an insecticide or pesticide and the same are collectively marked as annexure No. CA-16. (f) THE customers of the petitioners are not dealing in insecticides or pesticides, but they are dealing/trading general merchandise goods like soap, shampoo, paper candle and cosmetics, etc. , which facts are evident from the certificate obtained from assessing authorities of two dealers buying the petitioner's goods in question. True copies of certificates dated September 15, 2005 and September 16, 2005 issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Sector-6, Trade Tax, Ghaziabad and Assistant Commissioner, Sector-4, Trade Tax, Ghaziabad in respect of dealers of their jurisdiction, i. e. , M/s. Agrawal Traders and M/s. Kusum Distributors respectively are collectively marked as annexure No. 17. (g) THE petitioner has not disclosed in the writ petition the composition of its product. THE answering respondents/assessing authority has collected the paper packing of the repellent sold by the petitioner under the brand name of 'knight Queen Red Mega Coil' in which the composition is mentioned as Allethrin a. i. 0. 2 per cent w/w and other ingredients 99. 8 per cent w/w. In the same packing it is mentioned that 'light the coil and place in the center of a closed room. Open the windows after about 20 minutes and mosquitoes will rush out'. In this packing material it is also mentioned that no symptoms of poisoning have been observed in use of coil. A photostat/true copy of the aforesaid packing material of 'knight Queen Red Mega Coil' is being annexed to this counter-affidavit and is marked as annexure No. CA-18. (h) That in paragraph No. 21 of the writ petition the petitioner himself has admitted that 'right from 1997 till August 27, 2001 there was no specific entry of mosquito repellent articles'. Thus according to the admission by the petitioner the commodity in question is not relatable to any specific entry of the notifications issued under section 3a (1) (a) or (b) of the Act and as such it is an unclassified item under section 3a (1) (c) of the Act. " (ii) Learned counsel for the respondents has further pointed out that in respect of Writ Petition No. 1214 of 2005 filed by M/s. Knight Queen Industries pursuant to the notice issued under section 21 of the Act, the assessment order was made on August 30, 2005 during the pendency of the petition and apart from the fact that it has not been challenged, an appeal lies against the said order and so the petition should not be entertained. (iii) Learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to the statement of Pawan Kumar Agrawal recorded on December 15, 2004 wherein he admitted that the products of his company was used for repelling mosquito, and as such it is a mosquito repellent and the same was subjected to tax treating it to be a product against "insecticides and pesticides", prior to September 1, 2001. Reasons : Learned counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on a number of decisions of the honourable Supreme Court and various High Courts including our court in support of their respective contentions. We consider it proper to first examine these decisions in order to find out whether mosquito mats, coils and refills would be "insecticides". In Sonic Electrochem v. Sales Tax Officer [1998] 111 STC 181; STI 1998 SC 63 the honourable Supreme Court examined whether Jet mat would come within entry No. 129 of Schedule II, Part A of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. THE said entry gave the description of goods as "mosquito repellents". It was sought to be argued on behalf the appellant that Jet mat was an "insecticide" and not a repellent, whereas on behalf of the Revenue it was sought to be argued that the product was nothing but a mosquito repellent and a repellant does not cease to be so merely because by its action mosquitoes are also killed. It is in this context that the Supreme Court observed : ". . . . . . . In view of the specific entry 129 dealing with mosquito repellents it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the product in question will not come within the ambit of entry 129 since one of its constituents 'd-Allethrin 4 per cent' happens to be an insecticide. THE product Jet mat which is the trade name containing 'd-Allethrin 4 per cent' and is commercially known as "mosquito repellent mat" in our considered opinion is a mosquito repellent notwithstanding the fact that it not only repels the mosquitoes but also is capable of killing the mosquitoes. It is difficult to hold that it is an insecticide entitled for partial exemption under entry 98 of the notification. . . . . . . . . . . " In Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur (1996) 9 SCC 402 the Supreme Court observed : ". . . . . . . . . . THE Tribunal rightly points out that in interpreting statutes like the Excise Act the primary object of which is to raise revenue and for which purpose various products are differently classified, resort should not be had to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms and expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those using the product. It is for this reason that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that scientific and technical meanings would not advance the case of the appellants if the same runs counter to how the product is understood in popular parlance. . . . . . . . . . . . . " In Commissioner of Central Excise v. Sharma Chemical Works [2003] 132 STC 251; (2003) 5 SCC 60 the Supreme Court observed as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mere fact that a product is sold across the counters and not under a doctor's prescription, does not by itself lead to the conclusion that it is not a medicament. We are also in agreement with the submission of Mr. Lakshmikumaran that merely because the percentage of medicament in a product is less, does not ipso facto mean that the product is not a medicament. Generally the percentage or dosage of the medicament will be such as can be absorbed by the human body. THE medicament would necessarily be covered by fillers/vehicles in order to make the product usable. It could not be denied that all the ingredients used in Banphool oil are those which are set out in the Ayurveda text books. Of course, the formula may not be as per the text books but a medicament can also be under a patented or proprietary formula. THE main criteria for determining classification is normally the use it is put to by the customers who use it. THE burden of proving that Banphool oil is understood by the customers as an hair oil was on the Revenue. This burden is not discharged as no such proof is adduced. On the contrary we find that the oil can be used for treatment of headache, eye problem, night blindness, reeling head, weak memory, hysteria, amnesia, blood pressure, insomnia, etc. THE dosages required are also set out on the label. THE product is registered with Drug Controller and is being manufactured under a drug licence. " In Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta v. Pt. D. P. Sharma Chemical Works (2003) 5 SCC 288, the question that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether "himtaj oil" was "ayurvedic medicament" or not classifiable or a "perfumed hair oil". THE court negatived the argument that the product could not be considered to be a drug because it was not prescribed by a medical practitioner and was one which could be used for long period. It was held that the test was to find out what persons using the product understood it to be and on the basis of the evidence produced by the manufacturer that common man understood the product as a medicine, it was held that the product was a medicament. THE aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Baidyanath (1996) 9 SCC 402 and D. P. Sharma (2003) 5 SCC 288 were considered by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decision in the case of Dabur India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur (2005) 4 SCC 9 wherein the Supreme Court held : " From the abovementioned authorities, it is clear that in classifying a product the scientific and technical meaning is not to be resorted to. THE product must be classifiable according to the popular meaning attached to it by those using the product. As stated above, in this case the appellants have shown that all the ingredients in the product are those which are mentioned in Ayurvedic textbooks. This by itself may not be sufficient but the appellants have shown that they have a Drug Controller's licence for the product and they have also produced evidence by way of prescriptions of Ayurvedic doctors, who have prescribed these for treatment of rickets. As against this, the Revenue has not made any effort and not produced any evidence that in common parlance the product is not understood as a medicament. " In Collector of Central Excise v. Fusebase Eltoto Ltd. AIR 1994 SC 1289; [1993] 67 ELT 30 (SC), the Supreme Court observed as follows : " THE Tribunal did not touch the question as to how the product called 'broadcast television receiver set' is identified by the class or section of people dealing with or using the product. That is the test to be followed when the relevant notifications do not contain any definition of the products. THE identity of an article is associated with its primary function and utility. THE names of certain products have functional association in the mind of the consumers. THEre is a mental association in the mind of the consumer in respect of certain products keeping in view the utility of the product and also the reputation the name of the product has acquired in the market and among the consumers. 'broadcast television receiver sets' and the 'projection television sets' are two entirely different products and the consumers in this country, as at present, do not identify these two as one and the same product. When you go to the market to buy a 'television set' you mean the conventional 'broadcast Television Receiver set' and the dealer will never understand you to mean the 'hotline Projector Vision 203 etc'. " In Atul Glass Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise [1986] 63 STC 322; (1986) 25 ELT 473 (SC) the Supreme Court observed as follows : " THE test commonly applied to such cases is : How is the product identified by the class or section of people dealing with or using the product ? That is a test which is attracted whenever the statute does not contain any definition. Porritts and Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1978] 42 STC 433 (SC); (1983) 13 ELT 1607 (SC ). It is generally by its functional character that a product is so identified. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. v. Macneill and Barry Ltd. [1986] 61 STC 76 (SC); (1985) 2 Scale 1093; (1986) 23 ELT 5 (SC) this Court expressed the view that ammonia paper and ferro paper, used for obtaining prints and sketches of site plans could not be described as paper as that word was used in common parlance. On the same basis the Orissa High Court held in State of Orissa v. Gestetner Duplicators (P.) Ltd. [1974] 33 STC 333 that stencil paper could not be classified as paper for the purposes of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. It is a matter of common experience that the identity of an article is associated with its primary function. It is only logical that it should be so. When a consumer buys an article, he buys it because it performs a specific function for him. THEre is a mental association in the mind of the consumer between the article and the need it supplies in his life. It is the functional character of the article which identifies it in his mind. In the case of a glass mirror, the consumer recalls primarily the reflective function of the article more than anything else. It is a mirror, an article which reflects images. It is referred to as a glass mirror only because the word 'glass' is descriptive of the mirror in that glass has been used as a medium for manufacturing the mirror. THE basic or fundamental character of the article lies in its being a mirror. It was observed by this Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [1980] 46 STC 256 (SC); [1980] 3 SCR 1109; [1980] 6 ELT 383 (SC) which was a case under the sales tax law : 'in determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article or commodity the turnover of which is taxed in a sales tax enactment, if there is one principle fairly well-settled it is that the words or expressions must be construed in the sense in which they are understood in the trade, by the dealer and the consumer. It is they who are concerned with it, and it is the sense in which they understand it that constitutes the definitive index of the legislative intention when the statute was enacted. ' That was also the view expressed in Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [1985] 22 ELT 3. Where the goods are not marketable that principle of construction is not attracted. Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. Union of India ([1987] 64 STC 180 (SC) ). (1985) 3 SCC 284; [1985] 21 ELT 3 (SC ). THE question whether thermometers, lactometers, syringes, eye-wash glasses and measuring glasses could be described as 'glassware' for the purpose of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, was answered by the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Janata Medical Stores [1976] 37 STC 33 in the negative. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Indo International Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. [1981] 47 STC 359 (SC); [1981] 3 SCR 294; [1981] 8 ELT 325 (SC), where hypodermic clinical syringes were regarded as falling more accurately under the entry relating to 'hospital equipment and apparatus' rather than under the entry which related to 'glasswares' in the U. P. Sales Tax Act. . . . . . . . . . . It is pointed out that glass mirrors have been classified by the Indian Standards Institution as 'glass and glassware' in the glossary of terms prepared by it in respect of that classification. That, to our mind, furnishes a piece of evidence only as to the manner in which the product has been treated for the purpose of the specifications laid down by the Indian Standards Institution. It was a test employed by this Court in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 586; [1997] 1 ELT J199 (SC) but was regarded as supportive material only of the expert opinion furnished by way of evidence in that case. THE considerations to which we have adverted should, in our opinion, have greatly weighed in deciding the question raised in this appeal. So also in Union Carbide Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise [1978] 2 ELT 180 (Cal), the description set forth in the publications of the Indian Standards Institution was regarded as a piece of evidence only. THEre were other more tangible considerations which weighed with the court in reaching its conclusions. We are firmly of the view that glass mirrors cannot be classified as 'other glass and glassware' set forth in tariff item No. 23a (4), and must therefore, fall under the residuary tariff item No. 68. " THE Supreme Court in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola [1961] 12 STC 286 observed as follows : " Thus under the Act all articles mentioned in the Schedule were exempt from sales tax and articles not so specified were taxable. In the Schedule applicable there were originally two items which are relevant for the purposes of the case. THEy were items Nos. 6 and 36 : Item 6 'vegetables - Except when sold in sealed containers'. Item 36 'betel leaves'. THE Schedule was amended by the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act (Act XVI of 1948) by which item No. 36 was omitted. It is contended that in spite of this omission they were exempt from sales tax as they are vegetables. THE intention of the Legislature in regard to what is vegetables is shown by its specifying vegetables and betel leaves as separate items in the Schedule exempting articles from sales tax. Subsequently betel leaves were removed from the Schedule which is indicative of the Legislature's intention of not exempting betel leaves from the imposition of the tax. But it was submitted that betel leaves are vegetables and therefore, they would be exempt from sales tax under item 6. Reliance was placed on the dictionary meaning of the word 'vegetable' as given in Shorter Oxford Dictionary where the word is defined as 'of or pertaining to, comprised or consisting of, or derived, or obtained from plants or their parts'. But this word must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning 'that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it'. It is to be construed as understood in common language : Craies on Statute Law, page 153 (5th Edition ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THErefore apart from the fact that the Legislature by using two distinct and different items, i. e. , item No. 6 'vegetables' and item No. 36 'betel leaves', has indicated its intention, decided cases also show that the word "vegetables" in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance, i. e. , denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table. " In Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; AIR 1977 SC 597, the Supreme Court observed as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is clear that meanings given to articles in a fiscal statute must be as people in trade and commerce, conversant with the subject, generally treat and understand them in the usual course. But once an article is classified and put under a distinct entry, the basis of the classification is not open to question. Technical and scientific tests offer guidance only within limits. Once the articles are in circulation and come to be described and known in common parlance, we then see no difficulty for statutory classification under a particular entry. It is not for the court to determine for itself under article 136 of the Constitution under which item a particular article falls. It is best left to the authorities entrusted with the subject. But where the very basis of the reason for including the article under a residuary head in order to charge higher duty is foreign to a proper determination of this kind, this Court will be loath to say that it will not interfere. " In Deputy Commissioner (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes) v. M. R. F. Ltd. [2001] 121 STC 274 (SC); 2000 UPTC 754, the Supreme Court observed : " It is the contention of the Revenue that compounded rubber is not a finished rubber product and that the word 'finished' must be understood as the last or concluding product in a chain. We are of the view that due weight must be given to the uncontested evidence of those in the trade who have stated that compounded rubber is understood in that trade as a finished rubber product and that, accordingly, the Tribunal and the High Court cannot be faulted for the view that they took in this behalf. . . . . . . . . . . THE next item that we are concerned with is the scrap that was sold by the respondent. THE scrap consisted of butyl rubber, banbury tailings, brass valves, empty drums and gunny bags. THE Tribunal found, taking into consideration the nature of the articles and the manner in which they were sold, that they had been treated as condemned articles and not as articles which could be put to use again and, accordingly, should be treated as scrap. It was contended on behalf of the Revenue that each of these items of butyl rubber, banbury tailings, etc. , should have been assessed under the particular tariff entry in which they fell and that the Tribunal was in error in taking into account the intention of the buyer and the seller in this behalf. It was not only the intention of the buyer and the seller that was taken into account but the nature of the articles that were being sold and, obviously, the Tribunal was satisfied that they were really no more than scrap and found that they should be taxed accordingly. THE High Court was, therefore, right in not interfering. " In Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Swastik Woollens (P.) Ltd. [1989] 72 STC 201; 1988 UPTC 1284 the Supreme Court observed : " 4. We are of the opinion that when no statutory definition is provided in respect of an item in the Customs Act or the Central Excises Act, the trade understanding, meaning thereby the understanding in the opinion of those who deal with the goods in question is the safest guide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " In MSCO Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1985 SC 76; [1985] 19 ELT 15 (SC) the Supreme Court observed : " 4. THE expression 'industry' has many meanings. It means 'skill', 'ingenuity', 'dexterity', 'diligence', 'systematic work or labour', 'habitual employment in the productive arts', 'manufacturing establishment', etc. But while construing a word which occurs in a statute or a statutory instrument in the absence of any definition in that very document it must be given the same meaning which it receives in ordinary parlance or understood in the sense in which people conversant with the subject-matter of the statute or statutory instrument understand it. It is hazardous to interpret a word in accordance with its definition in another statute or statutory instrument and more so when such statute or statutory instrument is not dealing with any cognate subject. . . . . . . 5. When the word to be construed is used in a taxing statute or a notification issued thereunder it should be understood in its commercial sense. . . . . . . . . . " In Goel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. , Lucknow [1971] 28 STC 729; 1971 UPTC 697, the Allahabad High Court observed as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE short question involved in this case is as to whether ice and water are the same thing. It is true that ice is manufactured from water without addition of any chemical or substance. THE chemical composition of ice and that of water is the same, but even then ice cannot be regarded as water. It is a matter of common experience that while water is generally available free, ice is always sold in the market. It is now well-settled that unless it is defined in the Act or the Rules, a term in the Sales Tax Act must be interpreted in a sense in which it is understood generally and in the commercial world and not in a technical sense. Chemically, ice and water may have the same composition, but in commercial and popular sense they are different commodities. " THE principles that emerge from the decisions referred to above are that while interpreting statutes like the Trade Tax Act, the primary object of which is to raise revenue and for which purpose various products are differently classified, resort should not be had to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms and expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those using the product; that merely because the percentage of medicament in a product is less does not also ipso facto mean that the product is not a medicament; that the main criterion for determining classification is normally the use it is put to by the customers who use it; that there is a mental association in the mind of the consumer in respect of certain products keeping in view the utility of the product and also the reputation the name of the product has acquired in the market and amongst the consumers; that when a consumer buys an article, he buys it because it performs a specific function for him; and that it is not for the court to determine for itself under which item a particular article falls, and it should be best left to the authorities entrusted with the subject, but where the very basis for including the article under a residuary head in order to charge higher duty is foreign to a proper determination of this kind, the court will be loath to hold that it will not interfere. We shall now examine the decisions which deal with "insecticides and pesticides". In Sonic Electrochem (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1994] 92 STC 117, the Orissa High Court considered whether "mosquito repellent mats" which admittedly were "insecticides", were entitled to exemption as "pesticides" and it observed : ". . . . . . . . . . THE authorities having exempted 'pesticides' from the levy of tax in exercise of powers under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act without having any limitation with regard to the kind of pesticides, it is difficult for us to give a limited meaning to the aforesaid expression 'pesticides'. In our considered opinion, 'insecticide' being also a species of 'pesticides' would be entitled to the exemption from levy of tax in view of the notification of the State Government under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and since the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that the goods manufactured by the assessee are 'insecticide', the said item is entitled to exemption in question. . . . . . . . . " In Transelektra Domestic Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Porur Assessment Circle, Madras [1993] 90 STC 436, the Madras High Court considered whether mosquito mats marketed under brand name "good Knight" could be treated as "insecticides" and consequently fall under item No. 66 of the Schedule to the Act. It is in this context that High Court observed : " 5. On going through the decision of the Tribunal, I am in entire agreement with the line of reasoning adopted therein. Even that apart, the entry No. 66 of the First Schedule to the Act while describing the various commodities as falling within it refers to insecticides generally and not with or of any particular percentage of combination or composition. As a matter of fact, the concluding portion of the entry 'and combinations thereof' without prescribing any particular percentage is an indicator that what was envisaged therein is that the product may be an insecticide simpliciter or a combination of an insecticide to bring it within the meaning of the entry and it need not necessarily be of any particular percentage of combination of any one or more of the category of goods referred to in the entry. THE stand taken to the contra for the Revenue is wholly misconceived. . . . . . . . . . " It may be relevant to point out that the Madras High Court in the aforesaid case of Transelektra Domestic Products [1993] 90 STC 436 had placed strong reliance upon the observations made by the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal in Transelektra Domestic Products Limited v. Inspector of Commercial Taxes [1992] 86 STC 497 wherein it was observed : ". . . . . . . . . In trade circle the mat is Understood as an insecticide in view of the existence of the label on the package 'd-Allethrin 4 per cent mosquito mat insecticide'. THE traders deal with insecticides in accordance with the provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968. THE preamble to that Act shows that Insecticides Act, 1968, is for regulating the import, manufacture, sale, transport, distribution and use of insecticides. We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968, for the purpose of showing that nobody can deal with insecticides otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Insecticides Act. Accordingly, we are to hold that mat manufactured by the applicant is understood in commercial parlance or trade circle as an insecticide and as such it will be governed by the Act of 1954. . . . . . . . . " In Transelektra Domestic Products Private Limited v. State of Kerala [2001] 122 STC 229, the Kerala High Court also considered whether mosquito repellent mats manufactured in the name "good Knight" and "banish" could be classified as "insecticides" for the purpose of levying sales tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and after placing reliance on the Madras High Court in the aforesaid case of Transelektra Domestic Products [1993] 90 STC 436 observed : " 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . THEse goods are covered by the provisions of the Insecticides Act and these goods can be classified in a specific entry and cannot be included in unclassified items. When we can attach a parentage to a product it need not be sent to orphanage, that is residuary entry as held by the Supreme Court in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241. Since the mosquito repellent mat contains insecticide allethrin chemicals, which is manufactured and sold under licence issued under the Insecticides Act and it will fatally affect the nervous system of mosquitoes, we are of the opinion that it can be classified as an insecticide till it was specifically classified from April 1, 1991 onwards. Government specifically classified mosquito repellent mat as coming under entry 123b from April 1, 1991 under item 85 from April 1, 1992 making it a single point rate. " A learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Commissioner, Trade Tax v. Priya Distributor (Trade Tax Revision No. 334 of 1996 connected with Trade Tax Revision No. 338 of 1996) (Commissioner of Trade Tax, U. P. v. Priya Distributor, Ghaziabad) considered whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was justified in holding that mosquito mats fall under the category of "insecticides". THE court placed reliance upon the decision of the Madras High Court and Orissa High Court in the case of Transelektra Domestic Products [1993] 90 STC 436 and Sonic Electrochem [1994] 92 STC 117 respectively and held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that mosquito mats fall under category "insecticides" and liable to tax accordingly. Special Leave Petitions No. 13187 of 2003 and 17018 of 2003 against the aforesaid decisions dated February 20, 2003 in TTR No. 334 of 1996 and in TTR No. 338 of 1996 were filed. Both the SLPs. were dismissed on February 23, 2004 and the order passed by the Supreme Court is quoted below : " We see no reason to interfere. THE special leave petitions are dismissed. " However, in Commissioner of Trade Tax, U. P. , Lucknow v. Britania Agencies (2004) 36 STJ 67 and Commissioner of Trade Tax, U. P. , Lucknow v. Hindu Super Store [2006] 145 STC 223; (2004) 36 STJ 76 another learned single Judge of this Court took a contrary view and held that "kachuwa Chap Agarbatti" was a mosquito repellent and not an "insecticide" or "pesticide". In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the court placed reliance upon those decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it was held that entries in sales tax should not be construed in any technical sense but in a manner as understood in common parlance and then concluded that "good Knight" mats have been treated by persons dealing with it as "repellent". Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, the material on record and examination of the facts of these petitions, we find from the pleadings that articles/goods sold by the petitioners, though used as household articles, are nevertheless household "insecticide" which fact is also mentioned on their products. THE chemical composition used in manufacturing the goods in question (though widely known and popularly understood as mosquito repellent) is allethrin which is an "insecticide". THE petitioners are using chemicals for manufacturing the finished goods which have been treated as "insecticides" and under the provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968 a certificate has been issued by Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture which leaves no scope of doubt that allethrin which is used in the product sold by the petitioners is "insecticide". Insecticides Rules, 1971 provides for the manner of labeling. Labelling/packing of the products of the petitioner is as per the aforequoted rule 19 (4) of the Rules. D-Trans "allethrin" and "pallethrin" are used in manufacturing the goods which have been described as household "insecticides" on their products as per the statutory requirement under the Insecticides Act. In the absence of any specific entry relating to mosquito repellent/mosquito destroyer and at the same time there being an entry mentioning "insecticides", it can reasonably be said that an ordinary person will ordinarily understand the product of the petitioners falling under category of the "insecticides". THEse facts coupled with the principles enunciated in the decisions referred to above leave us in no doubt that the products sold by the petitioners are basically in the categories of "insecticides" particularly in the absence of any indication in the notification in question. It has, however, been urged by Sri Kesarwani, learned counsel for the Revenue that the petitioner applied for registration under section 8a of the Act "form 14" wherein in column 7 it has been mentioned that the commodity traded is "mosquito repellent mats/coils, etc. ". Similarly under section 7 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the petitioner applied for registration in form-A wherein in column 16 it has been mentioned that the purchase and sales of "mosquito repellent mats/coils, etc. ". We are, however, unable to persuade ourselves to hold that merely because the petitioners have at various stages contended that the product is described or commonly traded as "mosquito repellent" it should not fall in the category of "insecticides". We would have accepted such a contention if there was separate or specific exclusion entry of "mosquito repellant" in the existing entry of "pesticide and insecticide". In that case there would have been no difficulty but in the absence of specific mention as indicated above, the product in question falls under the entry "insecticides". THE percentage of "allethrin" used in the product, is of no consequence at all, since it is admittedly an "insecticide". We entirely agree with the view taken by the Madras High Court in Transelektra Domestic Products Pvt. Ltd. [1993] 90 STC 436, and by the Kerala High Court in Transelektra Domestic Products Pvt. Ltd. [2001] 122 STC 229. THE learned Judge in Priya Distributor (T. T. R. Nos. 334 and 338 of 1996 decided on February 20, 2003 - Allahabad High Court) had also placed reliance upon the said decisions. Sri S. P. Kesarwani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, also urged that Writ Petition No. 1214 of 2005 has become infructuous inasmuch as pursuant to the notice dated July 21, 2005 issued under section 21 of the Act, the proceedings were finalised and the assessment order was passed on August 30, 2005 and was also served upon the petitioner along with demand notice. It is true that the petitioner was required to challenge the assessment order dated August 30, 2005 but since the main question whether the "good Knight mats" are "insecticides" or not is required to be examined in the other two writ petitions, we consider it appropriate to decide all the matters and do not intend to dismiss Writ Petition No. 1214 of 2005 on this ground. It was also urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners have sought the quashing of the notices issued under section 21 (2) of the Act and so these petitions should not be entertained at this stage. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, urged that notices issued under section 21 (2) of the Act are liable to be quashed since they are based upon the decisions rendered by this Court in the case of Britania Agencies (2004) 36 STJ 67 and Hindu Super Store [2006] 145 STC 223; (2004) 36 STJ 76 which decisions are contrary to the earlier decision of this Court in the matter of Priya Distributor (T. T. R. Nos. 334 and 338 of 1996 decided on February 20, 2003 ). Learned counsel submitted that decisions of this Court in Britania Agencies (2004) 36 STJ 67 and Hindu Super Store [2006] 145 STC 223; (2004) 36 STJ 76 do not lay down the correct law and therefore it would be in the interest of all concerned that this matter is decided by this Court, particularly when there is already decision of this Court in the matter of Priya Distributor (T. T. R. Nos. 334 and 338 of 1996 decided on February 20, 2003) holding to the contrary. Taking into consideration the overall facts and circumstances, we consider it appropriate to decide the issue and matter finally at this stage and reject the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, that the petitioners seeks to challenge, at this stage, show cause notice issued under section 21 (2) of the Act. In view of the above discussion, all the above writ petitions are liable to succeed. In Writ Petition No. 1214 of 2005 the order dated March 9, 2005 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Trade Tax (annexure 14 to the writ petition) and the consequent notices dated July 21, 2005 (annexure 23 to the petition), in writ petition No. 584 of 2005 the order dated March 18/19, 2005 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Trade Tax (annexure 15 to the petition) and the notices dated March 19, 2005 (annexure 24 to the petition), in Writ Petition No. 651 of 2005 the order dated March 19, 2005 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Trade Tax (annexure 17 to the petition) and the notices dated March 21, 2005 (annexure 26 to the petition) are hereby quashed. All the above Writ Petitions Nos. 1214 of 2005, 584 of 2005 and 651 of 2005 are allowed. THEre shall be, however, in the facts of the case, no orders as to costs. Writ petitions allowed. .;