- (1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Standing Counsel. In view of exchange of counter and rejoinder affidavits and as per Rules of the court the present petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. The petitioner, by this petition, seeks quashing of the order dated January 19, 1989, passed by the Divisional Level Committee, respondent No. 2, rejecting the review application (annexure "8" to the writ petition) and further seeks mandamus for granting of exemption which according to the petitioner is from the date of first sale, i. e. , July 3, 1985. The brief facts in this case are that the petitioner earlier applied for granting of eligibility certificate under section 4a of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The claim of the petitioner is that it was entitled for the grant of said exemption for a period of five years and the Divisional Level Committee without making any proper enquiry granted the said exemption for a period of three years with effect from December 31, 1984, whereas according to the petitioner the date of first sale was July 3, 1985. Thus the petitioner claims it was entitled to exemption from July 3, 1985. The contention of the petitioner is that the finding to the effect that the production started on December 31, 1984, was wrong. It should have been July 3, 1985. The petitioner thereafter filed a review application before respondent No. 2. It is further averred that on December 31, 1984, the installation of electricity was only for 5 h. p. , which was only for the purpose of testing the machines, etc. , but the manufacturing process could not be started since it required 35 h. p. of electricity which was only sanctioned on July 2, 1985. Hence the production started from that date and the first sale was only made on July 3, 1985. The further contention raised in the review application was that since the investment in the production unit was more than Rs. 3 lacs the petitioner was entitled for grant of exemption for a period of five years. In spite of request no opportunity of hearing was given and the review application was rejected by means of the impugned order dated January 19, 1989, treating the date of production as March 9, 1985 and holding that since the investment of Rs. 74,763. 31, in the unit was less than Rs. 3 lacs on this date, hence the petitioner is entitled for exemption for three years only. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the review application of the petitioner has been rejected by respondent No. 2 on new ground which was not taken earlier, hence the said finding is not sustainable. We find from the impugned order that the recorded date of starting production is March 9, 1985, which is said to be the starting date from which manufacturing of diesel engine started. This date was treated to be the date of starting production. It has further recorded a finding that till the aforesaid date since the petitioner had only invested Rs. 74,763. 31 hence it is not entitled for exemption for a period of five years. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged this finding that this date (i. e. , March 9, 1985) of starting production recorded is illegal. It was never the case of the respondents treating this to be the date of starting production. The stand taken in the original order was that the date of starting production was the date on which electricity was given to the petitioner, i. e. , on December 31, 1984. The petitioner has come with the case that no production could start on that date on account of the fact that only 5 h. p. electricity was given whereas production requires at least 35 h. p. electricity which was only given on July 2, 1985. Hence the said finding was challenged to be illegal. It seems that the reviewing authority did not advert to the aforesaid plea of the petitioner but took a stand that the production of the petitioner started on March 9, 1985. So far as the contention of the petitioner that March 9, 1985 could not be the date of production as by this date the requirement of electricity of 35 h. p. was not sanctioned is concerned, we find that this finding recorded by the reviewing authority is a subsequent finding which was not recorded by this very authority earlier. This Court repeatedly has been asserting that in case the reviewing authority desires to record a finding, apart from any other point adjudicated earlier would be a new finding, then it must confront the dealer before recording its finding finally. In this case this has not been done. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that without any justification the date of March 9, 1985, has been recorded as by this date the electricity supply to the petitioner's unit was only 5 h. p. and the petitioner could not start production. However, it is not necessary for us to go into the question as we find that in para 9 of the petition the petitioner has stated that since the petitioner was going to get electricity in a short time hence from March 9, 1985, it started some sub-assembly work of diesel engine but no final production was done and the final production was done only on July 2, 1985. The question raised on behalf of the respondents is that in case production started irrespective of the electricity supply of 35 h. p. then there is nothing wrong in recording a finding as March 9, 1985 to be the date of starting production. As we observed above, we feel it proper to send the case back to respondent No. 2 to decide the matter afresh after giving opportunity to the petitioner regarding the finding recorded by respondent No. 2. Since the said finding recorded by respondent No. 2 being on a new point not recorded earlier, we feel that the impugned order dated January 19, 1989 (annexure "8" to the writ petition) is unsustainable and is liable to be quashed. We accordingly quash the impugned order dated January 19, 1989 (annexure "8" to the writ petition) and direct respondent No. 2 to decide afresh the question regarding the date of starting production by the petitioner's unit, after giving opportunity to the petitioner of being heard, by a speaking order preferably within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before the said authority. The petitioner will file a certified copy of this order within six weeks from today. Until disposal of the said review application of the petitioner by respondent No. 2 afresh, as aforesaid, the assessment proceedings for the years 1987-88 and 1988-89, both under the U. P. and Central Sales Tax Acts, shall remain stayed. The writ petition stand disposed of finally in the above terms. Ordered accordingly. .;