C.A.Rahim - (1.) THIS revision has been preferred against the order dated 6.4.1994 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah.
(2.) THE fact is that by that order learned Magistrate framed charge against a firm M/s Kailash Narain Om Prakash at the stage of argument. From the record it appears that 'Chana Dal' (Gram) was stored at the factory of the said firm, sample was taken and on the analysis it was found to be adulterated and accordingly a complaint was lodged against the revisionist. Trial proceeded against the revisionist but at the time of argument learned Magistrate framed charge against the firm and called witnesses for cross-examination. This is the grievance of the revisionist. The case is listed for admission. But since the State is the only respondent and lower court record has been received, final hearing on merits is taken up. The only point which has been raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist is that there was inordinate delay in the trial leading to failure of justice. He has submitted that the incident occurred on 29.10.1986 and the case was started in the year 1992 and even after the lapse of about 8 years trial could not be concluded. He has submitted that if at the stage of argument te learned Magistrate is allowed to recall the Witness for cross examination, denovo trial will thereby commence causing further delay. In support of his contention he has referred the case of Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 1729, wherein it was held that where there is enormous delay in proceeding of criminal prosecution, i.e. about 91/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 91/2years without any cause at all cannot be the spirit of the procedure established by law. In another decision Madheshwardhari and another v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Pat 324 (FB), it was held that "a calbus and inordinately prolonged delay of 7 years or more in investigation and trial for the offence other than capital ones plainly violate constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution."
(3.) 'The fixation of the outer limit of 7 years must not be misunderstood and misconstrued to mean that a delay of less than 7 years would not in any case amount to prejudice. Indeed, what is sought to be laid down in extreme outer limit whereafter grave prejudice to the accused must be presumed and the infraction of the constitutional right would be plainly established." In the instant case there was inordinate delay in lodging the complaint after analysis of the sample taken by the Food Inspector and in all about 71/2 years elapsed in between the date of taking sample and the date of framing charge once against the firm. In view of the decisions this is clear violation of the constitutional rights provided under Article 21 of the Constitution.;