M. C. AGARWAL, J. - (1.) This revision petition under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, is directed against an order dated June 13, 1994 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Varanasi, whereby it allowed the second appeal of the revisionist and setting aside the order passed by the assessing officer on May 18, 1992, under section 3-B of the Act and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) dated October 23, 1992, remanded the matter back to the assessing officer for a fresh determination. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned Standing Counsel. The proceedings relate to assessment year 1983-84. The revisionist is an automobile dealer and had sold Telco diesel vehicles, inter alia, on hire-purchase basis. The assessment for the year 1983-84 was completed on November 1, 1985. Later on proceedings under section 3-B of the Act, were initiated against the revisionist for the alleged misuse of form III-A in so far as the vehicles sold on hire-purchase basis were concerned. Form III-A contains a declaration that the goods have been purchased for sale in the same condition. The case of the revisionist is that the chassis of the vehicle was purchased by the assessee from its manufacturer. Telco were not sold in the same condition but were sold after getting bodies built on them. By an order dated May 18, 1992, the assessing officer levied a sum of Rs. 83,123. 54 on the revisionist. The revisionist preferred an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner that was dismissed. Then the revisionist preferred a second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal's order shows that one of the pleas raised before it was that the order dated May 18, 1992 passed by the assessing officer was barred by time. The Tribunal has not decided this point and has remanded the matter back to the assessing officer on the ground that the definition of "sale" had since been amended including within its scope sales made on hire-purchase basis and therefor, because of the change of law the matter required to be remanded to the assessing officer. In the present revision the grievance of the revisionist is that the Tribunal was in error in not deciding the question of limitation and also in not deciding the question of sale on hire-purchase basis itself and that the remand of the matter to the assessing officer was unjustified. It appears that it was contended before the first appellate authority as well as the Tribunal that the sale on hire-purchase basis was not complete in the assessment year 1983-84 and would be complete only in the year in which the hire-purchaser paid the last instalment. By amending the definition of sale by the U. P. Act No. 25 of 1985 with effect from February 2, 1983, the delivery of goods an hire-purchase of any system of payment by instalment has been included within the scope of "sale" as defined in section 2 (h) of the Act. It was not the case of the dealer that the vehicles were not delivered to the purchaser on hire-purchase basis during the period relevant to assessment year 1983-84. Therefore, this being an admitted fact the learned Tribunal could have itself decided the issue in accordance with the amended definition and there was no fact which needed to be investigated and determined by the assessing officer. The remand of the matter to the assessing officer, therefore, was unjustified. The dealer-revisionist had also raised the plea of limitation before the first appellate authority as well as the Tribunal. This was purely legal plea and should have been settled by the Tribunal. The Tribunal's order is erroneous in so far as it fails to determine this issue. The contention of the learned counsel for the revisionist is that an order passed by the assessing officer under section 3-B of the Act, is also an order of assessment and therefore, must be passed within 4 years of the end of the assessment year as provided under sub-section (2) of section 21. Patently the order dated May 18, 1992, was passed after more than 8 years of the end of the assessment year. Reliance was placed on my judgment in Gram Udyog Kutir Sabu Utpadan Sadhan Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1994] 93 STC 153 (All.); 1993 UPTC 502 in which on a detailed discussion of the various provisions of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, it was held that the determination of an amount payable by a dealer under section 3-B of the Sales Tax Act is an assessment and the period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 21 is applicable. The reasons for this view as discussed in that judgment need not be repeated here. The learned Standing Counsel reagitated that an order passed under section 3-B does not amount to an assessment order. He placed reliance on Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. , Lucknow v. R. S. Steel Works [1989] 73 STC 207 (All.); 1987 UPTC 28 in which it was held that the amount levied under section 3-B is not a tax. This ruling is discussed in my earlier order referred to above and needs no further discussion as the question of limitation was not an issue in that case. Reliance is also placed on Mahabir Wire Netting Industries v. Sales Tax Officer 1987 UPTC 16. In this case the legislative competence of levy of penalty under section 4-B and the question whether notice under section 3-B can be issued after finalisation of the assessment year were involved. Both the points were decided in favour of the revisionist. However, the question about the nature of an order passed under section 3-B, i. e. , whether such an order amounts to an assessment order within the meaning of section 21 (2) was not raised. Lastly, learned Standing Counsel pressed into service the non obstante clause with which section 3-B begins. It says "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained elsewhere in this Act". These words cannot be interpreted to mean that no other provisions of the Sales Tax Act are applicable to an order under section 3-B. The non obstante clause operates only with regard to the liability of a dealer and not with regard to the manner of its determination, limitation, mode of recovery, etc. All such provisions would in my view apply with as much force as they applied to an assessment order made under the other provisions of the Act. For the above reasons, this revision petition is allowed. The impugned order dated June 13, 1994 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Varanasi, in Second Appeal No. 6 of 1992 for the assessment year 1983-84 is set aside and the said appeal is ordered to be allowed and the order dated May 18, 1992 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Sales Tax, under section 3-B of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, is annulled. The revisionist will get its costs of this revision from the respondents. Petition allowed. .;