- (1.) S. S. Sodhi, C. J. The contentions issue of the respective jurisdictions of the High Court at Allahabad and the Bench at Lucknow in terms of the United Provinces High Court (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 is what confronts us in this reference. This in turn brings into focus the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331, which had, until the judgment of the Division Bench of B. M. Lal and S. R. Singh, JJ. in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nil of 1994, U. P. Rashtriya Chini Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P. decided on September 27, 1994, been taken to have finally settled the controversy.
(2.) THE issue raised here arisen in the context of the order of the Vice Chairman of the Varanasi Development Authority of May, 30, 1994, suspend ing the appellant Nitya Nand Tewari, Assistant Town Planner, from service. In passing this order the Vice Chairman exercised the power delegated to him to do so by the Government Orders of November 10, 1986 and September 10, 1990. The passing of the order of suspension is what led the appellant to file the present writ petition seeking the quashing thereof, inter alia, on the ground that the delegation of the power of suspension to the Vice Chairman by the Government Orders, referred to earlier, was illegal and without jurisdic tion. This being so, it was said, the order of suspension had thus to be held to have been passed by an authority not competent to do so. This in turn is what brought to the fore the controversy whether the challenge to the order of suspension could be made only before the High Court at Allahabad as the order had been passed at Varanasi by the authority located there or it could also be filed before the Bench of the High Court at Lucknow, as the two Government Orders, the validity of which had been questioned, had been issued by the Government at Lucknow. There can be no manner of doubt that the impugned order of suspen sion having been passed at Varanasi by an authority located there and against the appellant, who had been appointed and was working there, rendered it amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court at Allahabad. Whether the challenge to it could, at the option of the appellant, also be made before the Bench at Lucknow, is what emerges as the point for determination.
(3.) ACCORDING to the learned single Jude "the cause of action for the petition has arisen at Varanasi and the mere submission that the delegation of power to the Vice Chairman is bad in law would not shift the cause of action from Allahabad to Lucknow Bench. The submission that delegation of power is bad in law if accepted may provide a ground for challenging the suspension order on the ground of jurisdiction but the cause of action having arisen at Varanasi, the petition should have been filed at Allahabad. " The controversy regarding the respective jurisdiction of the High Court at Allahadad and its Bench at Lucknow has to be resolved in terms of the provisions of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948. The two relevant paragraphs thereof are 7 and 14, which provide i "7. (1) The New High Court shall have, in respect of the whole of the United Provinces, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of any part of that Province by either of the existing High Courts. (2) The new High Court shall also have in respect of any area outside the United Provinces all such original, appellate and other juris diction as under the law in force immediately before the appoint ed day is exercisable in respect of that area by the High Court in Allahabad. " "14. The new High Court, and the judges and division courts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appoint: Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number, as the Chief Justice, may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court: Provided futher that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad. " 9. A reading of the provisions of these two paragraphs would show that for the purposes of the point now in contention the crucial expression "in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as it occurs in the first Proviso to paragraph 14. This expression came up for consideration before the Full Bench of this Court in Nirmal Dass v. Sales Tax Tribunal AIR 1972 All. 200 where it was held: "the expression 'in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh' used in the first proviso to Article 14 of the High Courts (Amal gamation) Order, 1948 refers to legal proceedings, including civil cases, petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution and petitions under Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the Constitution instituted before the judges sitting at Lucknow and having their origin, in the sense explained in the majority judgment, in such areas in Oudh as the Chief Justice may direct. The expression 'arising in such areas in Oudh' refers to the place where the case originated in the sense explained in the majority judgment and not to the place of sitting of the last court or autho rity whose decree or order is being challenged in the proceeding before the High Court". 8. The conclusion of the High Court as also its reasoning was, however, held to be incorrect and unsound by the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331: ". . . because the expression 'cause of action' in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and as if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original order Was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression 'cause of action' is well-known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputa ble that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum convenient. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action. " 9. This view expressed in Nasiruddin's case (supra) has been consistently followed in a string of judicial precedents, some of which find mention in the referring order too. It is also pertinent to note that there has been no modi fication or variation of this view in any subsequent ruling nor has there been any amendment in the provisions of the Amalgamation Order. 10. When the matter, in the present case, came up before the Division Bench in Special Appeal, after quoting the relevant observations of the Sup reme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra) the Bench held: "if the order is passed by an authority outside the Oudh areas but an appeal or revision is file against it before an authority at Lucknow, the order, which may be passed by appellate/revisional authority will be the order, which will furnish the cause of action for filing the writ petition. In such cases undoubtedly writ petition can be filed either at Lucknow or Allahabad, because the part of cause of action has arisen in the Oudh areas also. " 11. The learned Judges, however, went on to pose another question, with regard to jurisdiction, namely, where an appeal or revision or representa tion is merely filed, but no decision has been taken thereon, whether this would, by itself, confer jurisdiction upon the Bench within whose jurisdiction the place, where they had been filed, fell? After referring to a judgment of the Division Bench and another of a single Bench on the issue, two questions were referred for decision by a larger Bench, namely: " (1) Whether writ petition against an order passed by an authority outside the Oudh areas can be entertained by this Court at Lucknow, if some order or the Act passed by a person or the Legislature in the areas of Oudh is also challenged in order to provide a ground for challenging the said order of the authority? (2) Whether Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed by an authority outside Oudh areas either by way of interim order or by way of final order, if any proceeding in the form of an appeal, revision or a representation is pending against it before an authority within Oudh areas, even though appeal or revision or representation has not been decided and the order of the original authority has not yet merged with the order of the higher authority within Oudh areas?" 12. Doubt was also expressed with regard to the correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench in Om Prakash v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Railway, AIR 1970 All 440. 13. Turning now to consider the questions referred, there can be no manner of doubt that having regard to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra) the first question must be answered in the affirmative. The order or the Act passed in the areas of Oudh would constitute part of the cause of action and this being so, the requisite jurisdiction would be conferred thereby, upon the Bench at Lucknow. Similarly, if the order challenged is passed in any other part of the State, even though it may have originally arisen in the Oudh areas, jurisdiction to deal with it would lie also with the High Court at Allahabad. 14. The matter cannot, however, be left here, as in the meanwhile a serious dent has been sought to be created in the dictum of Nasiruddin's case (supra) by a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nil of 1994, U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P. , decided on September 27, 1994, where it was held that this rule was no longer of any avail, and that the judgments of this Court, following it, based upon the theory of partial cause of action, had become otiose. The reasoning adopted to arrive at their conclusion being: "the theory of 'cause of action' originates from the Code of Civil Procedure which is of general character and is, therefore, a general law. In the present case, the theory of 'exercise of juris diction revolving on the place of sitting' originates from the Amalgamation Order, 194$ which is of special character and is therefore in the shape of special law. It applies to a limited con tingency i. e. where the case falls within the territorial jurisdiction of one High Court and the Judges sit at two places in order to exercise jurisdiction of the High Court. "thus where the controversy pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of two different High Courts, certainly the theory of 'cause of action' in the shape of sub-clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India comes into play with full force but where the controversy pertains to the exercise of jurisdiction of one High Court as is in the present case, the theory of 'exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting' comes into play. "both the theories have got different fields to operate but at the appro priate occasion, the theory having characteristic of special law will have overriding effect in preference to the theory having characte ristic of general law, is the well settled position of law. " 15. We are, with respect constrained to observe here that this does not represent a line of reasoning that commends itself to us nor the further observation: ". . . as far as the theory of cause of action attracting jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench even in the cases pertaining to those districts which are situated outside the Oudh area is concerned, Nasiruddin's case (supra) is of no avail to the petitioners in view' of the change in law with effect from 1-2-1977 (adding Explanation to Section 141, C, P. C.) and in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the recent pronouncements in Oil and Natural Gas Commission's case (supra) and Navodaya Vidayalaya Samiti's case (supra ). " 16. The learned Judges comprising the Division Bench then went on to hold that the judgments of this Court in Om Prakash v. Divisional Superin tendent Northern Railway, AIR 1970 All 440, M/s. Khunnoo Lal and Sons v Union of India, AIR 1974 All 170; Salik Ram v. State of U. P. , AIR 1973 All 107; Santosh Kumar v. State of U. P. , 1994 LCD 12 at page 254, and Smt Prabhawati Devi v. Board of Revenue, 1994 ACJ 176, to the extent they were based on the theory of partial "cause of action" had become otiose in view of the change with effect from February 1, 1977 by the addition of the Explana tion to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure being in these terms: "141. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Explanation.- In this section, the expression 'proceedings' includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. " 17. Further, the reference to the Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 5 JT (SC) 1 and Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti v. Bhupendra Kumar, (1988) 2 JT (SC) 236, was with regard to it being held there that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to writ proceedings. 18. A plain reading of Nasiruddin's case (supra) would show that it was precisely this very issue, namely, that raised in the first question referred, that arose and was dealt with there. The observations squarely and fully covered the point before the Division Bench in V. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad's case (supra ). It will be seen that a strained and involved process of reasoning set forth there marks its advance to the conclusion that what determines the respective jurisdictions of the High Court at Allahabad and Bench, at Lucknow are, their territorial limits and the concept of "cause of action" or part thereof arising in any particular area was no longer of any consequence. With this reasoning we cannot, with respect, either agree or endorse, to distinguish Nasiruddin's case (supra), to hold to the contrary merely on the ground of the addition of the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the face of it this cannot but be described as a self-defeating logic, as according to the view of the Division Bench itself, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to writ proceedings and if this is so how could an amendment therein affect the interpretation of the Amalgamation Order by the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra), In other words, the dictum in Nasiruddin's case (supra) still holds the field and there wore no grounds to hold that it had ceased to be of any avail merely on account of the incorporation of the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a necessary consequence it further follows that the Division Bench fell in error in holding that the judgments of this Court, with regard to this aspect, in Om Prakash, M/s. Khunnoo Lal and Sons, Salik Ram, Santosh Kumar and Smt. Prabhawati Devi's case (supra) had become otiose, rather the law laid down therein must be taken to be correct and legally binding. 19. Similarly the logic of parity sought to be drawn from the scheme of sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Re-organisation Act, 1956 is equally mis conceived because in the later part of their discussion the learned Judges themselves observed that the 1948 Amalgamation Order is a self-contained Code. The inescapable inference would, therefore, be that in the absence of any ambiguity therein, the answer to the query of jurisdiction would have to be found from within its own framework, and as mentioned hereinbefore, the issue stands settled by the apex court in the context of Nasiruddin. 20. In dealing with this matter, we cannot also but recall here the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution, which lay down that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts in India. Nasiruddin's case (supra) being a judgment of the Supreme Court, is clearly binding upon this Court and has thus to be followed and as pointed out earlier, we are unable to find any justifiable ground on the basis of which it can be said that the Division Bench in U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad's case (supra) was justified in either trying to distinguish it or to hold that the dictum of the Supreme Court was of no avail. We are constrained, therefore, to hold that the judgment of the Division Bench does not lay down correct law. 21. As regards the doubt expressed with regard to the judgment of the Full Bench in Om Prakash's case (supra), no occasion, in our opinion, arises to warrant any reconsideration thereof while dealing with the issues no. v before us. Similar is the position with regard to the second question posed in the referring order. No such issue arises here and we do not, therefore, consider it appropriate to deal with it and would prefer to leave it to be 'considered' and determined in the context of facts which may render such determination imperative. 22. The questions referred are thus answered accordingly and this reference is returned to the Division Bench for the decision of the appeal on merits. Answered accordingly. .;