M. C. AGARWAL, J. - (1.) These two revision petitions under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, are directed against a common order dated October 13, 1987, passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Bareilly, whereby it dismissed the revisionist's second appeals against the rejection of its applications under section 30 of the Act for setting aside the ex parte assessments under the U. P. and Central Sales Tax Acts. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned Standing Counsel. The Sales Tax Officer had fixed September 16, 1985, as the date for taking up proceedings for the two assessments for the assessment year 1981-82. The revisionist did not appear on that date and ex parts assessment orders were passed. Copies of the ex parte assessment orders were served on the revisionist on October 14, 1985, by registered post. The applications under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act were made on November 15, 1985, stating therein that the copies of the assessment orders were served on October 16, 1985. On being pointed out that the copies of the assessment orders were served on October 14, 1985, by registered post A. D. , the revisionist moved an application for condonation of delay contending that, by mistake, the partner of the revisionist firm Sri Anil Kumar had noted in his diary that the assessment orders were received on October 16, 1985, and this was the date communicated to the counsel, who, accordingly, filed the restoration application mentioning October 16, 1985, as the date of service. It was stated that the delay of two days had occurred because of a mistake in noting the date of service and the same be condoned. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the applications under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act by order dated December 17, 1985, holding that the same were barred by time, the admitted tax was not deposited and there was no reasonable cause for not attending the hearing on September 16, 1985. The revisionist preferred appeals before the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, and moved an application for admitting on record a medical certificate. The learned Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, did not discuss the issue about the cause of absence and dismissed the appeals holding that the applications were not within time and the admitted tax was not deposited. The Sales Tax Tribunal vide its order dated October 13, 1987, also dismissed the second appeals of the revisionist holding that the appeals were barred by time. There is no specific finding about the payment of the admitted tax or about the sufficiency of the cause of absence. As is evident, all the three authorities have treated the applications to be barred by time. None of them has specifically dealt with the applications for condonation of delay but the Sales Tax Officer and the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, did mention that it was stated on behalf of the dealer that October 16, 1985, was wrongly, noted as the date of service in the diary. The Tribunal's order is totally silent on the point. The learned counsel for the revisionist contended that a genuine mistake in noting a wrong date of service was a sufficient cause for not making the application within time and the small delay of two days should have been condoned. The learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contended that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before the Sales Tax Officer because the Sales Tax Officer is not a court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that any appeal or application. . . . may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Thus, on the face of it, section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as, quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities. The learned Standing Counsel placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Janta Cycle and Motor Mart v. Assistant Commissioner (J) III, Sales Tax, Kanpur [1968] 22 STC 94 in which in an appeal under section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, the admitted tax was not paid within the period of 30 days prescribed as the period of limitation under the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The amount was deposited later on and an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was made for condoning the delay in the payment of the admitted tax. It was held that section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked for condoning the delay in the payment of tax. This judgment, therefore, does not deal with the question whether section 5 of the Limitation Act should have been invoked if the appeal itself was delayed. In Gopaldas Sarvadayal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. [1956] 7 STC 360 (All.); AIR 1956 All 305 in which the question was whether the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order under section 10 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act could he excluded for computing the period of limitation for making an application for reference under section 11 of the said Act, a Full Bench of this Court held that the provisions of section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act did not apply to an application for reference under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The Full Bench, however, observed that there was no doubt that section 29 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the U. P. Sales Tax Act which is a special law dealing with the sales tax in Uttar Pradesh. Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes period of limitation for application for which no period has elsewhere been provided. There is no specific provision in the Limitation Act prescribing a period of limitation for an application under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. If the Sales Tax Officer had been a court, such application would fall under article 137 and section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act would be a special law within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, with the result that sections 4 to 24 thereof would have applied. But in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court AIR 1969 SC 1335 the honourable Supreme Court has held that article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to bodies other than courts, such as quasi-judicial Tribunal, or even an executive authority. The honourable Supreme Court observed that an industrial tribunal or a labour court are not courts and they are not governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Sales Tax Officer is an executive authority and is not a court. Therefore, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings before the authorities under the U. P. Sales Tax Act. In the U. P. Sales Tax Act, wherever the authorities concerned have been given the power of condonation of delay, specific provisions have been inserted in the relevant sections. Sub-section (6) of section 9 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, which deals with the first appeals, provides that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to appeals or other applications under this section. A similar provision is contained in sub-section (3) of section 10 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, which deals with appeals to the Tribunal and there is a specific provision in sub-section (9) of section 11 of the Act giving the High Court the power to invoke section 5 of the Limitation Act in every application for revision under this section. However, in section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, no such provision has been made for condonation of delay or specifying that section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. Learned counsel for the revisionist placed reliance on a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Agarwal Fertilizer Stores v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1987 UPTC 1522. In that case, there was a delayed application under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act and the Tribunal had not recorded any finding about the cause of the delay and yet rejected the application. On a revision petition filed by the dealer, the learned single Judge set aside the Tribunal's order observing that the Tribunal being the last fact-finding body should have recorded a finding on the point. This judgment is of no help because the question whether section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply to an application under section 30 of the Act or not was not agitated before this Court nor was it decided. In view of the above discussion, I am of the opinion that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act moved before the Sales Tax Officer and the delay even of two days could not have been condoned. Another point raised in Sales Tax Revision No. 589 of 1988, which relates to the Central sales tax, is about the deposit of the admitted tax. Section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act provides that no application for setting aside an ex parte order of assessment or penalty shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of admitted tax by the dealer to be due. In this case, a sum of Rs. 1,795 was admitted by the revisionist to be due on account of Central sales tax and the same was deposited by cheque while moving the application under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The cheque was accepted and was sent for collection. According to the Sales Tax Officer, the bank deposited in the Government account Rs. 1,791. 50 after deducting its commission. The contention of the department, therefore, is that the full amount of the admitted tax was not deposited. Under rules 48 and 49 of the U. P. Sales Tax Rules, payment by cheque is permitted as a valid mode of payment. Sub-rule (2) of rule 49, as it stood at the relevant time, stated that if the cheque is on another branch or if bank commission is deducted from the amount of the cheque or the draft, as the case may be, the net amount credited to the Government account after such deduction shall be deemed to be the amount deposited by the dealer. Invoking this provision, the Revenue is taking the stand that only Rs. 1,791. 50 was deposited and the application was, therefore, defective. This contention is not tenable and the department having accepted the cheque without pointing out to the dealer that any bank commission was likely to be charged, it was its duty. To inform the revisionist that a certain amount had been deducted by the bank as commission and ask the revisionist to make up the, deficiency. It is only if the deficiency was not made good that the Sales Tax Officer could set up a stand like this. In view of the finding recorded above, that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under section 30 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the applications moved by the revisionist were barred by time and have been rightly rejected. These revision petitions, therefore, have no force and are hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed. .;