S.R.Singh, J. - (1.) SUBJECT matter of impugnment in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the order dated 21-10-1993 passed by Superintendent of Police (Railways), Jhansi whereby the petitioners have been placed under suspension. The suspension order has its genesis in the institution of a criminal case in case crime No. 416 of 1993, under section 394/397 IPC pertaining to P.S, G R.P. Jhansi against the petitioners.
(2.) SRI Sudama Ji Shandilya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, vehemently urged that the suspension order is vitiated for the reason of the requirements of Rule 17 (1) (b) of U. P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks Rules, 1991 (in short the Rules) being observed in non-complaince, In that, urged the learned counsel, the appointing authority has not applied Its mind to the relevant factors governing the exercise of discretion vested in It under clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the said Rules. With a view to appreciating the contentions of the learned counsel Rule 17 of the Rules, in so far as it is relevant may be quoted below. "17 Suspension-(1) (a) A Police Officer against whose conduct an enquiry is contemplated or is proceeding, may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the enquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority or by any other authority not below the rank of Superintended of police authorised by him in this behalf. (b) A police officer in respect of or against whom an investigation, enquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending, may at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension, until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is conected with his position as a police officer of is likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude.- If the prosecution is instituted by a private person on complaint the appointing" authority may decide whether the circumstances of the case justify the suspension of the accused. (5) (a) Any suspension ordered or deemed to have been ordered or to have continued in force under this rule shall continue to remain in force until' it is modified or revoked by any authority specified in sub-rule (1)." A perusal of the impugned order (Annexure-1) would be eloquent of the fact that although the provision under which it has been passed, does not find mention, but the facts staged therein, leave no manner of doubt that it is referrable to clause (b) of sub rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules, inasmuch as it has not been passed on the grounds comprehended by clause (a) but on the ones comprehended by clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules.
(3.) IT is no doubt evident from the relevant rule quoted hereinbefore, that the power to place a police officer under suspension under clause (b) of sub rule (1) of Rule 17 of the Rules in discretionary but 'discretion' necessarily implies good faith and reasonableness in discharging public duties. IT cannot be gain-said that there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate. Further the discretionary power under rule 17 (1) (b) Uncoupled with a legal duty cast upon the appointing authority to place under suspension a police officer in respect of or against whom enquiry etc relating to a criminal charge connected with his position as a police officer or the one which is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties of involves moral turpitude is pending. This, of course, is coupled with the duty to apply its mind to the afore-stated relevant factors governing the exercise of discretion vested in it. It cannot be gainsaid that when a discretionary power is conferred upon an authority and the exercise of the discretion depends upon the existence of certain conditions, the exercise of the discretionary power would be vitiated if the conditions are non-existent. Under the rule in question, the condition precedent for the exercise of the power is comprehended in the expression if the charge is connected with his position as a police officer or is likely to embarass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude ; occurring in rule 17 (I) (b) of the Rules. It is no doubt true that if the prosecution is instituted by a private person on compliant, the appointing authority may decide whether the circumstances of the case justify the suspension of the accused but here again the appointing authority would be guided by the nature and gravity of the charge and its bonafide. Wade on Administrative Law (4th Edn. p. 340) has aptly said- "........Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely that it to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended." ;