M. C. AGARWAL, J. - (1.) This revision petition under z 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 challenges an order dated August 5, 1987, passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal whereby it allowed the respondent's Second Appeal No. 74 of 1976 for assessment year 1976-77 and quashed the assessment on the ground that it was barred by time. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned Standing Counsel. The proceedings relate to assessment year 1976-77 and originally the period of limitation as prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 21 was four years and expired on March 31, 1981. Subsequently by the U. P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1982 (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1992), the then existing proviso to sub-section (2) of section 21 was substituted by a new proviso as under : " Provided that the assessment or reassessment for the assessment years 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77 may be made by December 31, 1982. " This was done with retrospective effect from November 1, 1978. The Sales Tax Tribunal has allowed the second appeal of the appellant for the assessment year 1976-77 holding the assessment to be barred by time. The Tribunal has discussed the issue as under : " However, in respect of assessment year 1976-77 under section 21 (2), the limitation for making the assessment expired on 31st March, 1981. The limitation in respect of year 1976-77 was neither extended by U. P. Ordinance 27 of 1979 nor by U. P. Act 2 of 1980. The limitation in respect of assessment year 1976-77 was extended for the first time by U. P. Ordinance 12 of 1981, which was published in Gazette Extraordinary dated 3rd August, 1981, and was confirmed by U. P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1982 (U. P. Act No. 4 of 1982), published on 23rd February, 1982. Consequently when U. P. Ordinance 12 of 1981 was promulgated for the first time on 3rd August, 1981, the limitation in respect of assessment year 1976-77 had become already closed or dead on 31st March, 1981 and the view taken by the honourable High Court in 1987 UPTC 504 (Jaiswal Colour Trading Company v. Commissioner of Sales Tax) is fully applicable on the facts of the case in respect to the assessment year 1976-77. It may be further mentioned in respect of year 1976-77, the notice under section 21 was sent to the assessee for the first time on 23rd February, 1982, when the assessment in respect of year in question was already closed. " In the revision petition it has been contended that in this case after the issue of a notice under section 21 the assessment was completed ex parte on March 17, 1982 and by an order dated April 26, 1983, the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) had set aside The assessment to be made afresh after ascertaining the turnover. It was in pursuance of the order of remand that the assessment order, dated November 26, 1983, was passed which ultimately went before the Tribunal and has been set aside with the observations quoted above. As is clear from the order of the Tribunal it has not noted that the assessment order in question was passed after the matter had been remanded to the assessing authority though this fact is mentioned in the very sentence of the assessment order. The Tribunal has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Jaiswal Colour Trading Company v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1987 UPTC 504 in which it was held that where no proceedings were pending and the matter had become dead or closed, subsequent enhancement of the period of limitation could not enable the initiation of proceedings under sub-section (2) of section 21. The Tribunal has observed that in this case the notice was, for the first time, issued on February 23, 1982, when the assessment in respect of the year in question was already closed. The case of Jaiswal Colour Trading Company 1987 UPTC 504 was decided by a learned single Judge of this Court following a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hargu Charan Srivastava v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1979] 119 ITR 622; 1979 UPTC 852. That was a judgment under the Income-tax Act and the controversy related to the initiation of penalty proceedings. Section 275 of the Income-tax Act earlier provided a period of limitation of two years commencing from the date of the assessment order for initiation of penalty proceedings. By the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1970, the period of limitation was changed to be two years commencing from the end of the financial year in which the assessment order was passed. This amendment was made effective from April 1, 1971. The Division Bench has observed as under : " The prescription of period of limitation is a matter of procedure. Any amendment in this regard is retrospective in the sense it is applicable to all those matters which are pending and which had not become closed or dead. If in a particular proceeding the period of limitation on 1st April, 1971, was still running, the amended provision enlarging the period of limitation would apply. This is the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka and Orissa High Courts in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Watan Mechanical and Turning Works [1977] 107 ITR 743 (AP) [fb], Commissioner of Income-tax v. Royal Motor Car Co. [1977] 107 ITR 753 (Guj), Commissioner of Income-tax v. M. Nagappa [1978] 114 ITR 707 (Kar), Commissioner of Income-tax, Orissa v. Soubhagya Manjari Devi [1976) 105 ITR 82 (Orissa) and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bhikari Charan Panda [1976] 104 ITR 73 (Orissa ). We are in respectful agreement with these authorities. On facts it is clear that the amended period of limitation was applicable to the present case. " As is evident, the amendment in this case by Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1970, was not made effective by the Legislature from the previous dates. The Legislature made the amendment effective from a future date, i. e. , April 1, 1971. In the present case the situation is entirely different. The amendment by U. P. Act No. 4 of 1982 was effective from November 1, 1978, and, therefore, the period of limitation stood extended from that date and when the notice under section 21 was issued on February 23, 1982, it cannot be said that the matter had become closed or dead as observed by the Division Bench in Harga Charan's case [1979] 119 ITR 622 (All.); 1979 UPTC 852. I have reproduced the discussion of the issue of the Division Bench to show that in Hargu Charan's case [1979] 119 ITR 622 (All.); 1979 UPTC 852 the law was not amended from a back date and it was for that reason that the Division Bench held that the cases in which the period of limitation had already expired, the period of limitation would not stand extended by virtue of the amendment because, in the words of the Division Bench, the cases had become dead or closed. In the present case the Legislature has specifically amended the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 21 from a back date, i. e. , November 1, 1978, and the amended provision would be deemed to be on the statute book on November 1, 1978 and on that date the matter was not closed or dead because on November 1, 1978, the period of limitation for the completion of the assessment for assessment year 1976-77 had not expired. In the case of Jaiswal Colour Trading Company 1987 UPTC 504 there is no independent discussion of the issue and the decision of a learned single Judge is based on Hargu Charan's case [1979] 119 ITR 622 (All.); 1979 UPTC 852. It has nowhere been mentioned whether the amendment to the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 21 by the U. P. Act No. 2 of 1980 was legislatively made prospective or not. A similar controversy regarding a retrospective amendment to section 21 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act reached the honourable Supreme Court in Jaipuria Brothers Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1965] 16 STC 494. In that case the question was about the period of limitation for an assessment to be made in pursuance of the order of remand. At that time there was no specific provision in section 21 governing the period of limitation for an assessment to be made in pursuance of an order of remand by the appellate authority. Therefore, the assessee's contention was that the period prescribed, i. e. , three years, for an assessment under section 21 would apply even in a case where the assessment order has been set aside by the appellate authority and has to be remade. This contention was negatived by this Court holding that where the assessing officer was directed by an order of the appellate or revising authority to make a reassessment the period of limitation has no application. This view was reversed by the honourable Supreme Court but the High Court's order was confirmed because in the meantime by Act No. 19 of 1956 section 21 was amended with retrospective effect from the date on which the principal Act had come into operation. The honourable Supreme Court held that the amended section must be deemed to have been on the statute book on the date on which the principal Act has come into operation. The honourable Supreme Court observed that the Legislature had given a clear retrospective operation to the amended section as from the date on which the principal Act came into operation and the correctness of the order of the Sales Tax Officer holding that there was no bar of limitation to the making of the fresh assessment pursuant to the order of the appellate or revising authority had to be adjudged in the light of section 21 as amended by Act No. 19 of 1956. The situation in the present case is similar. The Legislature has amended the proviso to section 21 (2) with effect from November 1, 1978 and the case could be treated as dead or closed only if before November 1, 1978, the period of limitation as operative had expired. This was not so in this case because the proceedings relate to assessment year 1976-77 and the period of limitation prescribed in the main sub-section (2) of section 21 was four years which expired on March 31, 1981 and hence on November 1, 1978, the case cannot be said to have been dead or closed. For the above reasons, neither the judgment of the Division Bench in Hargu Charan's case [1979] 119 ITR 622 (All.); 1979 UPTC 852 nor that of the learned single Judge in Jaiswal Colour Trading Company 1987 UPTC 504 applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the Tribunal was in error in holding in a summary manner that the case was dead or closed and the assessment was barred by time. Since the Tribunal has not mentioned the necessary facts, i. e. , the date on which the assessment was originally made, the date on which the order was set aside by the first appellate authority and the revisionist has also not filed copies of the first assessment order and that of the appellate order, it is not possible for me to finally decide whether the assessment was barred by time or not. Therefore, having explained the legal position as above, the matter will have to be remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision of the appeal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated August 5, 1987, so far as it relates to assessment year 1976-77 is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to rehear the respondent's appeal and to dispose it of afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. Petition allowed. .;