- (1.) S. R. Singh, J. Subject-matter of impugnment in the instant appeal is the award dated 31-1-1987 rendered by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in M. A. C. Case No. 23 of 1986 - Ram Avtar and another v. Ram Prakash and others, whereby the Claims Tribunal has awarded a compensation of Rs. 62,400 together with interest at the rate of 8% with effect from 6-5-1986, which is the date on which was the claim petition tiled, till the date of actual payment of the compensation to the claimants with a further direction that the entire amount of compensation would be payable by the appellant-Insu rance company.
(2.) FOR sensitive appreciation of the controversy involved in the case, necessary facts may be delineated. Claimants-respondents 1 and 2 are parents of the deceased Ashok Kumar who, has held by the Tribunal had got con cussed in the accident which occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle i. e. Truck No. UPC 3108 being driven on the fateful day by Pappu, 4th respondent who, as further held by the Tribunal, had a valid driving licence. Ram Prakash, respondent No. 3 is admittedly the owner of the Vehicle. The claim petition was filed by the parents of the deceased claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 2 lac as against which the Tribunal awarded only a sum of Rs 62,400. The finding that the accident took place as a result of actionable rash and negligent driving and the finding that the Driver had a valid driving licence were rightly not challenged by the counsel appearing for the appellant. The challenge has been telescoped to the only submission made by Sri A. B. Saran, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that the appellant Insurance Company was not liable to pay the compensation beyond the statutory limit postulated by Section 95 (2) (h) of the Act. Sri R. P. Goyal, learned Counsel appearing for the claimants-res pondents canvassed that the Insurance Company was rightly fastened with the liability to pay the entire amount of compensation in that, urged the learned counsel, the policy was the comprehensive one, indemnifying the liability of the insured beyond statutory limits. I have bestowed my sedulous consideration to the submissions made at the bar. The appeal, in my opinion, has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. Section 95 of the Act stipulates requirements of policy and limits of liability of Insurer. According to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance may be a policy which is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a cooperative society allowed under Section 108 to transact the business of an insurer, and insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) : (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. It is evident that the liability of the insurer under clause (i) aforesaid is "in respect of death of, or bodily injury to, any person" or damage to any propeny of a third party not being a passenger while clause (ii) is attracted in the case of death of or bodily injury to any passenger of "a public service vehicle" which term, in my opinion, includes a goods vehicle. The proviso (ii) to sub-section (1) however, carves out an exception that a policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to any person being carried on or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason or in pursuance of a contract of employment. The expression "in which passengers are carried" occurring in proviso (ii) no doubt reasonably suggests that in order to exclude the applicability of the exception carved out by proviso (ii), the vehicle ought not to be a vehicle with no permit to carry passengers. In other words where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried, a policy as comprehended by sub-section (1) shall be necessary inasmuch as Rule 92 of the U. P. Motor Vehicles Rules 1940 provides for and per mits the carriage of the owner of goods hiring the vehicle or the bona fide employee of the hirer of the goods vehicle, such vehicle too, for the purposes of sub-section (1), shall be deemed to be "a vehicle in which passen gers are carried vis-a-vis the owner of the goods and or his employee accom panying the goods. A goods vehicle, therefore, also comes within the purview of "a public service vehicle" within the meaning of the expression used in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of Section 95 (1) in respect of the death of or bodily injury to the owner of the goods or his employee accompanying the goods being carried in the vehicle for hire or reward. A division Bench of this Court in Abdul Razzak v. Shqfiqunnisa, AIR 1983 All 400, has ruled as under: ". . . . . . Rule 92 makes it amply clear that goods vehicle is authorized to carry hirer or an employee of the hirer of the vehicle whenever a person hires a goods vehicle for transporting his goods from one place to the other, he himself or his employee is entitled to be carried in the vehicle under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. " In T. N. Renukappa v. Fahmida, AIR 1980 Karnataka 25, a Division Bench has held that the owner of goods travelling in goods vehicle alongwith his goods is also covered by third party risk and in case of death of the owner, the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner.
(3.) IN my opinion, therefore, the exception carved out in the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 95, would cover the owner of goods or his bona fide employee travelling in a goods vehicle taken on hire or for reward etc. It may be observed that the expression 'in pursuance of a con tract of employment' was construed by the Division Bench in Abdul Razzak's case (supra) to mean the contract of employment between the owner of the goods and his employee accompanying the goods in a goods vehicle taken on payment of hire or reward etc. Now I proceed to scan the submission of Sri A. B. Saran vis-a-vis the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the Act.;