R. A. Sharma, J. - (1.) PETITIONER who claim to be existing operators of Khruja Jowar Tappal route, have filed this writ petition for writ of mandamus directing the respondents, namely, transport authorities, not to grant any permanent or temporary permit on their route except on the basis of the direction issued the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mithiles Garg v, Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443 and the judgment of this court in writ petition No, 231 of 1992. Further prayer for writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to disturb the approve time-table fixed in 1986 has also been made.
(2.) UNLIKE the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not confer any right of objection or of hearing to the existing operators against the grant of permits. The participation of existicg operators in the proceedings relating to grant of permits has been completely excluded by the new Act, This has been highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 443. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Surji Devi v. State: Transport Authority, U. P., Lucknow, Writ Petition No. 8268 of 1991, has held that an existing operator has no locus standi to challenge the grant of permit under the liberalised scheme of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Supreme Court in the above case of Mithilesh Garg ''supra) has also laid down that by grant of new permits on any route the rights of existing operators are not infiringed and they cannot complain against the liberalised policy for grant of new permits under the new Act. Under the circumstances, no direction can be issued at the instance of the petitioners to the transport authorities not to grant permits. The request of the petitioners for issuing direction to the transport authorities for granting permits, on the basis of the direction issued by the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) and of this Court in Writ Petition No. 231 of 1992 is also liable to be rejected. Every authority is bound to obey the judgments of the Supreme Court and of this Court and no directions are required to be Issued by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for obeying the law laid down by the Supreme Court. and this Court. Such a request is misconceived. That apart, the Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) has not issued any direction to the transport authorities. It has laid down the law while considering the validity of the new Act. This judgment of the Supreme Court Is binding on every authority and Courts. So far as the order of this Court, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure III to the writ petition is concerned, it is an interim order passed by Division Bench of this Court, whereby the concerned authority was directed not to act mechanically in granting permits and have due regard to the factors enumerated by the Sureme Court in the case of Mithilesh Garg (supra) as also the guidelines set up by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Revision No, 46 of 1992, decided on 19-10 1992 State Traasport Appellate Tribunal has its Judgments, referred to above, required the transport authorities to work out the economics of the transport service and to determine the requirement of additional buses and permits on the route before granting permits and further to investigate into the social and economic status of the applicants before they are granted permits. These directions, issued by the Tribunal, are contrary to and are inconsistent with the object of the new Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Mithilesh Garg, relevant extract from which is reproduced below : "The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalise the grant of permits. Section 7 (1) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Section 80 (2) m, which is the harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act, There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47 (3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act." "More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system. Over-crowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, clinging to the bus doors and even sitting on the roof-tops are some of the common sights in this country. More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old uphostly, uncomfortable seats and continous emission of the black-smoke from the exhaust pipe. It is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronise the operator who is providing the best service. Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favoritism in the process of granting permits. Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentration of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest. The apprehensions of the petitioners, that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed - out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment. The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics under lying the profession. Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as arc economically viable. In any case the transport system in a state is meamt for the benefit and convenience of the public. The policy to grant permits liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal."
(3.) FOR the reasons given above, it is not possible to issue any direction to the transport authorities to follow the guide lines laid down by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal while granting permits. The order of the Division- Bench, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure III to the wirt petition, is merely an interim order, which cannot be used as a precedent while deciding the writ petition finally. For the reasons given above, this writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.;