H.N. Tilhari, J. - (1.) This revision has been filed under Section 25 of the Provincial-Small Cause Courts Act challenging the judgment and decree dated 27-1-92 passed by Shri Parmeshwar Datt, Judge, Small Causes/Additional District Judge, Kheri, in S.C.C. Suit No. 15 of 1985, originally with title Azmatullah v. Shamirn Ahmad and of which suit, the title was changed subsequently by substitution of the names of Smt. Badar Jehan and others plaintiffs who were the heirs of the original plaintiff on one side and Smt. Rasheeda Begum and Jamil Ahmad as defendants being heirs of deceased defendant Shamirn Ahmad. The plaintiff claimed a decree for eviction of the defendant-revisionist from the property in dispute, namely, House No. 114 situate in mohalla East Lakhpera, Town Mohammadi, district Kheri as well as for recovery of a sum of Rs. 7,200/- as rent and damages as well as for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 6.00 per day for use and occupation of the suit property during the pendency of the case. The plaintiffs' case has been that plaintiffs have been the landlord-owner of the house in dispute as detailed in the plaint and that the original defendant Shamirn Ahmed was the tenant of the same on a monthly rental of Rs. 200/- on behalf of the plaintiffs in accordance with English calendar. The plaintiffs case is that defendant did not pay the arrears of rent in spite of repeated demands since May, 1979. The defendant, also, according to the plaintiff's case, made unauthorised alterations in the house in dispute without the plaintiff-landlord's permission causing hereby the substantial damage to the property or substantially lowering the value of the property. The plaintiff's case further is that on 10-6-85 the plaintiff issued a notice demanding of arrears of rent requiring the defendant tenant to pay the arrears of rent within a period of one month from the date of the service of the notice as well as of termination of the contract of tenancy i.e. determining the lease and required the defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the property in dispute by expiry or on the expiry of the period of notices from the date of service of the notice. According to plaintiff's case the notice was served on the defendant by refusal i.e. the defendant refused the notice when it was tendered to him. The plaintiff further alleged that defendant did not comply with the notice and the defendant did not pay either arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation within the period of notice nor did hand over the vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute which was in his tenancy on the expiry of the period of notice, and, as such, the cause of action for filing the suit did accrue to the plaintiff and plaintiff has filed the suit for the reliefs claimed in the plaint i.e. decree for eviction of the defendant from the accommodation in dispute referred to in paragraph 1 of the plaint and a decree for a sum of Rs. 7,200/- as arrears of rent. The plaintiff also claimed a decree for damages or mesne profits for use and occupation against the defendant during the pendency of the suit and till the actual delivery of possession.
(2.) The defendant contested the suit, filed the written statement and had taken the various pleas. The defendant did not admit the plaint allegations. It was stated with reference to the plaint allegations in the written statement that the allegations made with reference to each paragraph that the statement contained in each paragraph is not admitted. Under heading additional pleas the defendant averred that defendants have been tenant of one Ishtiaq Ahmad for more than 10 years on a monthly rental of Rs. 40/- and that defendant had paid rent. The defendant had denied the contract of tenancy with the plaintiff. The defendant further alleged that on May 20, 1985 Smt. Rasheeda Begum, widow of original defendant Shamirn Ahmad purchased the property in dispute from Ishtiaq Ahmad and by virtue of the sale deed executed by Ishtiaq Ahmad of the property in dispute Smt. Rasheeda Begum became the owner, and as such, the plaintiff's suit was liable to be dismissed. Plea was also raised to the effect that the suit was not maintainable on the Small Cause Court side in view of the provisions of Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The defendant further took the plea that the defendant did not receive the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or under Section 20 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 72 nor any combined notice and that in absence of service of notice on them the relationship of landlord and tenant, if any, had not been validity terminated and plaintiff's suit, as such, was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed. The defendant's next plea was that notice was invalid and it was also submitted that the landlord can file a suit against the tenant or a person who alleges to be a tenant only after terminating the tenancy and once a notice of termination of tenancy had not been served he could not file the suit. In support of their respective cases of (sic) the plaintiff -opposite party examined the Postman Deo Datt Agnihotri as P.W. 1, Atharullah as P.W. 2 and Ishwari as P.W. 3 and documentary evidence in the form of acknowledgment showing refusal of the defendant was filed as Ext. 1 and the copy of combined notice i.e. notice for arrears as well as determination of lease was filed and was marked as Ext. 2 on record. In objection thereto a copy of house tax assessment of the Nagar Palika Mohammadi had been filed as Exts. 3 to 15 and Exts. 16 to 18 on the record of the case and the copy of the register of Nagar Palika for demand of rent as Ext. 19. Defendant-revisionists examined three witnesses in support of the defence plea i.e. D.W. 1 Mohd, Shamirn, D.W. 2 Ishtiaq and D.W. 3 Ashgar Ali. From a perusal of the record it also appears that on behalf of the defendant the copy of the sale deed executed or purporting to have been executed by Ishtiaq Ahmad in favour of Smt. Rasheeda Begum has also been filed. S.C.C. Suit No. 15 of 1985 had been filed on 31-7-85 and the deeds on record which have been filed on behalf of the defendant purports to have been executed on 1-1-1986 and there is another document purporting to be sale deed dated 25-9-85 which is unregistered document. The trial Court considered the evidence of the parties and decreed the plaintiff's suit for eviction against the defendant from the property in dispute as well as for the recovery of the arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 7,200/- as well as for mesne profits against the defendant at the rate of Rs. 6.60 per day till the actual delivery of possession of the property in dispute. The trial Court while decreeing the plaintiff's claim held as under:- That admittedly the sale deed has not been proved and it was executed during the pendency of the suit and it created no right of owner ship in favour of Smt. Rasheeda Begum, the trial Court recorded the finding that defendants have failed to prove ownership of Smt. Rasheeda Begum and it is their admitted case that they have occupying the house in dispute as a tenant. Relying on the plaintiff's witnesses and the document Ext. 19, the trial Court held that Shamirn Ahmed was the tenant and the plaintiff was the landlord. The findings of the trial Court reads as under:- "The evidence shows that the defendant was tenant in the house, in question while the plaintiffs were landlord there was relationship of tenant and landlord between, the defendants and plaintiff and the defendants were tenant in the house in question at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month." The trial court further found that the evidence on record establishes that a registered notice was sent demanding the arrears of rent as well as terminating the tenancy and that notice has been proved and Ext. 2 on record, the trial Court further recorded that it has been served by refusal but the defendant did not comply with the notice of demand of arrears of rent and termination of tenancy and did neither pay arrears of rent nor did vacate the accommodation in dispute, and, as such, the plaintiffs had been entitled to the decree claimed in the suit for eviction of defendant, arrears of rent as mentioned in the plaint and mesne profits up to date and decreed the plaintiffs' claim in to to.
(3.) Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 27-1-92 the defendant-revisionists have come up before this Court and have filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts. Learned counsel for the revisionists Shri S. Mirza pressed before me the following pleas:- (a) that in view of Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts the Court could not decree the plaintiffs' suit when the defendant took the plea on the basis of the sale deed alleged to have been executed by Ishtiaq Ahmad. As regards the plea of Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act that plea is now not open, this plea has been rejected by the trial Court by its order dated 24-4-87 passed by III Additional District Judge. Khari, against which the defendant preferred revision i.e. Revision No. 98 of 1987 and that revision has been dismissed by this Court vide judgment and order delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. G. Mathur that decision shall operate as res judicata, and, as such, that plea is barred and is not open to the revisionists. Second point has been raised to the effect that an application was moved on behalf of the revisionists for being permitted to file some additional evidence consisting of certain papers mentioned in C. M. Application No. 320(m) of 1993 and it was asserted that the said application may be allowed and the defendant may be allowed to file the document and after allowing to file the documents the revision may be allowed and the order of the trial Court be set aside and the case may be remanded. In the nutshell it appears that this plea has been taken to get rid of the judgment and decree of the trial Court acting in a manner which was not open to the defendant-revisionists in view of the provisions of Order 50 Rule 1 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a perusal of which per se shows that provisions of Order 41 of the Code including Rule 27 are not applicable in the matters of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Learned counsel for the revisionists to this extent submitted that they may be so but under inherent powers of the Court the revisional Court "Order" can entertain the additional evidence. Shri Mirza relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Babu Ram v. The Addl. District Judge, Dehradun, reported in (1983 ARC 13). The Division Bench has been pleased to take the view as under:- "Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers right on a Court of appeal to admit additional evidence. But, since that Order has expressly been excluded from application to Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, neither Order XLI Rule 27 in terms nor in principle can be applied for taking additional evidence. So far as a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is concerned, the Court has a much narrower power than that of the first appellate Court. Under Section 25, the Court can interfere only when the decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was not according to law. Order XLI, Rule 27 cannot, therefore, be pressed into service for admitting additional evidence in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The question that next arises is whether additional evidence can be admitted in a case under Section 25 by a Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Section 17, as observed above, requires the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure to be followed in all suits and in all proceedings pending out of such suits. Section 151 is not one of the provisions mentioned in the list excluded from application to the Courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. Hence, Section 151, since it has not been excluded applies, which preserves the inherent powers of the Court. Every Court is constituted for be purpose of doing justice according to law and must, therefore, be deemed to possess as a necessary corollary, and has inherent in its very constitution, all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and undo the wrong in the course of the administration of justice 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC). In fact, Section 151 does not confer but only saves the inherent jurisdiction." The Division Bench further observed:- "After a review of the various provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, we find that there is no prohibition contained in either of the two enactments expressly or impliedly providing for the bar of admitting additional evidence. What order L Rule 1 (b) did by excluding Order XLI was only that this pro vision will not apply to revision. But, the fact that Order XLI Rule 27 has been excluded does not lead to be conclusion that the Court cannot in exercise of its inherent power admit additional evidence when Die ends of justice requires the same to be done. This Court further observed:- "A revision under Section 25 can be entertained on a question of law. The Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with finding of fact. Under Section 25, therefore, the Court cannot admit additional evidence for re-appraising the evidence or for setting aside a finding of lad, is incorrect to suggest that considerations which prevail in regard to the reception of additional evidence in a first appeal should apply or should prevail in regard to its reception in a revision. In a revision, the Court is required to examine whether the impugned judgment is in conformity with law. The findings of fact recorded by the Judge Small Causes are final and binding on the revisional Court. Additional evidence subsequently discovered by a party cannot be admitted in a revision to demonstrate that the finding given by the Judge Small Causes was erroneous. Similarly, with the aid of expression "substantial cause" used in Order XLI Rule, 27, no evidence can be filed in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to fill in the lacuna." In paragraph 14 of this judgment the Division Bench has also clarified that subsequent events stands on a different footing from the additional evidence. That subsequent events betaken to be something as additional evidence. Additional evidence may consists of some evidence which may relate to the facts in issue but subsequently discovered the events of do not come with expression one coming into existence at subsequent events "additional evidence".;