Virendra Saran, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel for petitioner. The present writ petition has been filed by Muqeem against the order dated 30th November, 1990 of Km. Sadhana Rani Vth Additional Munsif Magistrate, Mathura granting Rs. 250/ - per month as maintenance to respondent No. 3 Smt. Nazama. The order passed by learned Munsif Magistrate has been confirmed in revision by III Additional Sessions Judge, Mathura by his order dated 7.1.1994. The basic argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that earlier also application u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No. 3 Smt. Nazama but the proceedings ended in a compromise. A copy of compromise has also been filed as Annexure 3 to the petition and a photostat copy of the certified copy of the order dated 28.3.1989 passed by Km. Sadhana Rani, VII Additional Munsif Magistrate Mathura in case No. 33/xi/88 has also been filed to show that the proceedings ended in compromise. I have gone through the compromise. In the compromise the husband gave an undertaking that he will keep his wife in a decent manner.
(2.) SRI . R.H. Zaidi learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the parties had entered into a compromise, they are bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise. Sri. Zaidi has placed reliance on the case of Hasim Hussain v. Rukaiya Begum, 1979 Crl. J. 1143, in which Hon'ble P.N. Bakshi, J. has held that if a compromise order has been passed in proceedings u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. the terms and conditions of the compromise are binding on the parties. I have gone through the compromise filed in the present case. It shows that the husband had given an undertaking that he would keep the wife in a decent manner. In such a situation the proceedings were simply dropped. The facts of the case of Hashim Hussain (Supra) are quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the case of Hashim Hussain (Supra) the proceeding u/s. 125 Cr.P.C. ended in a compromise which provided 250/ - per month to the wife as maintenance and hence maintenance was allowed to the wife in terms of the compromise. In the present case the situation is quite different. Husband and wife entered into a compromise and the proceedings were simply dropped on the basis of compromise, but thereafter the husband has gone back upon his promise and has again started treating the wife with cruelty. In my opinion even if the husband and wife start living together and get the proceedings u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. dropped by filing a compromise it is always open to a wife to take recourse to fresh proceedings u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. in case the husband neglects or refused to maintain the wife at a subsequent stage. The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in respect of an incident dated 24.4.1989 the wife prosecuted her husband u/ss. 498 -A/323, I.P.C. but the case resulted in acquittal. The order of acquittal has been annexed with the petition. In my opinion the acquittal of the petitioner for a solitary incident cannot be a ground for throwing out the case of the wife and refuse her maintenance. Cruelty as defined u/s. 498 -A I.P.C. has special meaning whereas sufficient grounds for not living with husband as mentioned u/s. 125, Cr.P.C. are quite different. I am of the opinion that the mere acquittal of the husband u/ss. 498 -A/323, I.P.C. is not enough to refuse maintenance to the wife. Considering the totality of circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that the present is not a case for exercising of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This petition is accordingly dismissed.;