Ravi S.Dhavan - (1.) THE petitioner, Anil Kumar Gangwar, a Driver with the U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, has filed the present writ petition impugning his order of termination dated 13 May, 1993, Annexure 8 to the writ petition, and the order in the departmental appeal dated 24 September, 1993, Annexure 10 to the writ petition. He had filed a writ petition earlier on 30 June, 1993, before the Honourable Vacation Judge, which writ petition was dismissed on the ground of a departmental alternate remedy being available. Finding that the order in the departmental appeal has gone against him, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition to impugn this order terminating his service, otherwise implying that the appellate order has upheld the termination of the services of w.e.f. 13 May, 1993.
(2.) REGARD being had to the circumstances of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in re State of U. P. v. Labh Chand, 1993 (2) SCC 495 the issue does arise before this Court on whether this petition can be entertained. On this aspect, on the decision of the Supreme Court being drawn to the notice of the learned counsel for the petitioner, yesterday, he sought an adjournment to argue the matter today, which he has done. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. R. P. Tripathi, Advocate, is that an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar for filing a writ petition and the High Court can consider the writ petition. In support of his contention, learned counsel has cited five cases viz. Vindya Nath Rai v. Registrar, Kanpur University, 1991 (1) ACJ 231; Umerh Chand Pandey v. State of U. P.. 1991 (1) ACJ 314; Nalini Ranjan Vidyarthi v. LIC, 1991 (1) ACJ 392; Brahma Prakash Misra v. Farrukhabad Zila Sahkari Bank Limited, 1991 (1) ACJ 707 and Iftikhar Ahmad Siddiqui v. State of U.P., 1991 (2) ACJ 1195. There is no quarrel with the proposition submitted at the Bar that it is at the discretion of the High Court to entertain a writ petition against an arbitrary executive action and where there may be a patent lack of jurisdiction or miscarriage of justice, a writ may issue. But, this is not the aspect of the matter in the writ petition under consideration and, thus, any of the decision which may have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, may be of guidance to this Court. But, after the decision of the Supreme Court, in reference to the context specifically, the issue before the Court is not whether an alternate remedy is an absolute bar before the Court. The issue before the Court is that could such of those public servants whose services come within the purview of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976, short-circuit the Tribunal which has been specifically constituted under the Act and file a writ petition to impugn an action which otherwise ought to be considered by the Tribunal so constituted under the enactment, aforesaid. Rather than go into the matter of considering the provisions of the Act itself, this Court is reproducing the observations of the Supreme Court in this regard:
(3.) AS is seen from the said preamble, the provisions in the Act and the Rules, the U. P. Public Services Tribunal is intended to be an exclusive and exhaustive machinery or forum for adjudication of claims of all public servants including the persons in the service or pay of the State Government, in matters of their employment, inasmuch as, suits in such matters are specifically barred by the provisions in section 6 of the Act. That Tribunal since composes of a Judicial Member who is a serving Judge of the High Court or is qualified to become such Judge and an Administrative Member who holds or has held the post of, or any Division, it is a statutory Tribunal of the State possessed of expertise to adjudicate claims of public servants in matter of their employment. That the Tribunal in its enquiries being not bound by the technical rules of procedure under the Civil Procedure Code and the technical rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, it could avail of its vast powers of enquiry to redress grievances of public servants concerning efficaciously. The fact that section 4 of the Act declares that the decision of the Tribunal is final subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution itself shows the nature of high judicial sanctity attached by statute to such decision. 16. If we have regard to the High status of the members constituting the Tribunal, expertise possessed by such members to consider the claims of employees in matters of their employment, vast powers invested in them to hold exhaustive enquiries and to grant full reliefs in matters relating to their employment, we cannot but hold that that Tribunal is the highest forum created by the Act to give full and complete relief to public servants in matters of their employment, that too, with expedition............" 5. Regard being had to the circumstances that the Supreme Court has now in no uncertain terms said that those persons who come within the purview of the definition of a "Public servant', as referred to in section 2 (b) of the Act. the Tribunal so constituted, under the Act, is the exclusive and the exhaustive remedy, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain a petition in matters which are cognizable for considering the merits of the issue by the Tribunal. At the expense of repetition, this Court has also to take note of the observations of the Supreme Court that the Act declares that the decision of the Tribunal is final, subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, itself shows the nature of high judicial sanctity attached by the statute to a decision of the Tribunal. The reference to the observation of the Supreme Court is clearly to section 4 and the recital in this section, to the effect, that 'the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall subject to the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution be final." The other argument which was raised by learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Tribunal which is functioning under the Act, is not an effective remedy. This Court is afraid that no comment may be made by this Court on the submission made at the Bar because the occasion to test the decision of the Tribunal, whether it is effective or not, will arise when any decision of the Tribunal is subject to a petition under Article 226 or Article 227.;