- (1.) N. B. Asthana, J. This revision has been directed against the order dated 15-7-1994 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut in Criminal Case No. 4400 of 1994 summoning the revisionist under Section 406, IPC. A pre liminary point cropped up as to whether order in question is an interlocutory order against which revision is barred by Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. Reliance has been placed upon Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1977 SC 2187. It was held therein that the "term interlocutory" in Section 397 (2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially effects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397. . . . . . . . . . But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused on a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
(2.) THE order in question cannot be said to adjudicate or affect the rights of the revisionists. THEy have simply been asked to appear in court on date fixed for standing trial of an offence punishable under Section 406, IPC. In that case the F. I. R. mentioned a number of accused persons including the appellants before the Supreme Court as having participated in the occurrence which resulted in the death of the deceased. THE police after holding investi gations submitted a charge-sheet against the other accused persons except the appellants against whom the police opined that no case at all was made out. THE Judicial Magistrate who after perusing the report set the appellants at liberty after having accepted the report. A revision petition filed by the com plainant before the Sessions Judge against the order of the Magistrate releasing the appellant, was dismissed. THE appellant then filed a regular complaint before the judicial Magistrate against all the accused including the appellants which was also dismissed on merits. THE Session Judge in revision, however, set aside the order dismissing the complaint and ordered further inquiry. THE Magistrate on receiving the order of the Sessions Judge summon the appellants straightway which meant that the appellants were put upon trial. THE peti tion under Section 482 and Section 397 against the order of the Magistrate was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the order summoning the appellants was an interlocutory order. THE Supreme Court held in the circumstances of the case that the order in question could not be held to be an interlocutory order because the Magistrate summoned the appellants straightway without proper application of mind and without complying with the order of the Sessions Judge for further enquiry. In the circumstances the revision against the order in question was entertained. The next ruling relied upon is Ratan Singh v. Kusum alias Suman, 1985 ACC 39, in which the order summoning the accused was held to be revisable. In Kailash Chaudhary and others v. State of U. P. , 1983 ACC 664, it was held that the order summoning the accused is an interlocutory order against which no revision lies. A number of rulings were discussed and then the Hon'ble Judge came to the conclusion that such an order is an interlocu tory order against which no revision lies. The courts in that case was further of the opinion that in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (supra) and in K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, AIR 1977 SC 2185. Further same principle has been affirmed. The Supreme Court has been held in the case of K. M. Mathew that it is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued and that the Magistrate may drop the proceed ings if he is satisfied on the consideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which that accused could be tried. The power of Magistrate to drop proceedings against the accused has been read by the Supreme Court in Section 204 of the Code and not on the basis of any specific provision requiring the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process by virtue of judicial discretion of the Magistrate.
(3.) IN V. C. Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 SC 978, it was held that "an interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action but it does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties". Thus while summoning up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order.;