S. H. A. RAZA, J. - (1.) The fate of this writ petition hinges on the reply to the two questions, as to whether in accordance with the provisions contained in section 13 (3) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, there existed any reasonable ground for believing that the petitioner was evading the liability of the tax or other dues under the Act and that anything necessary for the purposes of investigation into his liability, might be found in any account, register or document before the seizure of such account, register or document and secondly that as to whether the provisions of sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were followed by the sales tax authorities at the time of inspection, search and seizure for the reason that the provisions of sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply in relation to any entry, search or inspection under sub-section (7) of section 13 of the Act. As far as the first ground is concerned, in para 23 of the writ petition, it has been averred by the petitioner that under section 13 (3) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that any dealer is trying to evade the liability to tax or other dues under the U. P. Sales Tax Act, no officer has any power to seize any account books, documents or registers, as there was no material whatsoever, on the basis of which such a belief, much less a reasonable belief, would have been formed that the petitioners were seeking to evade their liabilities to tax. In para 40 of the counter-affidavit, it has been averred by the respondents that there were sufficient grounds for forming the belief that the petitioners were trying to evade the liabilities to pay tax, which gave necessary jurisdiction to the deponent of the counter-affidavit, who is an officer, authorised by the State Government in that behalf, under section 13 (1) of the Act to inspect, search and seize any incriminating documents and material accounts found at the premises. In para 5 of the counter it has been averred/submitted that the petitioner No. 1, M/s. Mahalakshmi Poly Plast Pvt. Ltd. , Muzaffarnagar carries on, the business of manufacture of HDPE fabrics and bags laminated and unlaminated at 3 and 4-C, Industrial Estate, Muzaffarnagar and the other two petitioners sell the said commodities. Prior to January 29, 1985, HDPE laminated fabrics and HDPE bags (both laminated and unlaminated) were taxable and after January 31, 1985, all the aforesaid goods namely, HDPE fabrics and bags laminated and unlaminated, have been taxable by virtue of the Notification No. ST 27038/x dated January 31, 1985. The petitioners even prior to January 31, 1985, claimed exemption on the sale of the manufactured commodity on the ground that the commodity manufactured by it, was covered by entry "fabrics" which claim was in turn, based on false assertion that he was mainly manufacturing fabrics and not bags. The petitioner No. 1 was thus evading tax by manufacturing bags, whereas he was declaring sale of fabrics mainly. Accordingly to the averments in the counter-affidavit, the deponent had further information that all the three petitioners, were making sales on challans without raising proper bills in respect of the same, and thereby were suppressing the sales. On the basis of the above information, the deponent formed a belief that the petitioners were trying to evade liability tax and consequently wanted to inspect the accounts of the petitioners, in exercise of the powers conferred on him, by sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 13 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. On the basis of the aforesaid averments, it was vehemently argued by the learned Standing Counsel that the officers authorised under sub-section (2), had reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioners were trying to evade liabilities for tax or other dues under the provisions of this Act, hence actions for making inspection, search, and seizure of the account books, etc. , were taken. In the case of Agrawal Engineering Stores v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in [1971] 28 STC 507 (All.), honourable Mr. Justice S. N. Dwivedi (as he then was), speaking on behalf of the Full Bench, indicated in para 19 of the Report as under : " The power of seizure is also severely limited in several other ways. Firstly, the power may be exercised only when the authorised officer has 'reasonable grounds for believing (1) that any dealer is trying to evade liability for tax' and (2) that anything necessary for the purpose of an investigation into his liability may be found in any account, register or documents. Reasonable grounds for believing both these things should co-exist prior to the making of search and seizure. Reasonable grounds should exist objectively and can be tested in a court. Where the court finds that they did not exist, the search and seizure will be illegal. " The aforesaid observations of the Full Bench were based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande AIR 1946 PC 123 Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board [1966] 36 Comp Cas 39; AIR 1967 SC 295 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal [1969] 39 Comp Cas 781; [1969] 3 SCR 108. It was further indicated by the Full Bench that that the law does not oblige the authorised officer to record reasonable grounds for his belief, is a weakness of meagre weight. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner AIR 1978 SC 851, honourable Mr. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer (as he then was), speaking for the Bench, indicated in para 8 of the Report as under : " The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. , in Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16 (at page 18) : 'public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority, cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. '" The learned Standing Counsel has drawn our attention towards various passages of the counter-affidavit, wherein details of the lapses on the part of the petitioners have been indicated. The acts of omission and commission alleged to have been perpetrated by the petitioners, which came to light after the inspection of the relevant documents, were also read over before this Court and a strenuous effort has been made to convince this Court that the petitioner was guilty of tax evasion on the basis of those records, which were seized. Some of the incidents, which occurred in the course of making search and seizure, were also brought to the notice of this Court. No doubt, several acts of omission and commission on the part of the petitioners, at the time when the search and seizure operation was going on may be said to be not proper particularly the resistance on the part of the petitioners at the time, when the raid was conducted by public servants, in consequences whereof, F. I. Rs were lodged by both sides, but in spite of the aforesaid acts of omission and commission, this Court has to examine as to whether before taking a decision to make inspection, search and seizure, the authorities concerned have satisfied themselves, either subjectively or objectively, as to whether, there existed reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner was evading taxes. In the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver [1967] 20 STC 453 (SC) in which the State of Kerala also intervened, honourable the Chief Justice K. N. Wanchoo (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench, indicated at page 468 of the Report as under : ". . . . . . We are therefore of opinion that safeguards provided in section 165 also apply to searches made under sub-section (2 ). These safeguards are (i) the empowered officer must have reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purpose of recovery of tax may be found in any place within his jurisdiction, (ii) he must be of the opinion that such thing cannot be otherwise got without undue delay, (iii) he must record in writing the grounds of his belief, and (iv) he must specify in such writing so far as possible the thing for which search is to be made. After he has done these things, he can make the search. " Section 13 (7) of the State Sales Tax Act provides that the provisions of section 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would mutatis mutandis, apply in relation to an entry, search or inspection under section 13 of the Act, It was averred that inasmuch as the provision of sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have not been complied with, hence the entry, inspection as well as search was wholly illegal, arbitrary, mala fide and without jurisdiction. No doubt, the averments made in para 35 of the writ petition are too general, sweeping and indefinite inasmuch as, it has been not indicated as to what protection or safeguard provided under the provisions of sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been given to the petitioners at the time of inspection, search and seizure. In the same vein, the counter-affidavit says that the provisions of sections 100 and 165, Code of Criminal Procedure were followed by the authorities concerned. Provisions of section 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are reproduced below. " 100. Persons in charge of closed placed of allow search.- (1) Whenever any place liable to search or inspection under this chapter is closed, any person residing in, or being in charge of, such place, shall, on demand of the officer or other person executing the warrant, and on production of the warrant, allow him free ingress thereto, and afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein. (2) If ingress into such place cannot be so obtained, the officer or other person executing the warrant may proceed in the manner provided by sub-section (2) of section 47. (3) Where any person in or about such place is reasonably suspected of concealing about his person any article for which search should be made, such person may be searched and if such person is a woman, the search shall be made by another woman with strict regard to decency. (4) Before making a search under this chapter, the officer or other person about to make it shall call upon two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate or of any other locality, if no such inhabitant of the said locality is available or is willing to be a witness to the search, to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do. (5) The search shall be made in their presence, and a list of all things seized in the course of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found shall be prepared by such officer or other person and signed by such witnesses but no person witnessing a search under this under this section shall be required to attend the court as a witness of the search unless specially summoned by it. (6) The occupant of the place searched, or some person in his behalf, shall, in every instance, be permitted to attend during the search, and a copy of the list prepared under this section, signed by the said witnesses, shall be delivered to such occupant or person. (7) When any person is searched under sub-section (3), a list of all things taken possession of shall be prepared, and a copy thereof shall be delivered to such person. (8) Any person who, without reasonable cause, refuses or neglects to attend and witness a search under this section, when called upon to do so by an order in writing delivered or tendered to him, shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 187 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ). " " 165. Search by police officer.- (1) Whenever an officer in-charge of a police station or a police officer making an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police station of which he is in-charge, or to which he is attached, and that such thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay, such officer may, after recording in writing the grounds of his belief and specifying in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made, search, or cause search to be made, for such thing in any place within the limits of such station. (2) A police officer proceeding under sub-section (1), shall, if practicable, conduct the search in person. (3) If he is unable to conduct the search in person, and there is no other person competent to make the search present at the time, he may, after recording in writing his reasons for so doing require any officer subordinate to him to make the search, and he shall deliver to such subordinate officer an order in writing, specifying the place to be searched, and so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made and such subordinate officer may thereupon search for such thing in such place. (4) The provision of this Code as to search warrants and the general provisions as to searches contained in section 100 shall, so far as may be, apply to a search made under this section. (5) Copies of any record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall forthwith be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, and the owner or occupier of the place searched shall, on application, be furnished, free of cost, with a copy of the same by the Magistrate. " Learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon the case of Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), Income-tax reported in [1974] 93 ITR 505 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348. Honourable Mr. Justice D. G. Palekar on his behalf as well as on behalf of honourable A. N. Ray, C. J. , Y. V. Chandrachud, A. Alagiriswami and P. N. Bhagwati, JJ. , in a case pertaining to section 132 A or rule 112-A, indicated in para 26 of the Report (page 528 of ITR) as under : " In that view, even assuming, as was done by the High Court, that the search and seizure were in contravention of the provision of section 132 of the Income-tax Act, still the material seized was liable to be used subject to law before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody it was seized and, therefore, no writ of prohibition in restraint of such use could be granted. It must be, therefore, held that the High Court was right in dismissing the two writ petitions. The appeals must also fail and are dismissed with costs. " In the case of Partap Singh v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, honourable Mr. Justice D. A. Desai, on his behalf as well as on behalf of honourable Mr. Justice V. Balakrishna Eradi, reported in [1985] 155 ITR 166 (SC); (1985) 3 SCC 72, indicated in paragraphs 12 and 15 of the Report (pages 173 and 174 of ITR) as under : " 12. Section 37 (2) provides that 'the provisions of the Code relating to searches, shall so far as may be, apply to searches directed under section 37 (1)'. Reading the two sub-sections together, it merely means that the methodology prescribed for carrying out a search provided in section 165 has to be generally followed. The expression 'so far as may be' has always been construed to mean that those provisions may be generally followed to the extent possible. The submission that section 165 (1) has been incorporated by pen and ink in section 37 (2) has to be negatived in view of the positive language employed in the section that the provisions relating to searches shall so far as may be apply to searches under section 37 (1 ). If section 165 (1 ). was to be incorporated by pen and ink as sub-section (2) of section 37, the legislative draftsmanship will leave no room for doubt by providing that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to searches shall apply to the searches directed or ordered under section 37 (1) except that the power will be exercised by the Director of Enforcement or other officer exercising his power and he will be substituted in place of the Magistrate. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 37 has not been cast in any such language. It merely provides that the search may be carried out according to the method prescribed in section 165 (1) If the duty to record reasons which furnish grounds for entertaining a reasonable belief were to be recorded in advance, the same could have been incorporated in section 37 (1), otherwise a simple one-line section would have been sufficient that all searches as required for the purpose of this Act shall be carried out in the manner prescribed in section 165 of the Code by the officer to be set out in the section. In order to give full meaning to the expression 'so far as may be', sub-section (2) of section 37 should be interpreted to mean that broadly, the procedure relating to search as enacted in section 165 shall be followed. But if a deviation becomes necessary to carry out the the purposes of the Act in which section 37 (1) is incorporated, it would be permissible except that when challenged before a court of law, justification will have to be offered for the deviation. This view will give full play to the expression 'so far as may be'. " " 15. Assuming that it is obligatory upon the officer proceeding to make a search or directing a search to record an writing the grounds of his relief and also to specify in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for which the search is to be made, is mandatory and that non-recording of his reasons would result in the search being condemned as illegal, what consequence it would have on the seizure of the documents during such illegal search. The view taken by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. 's case AIR 1976 Cal 178, that once the authorisation for carrying out the search is found to be illegal on account of the absence of recording of reasons in the formation of a reasonable belief, the officer who has seized documents during such search must return the documents seized as a result of the illegal search is against the weight of judicial opinion on the subject and does not commend to us. In fact this decision should not detain us at all because virtually for all practical purposes, it can be said to have been overruled by the decision of the Constitution Bench in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), Income-tax [1974] 93 ITR 505 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348. This Court held that 'courts in India and even in England have consistently refused to exclude relevant evidence merely on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search or seizure. ' If, therefore, the view of the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court were to be accepted, meaning thereby that if the search is shown to be illegal, anything seized during such illegal search will have to be returned to the person from whose premises the same was seized, it would be tantamount to saying that evidence collected during illegal search must be excluded on that ground alone. This was in terms negatived by the Constitution Bench. It has been often held that the illegality in the method, manner or initiation of a search does not necessarily mean that anything seized during the search has to be returned. After all, in the course of a search, things or documents are required to be seized and such things and documents when seized may furnish evidence. Illegality of the search does not vitiate the evidence collected during such illegal search. The only requirement is that the court or the authority before which such material or evidence seized during the search shown to be illegal is placed has to be cautious and circumspect in dealing with such evidence or material. This is too well-established to necessitate its substantiation by a precedent. However, one can profitably refer to Radha Kishan v. State of U. P. [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 408; AIR 1963 SC 822, wherein the court held that assuming that the search was illegal, the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. It may be that because of the illegality of the search, the court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding seizure, but no other consequence ensues. [see State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni (1980) 4 SCC 669; AIR 1980 SC 593]. " It is pertinent to mention here that section 37 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is not analogous to section 13 (7) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, while section 37 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act provides that the provisions of the Code relating to searches shall, so far as may be, apply to searches directed under section 37 (1 ). Section 13 (7) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act provides that the provisions of sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to any entry, or search or inspection under this section as they apply in relation to any inspection or search under the said Code. After reading the provisions of section 37 (1) and section 37 (2), the honourable Supreme Court rules that methodology prescribed for carrying out the search provided in section 165 has to be generally followed. The words "so far as may be" has always been construed to mean that those provisions may generally be followed to the extent possible. In the light of the aforesaid observations, the court held that if the duty to record reasons which furnish grounds for entertaining a reasonable belief were to be recorded in advance, the same could have been incorporated in section 37 (1), otherwise a simple one-line section would have been sufficient that all searches as required for the purpose of this Act shall be carried out in the manner prescribed in section 165 of the Code by the Officer to be set out in this section. In case the provision of section 165 was not followed or the officer making a search deviates from it, the honourable Supreme Court rules that such deviation is permissible but would be subject to judicial scrutiny of the court. In Partap Singh's case [1985] 155 ITR 166 (SC); (1985) 3 SCC 72, the honourable Supreme Court disagreed with the view, which was taken by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1976 Cal 178 that once the authorisation for carrying out the search is found to be illegal on account of the absence of recording of reasons in the formation of a reasonable belief, the officer who has seized documents during such search, must return the documents seized as a result of illegal search, is against the weight of judicial opinion on the subject and does not commend to us. Later on, the Supreme Court said that Calcutta's case mentioned above, was overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection [1974] 93 ITR 505; [1974] 2 SCR 704. Probably, the attention of the Supreme Court escaped in the case of Partap Singh [1985] 155 ITR 166; (1985) 3 SCC 72, that the judgment of the Calcutta High Court was subsequent to the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court, hence it could have not been overruled, but in any, in the case of Partap Singh's case [1985] 155 ITR 166; (1985) 3 SCC 72, the Division Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of two honourable Judges, expressed its disagreement with the decision of the Calcutta High Court in New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1976 Cal 178 in view of the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court in Pooran Mal's case [1974] 93 ITR 505; AIR 1974 SC 348. In the light of the above context, it has to be seen and examined as to what is the ratio decidendi of Pooran Mal's case [1974] 93 ITR 505 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348 which pertained to seizure and search made by the income-tax authorities under section 132 of the Income-tax Act. Honourable Supreme Court indicated that if the search and seizure were in contravention of the provisions of section 132 of the Income-tax Act, still the material seized was liable to be used subject to law, before the income-tax authorities against the person from whose custody, it was seized and therefore, no writ in the nature of prohibition could be issued. In view of the aforesaid observations of the honourable Supreme Court, we are of the view that the relief sought by the petitioner at Nos. 2 and 4 in the relief column, cannot be granted to the petitioner, but as far as other reliefs pertaining to the return of the documents so seized is concerned it has to be examined as to whether this relief sustains or not. Ratio of Pooran Mal's case [1974] 93 ITR 505 (SC); AIR 1974 SC 348, in a nut-shell is that the seized documents can be used in evidence, but there it does not lay down the law that in case, search and seizure was illegal and not in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with section 13 (7) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, the documents seized deserve to be returned or not, to the person, from whose possession it was seized. In the case of Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] Supp 1 SCR 408; AIR 1963 SC 822, wherein, honourable Mr. Justice Mudholkar (as he then was) speaking on his behalf as well as of two honourable Judges indicated that so far as alleged illegality of the search is concerned, it is sufficient to say that even assuming that the search was illegal, the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. It may be that where the provisions of sections 100 and 165, Code of Criminal Procedure are contravened, the search could be resisted by the persons whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search, the court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure but beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues. It is really surprising that from the side of the respondents, the relevant records have not been produced before this Court. Although in para 5 of the counter-affidavit, it was averred that the petitioner No. 1 was evading tax by manufacturing bags whereas he was declaring sale of fabrics and all the petitioners were making sales on challans without raising proper bills in respect of the same and thereby, suppressing the sale and on the basis of the above information, the sales tax authorities formed a belief that the petitioners were trying to evade liability of the tax, but the relevant pertaining to the information received, formation of a reasonable ground for believing that the petitioners were trying to evade liability of the tax or other dues, etc. , have not been placed before this Court. Although, in the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that the provisions of sections 100 and 165, Code of Criminal Procedure were followed, but it has not been indicated as to whether the three conditions as contained in section 165 and the other pre-requisites of section 100 as indicated hereinabove have been followed. No record pertaining to the same has been produced. It is a settled legal principle of evidence, that if the best evidence available with a person is not produced, then an adverse inference would be taken against that particular person. Admittedly, the Sales Tax Department must be possessing the relevant records, hence it was incumbent upon them, to have produced the entire record before this Court to indicate that there existed sufficient grounds for believing that the petitioners were evading the tax and the procedure prescribed under sections 100 and 165 were followed, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver [1967] 20 STC 453. In view of the aforesaid position, we have no other option, except to accept the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the inspection, search and seizure was not in accordance with the provisions of sections 13 (3) and 13 (7) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act read with sections 100 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the question as to what would be the consequence of the aforesaid observations, learned Standing Counsel contended that when the seized documents could be used in evidence, its return to the petitioners does not arise at all. In the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver [1967] 20 STC 453 (SC), it was laid down that anything recovered from the the search of the residential accommodation on the basis of the defective warrant, must be returned for the reasons that the safeguards provided under section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not appear to have been followed when the said search was made. The aforesaid decision was pronounced by five honourable Judges of the Supreme Court. Hence being a case of a large Bench, the ratio of the aforesaid case would be applicable to the facts of the instant case. The decision of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Partap Singh v. Director of Enforcement [1985] 155 ITR 166; (1985) 3 SCC 72, was delivered by two honourable Judges of the Supreme Court. The decision of a larger Bench even pronounced earlier in comparison of a decision of a Bench consisting of two honourable Judges, would prevail. This view of ours, is fortified by the decision of the honourable Supreme Court in the cases of Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection reported in [1974] 93 ITR 505; [1974] 2 SCR 704; AIR 1974 SC 348, Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] Supp 1 SCR 408; AIR 1963 SC 822 and State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi AIR 1976 SC 2547. The learned Standing Counsel wanted us to delve into certain facts and nature of the documents, which according to him, reflect the character of the petitioners in evading the taxes. Such events and the material which have been referred and relied upon, have no nexus with the formation of a reasonable opinion prior to making the search. Hence it is not relevant for the purpose of this case. The validity of action must be judged by the reasons indicated prior to inspection, search and seizure and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit, etc. In view of the above, we are of the view that as the inspection, search and seizure were not in accordance with law, anything recovered from the search of the premises of the petitioners, must be returned. But we are of the view that while returning the same, the relevant documents which have been kept under sealed cover, under the direction of this Court, should be opened by the sales tax authorities, in the presence of the petitioners or their nominee or counsel, and after obtaining photo copies of all the relevant documents, which may be kept by the sales tax authorities for themselves, the original documents, would be returned. In view of what we have indicated hereinabove, this writ petition partly succeeds. A writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to return all the account books, registers, documents, etc. , which were seized by the respondents in the night of 17th and 18th February, 1986, from premises of the petitioners, is issued. However, the sales tax authorities in the presence of the petitioners or their nominee or counsel, will open the sealed cover which contains the relevant documents and after obtaining photo copies of the same which the sales tax authorities may retain for themselves, will return the original documents to the petitioners expeditiously, say, within a period of six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. Writ petition partly allowed. .;