R.A. Sharma, J. - (1.) THE Respondents, who are Constables in U.P. Police applied for promotion to the posts of Head Constables. As they were not found eligible they were not sent for training of Head Constable. Being aggrieved thereby, they filed a writ petition before this Court in which an interim order was passed on 18.12.1990 directing the Respondents therein to send them for training of Head Constable. in pursuance of the above interim order, Respondents were allowed to join the training of Head Constable. After they had completed the course, they made an application before the learned Single Judge for issuing a direction to the State to declare their result and appoint them as Head Constable. Learned Single Judge on 5.11.1992 allowed the writ petition with the observation that as the Respondents have already completed the training, it is not necessary to decide the writ petition on merit "because after the interim order if this Court the Petitioners have undoubtedly completed more than three years after doing the training of Head Constable and hence they are qualified in the examination." Learned Judge accordingly issued a mandamus directing the Respondents to the writ petition to declare the result of the Respondents herein and if they are found successful, they should be posted as Head Constable. Against the above judgment of the learned Single Judge, this appeal has been filed.
(2.) WE have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for both the parties have requested that this appeal may be disposed of finally at this stage. Petitioners/Respondents were not sent for training of Head Constable as they were not found eligible by the Police Authorities for promotion to the post of Head Constable. They were sent for training of Head Constable in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court. This Court while passing the interim order did not go into question of the eligibility of the Respondents for being promoted to the post of Head Constable. While deciding the writ petition the question of their eligibility has also not been decided. The result is that although the order of the authorities holding the Respondents as not eligible still stands but they have been promoted to the post of Head Constable by the order of this Court.
(3.) IF a person is not eligible for being promoted or appointed to a higher post, this Court has no Jurisdiction to direct the promotion or appointment to such a post. By the interim order, no vested rights are created in favour of any party. If this Court has permitted the Petitioners/Respondents to undergo the training of Head Constable, they cannot be appointed to that post even if they have completed the training unless they satisfy the Court about their eligibility. Any direction by this Court to promote them to the post of Head Constable without deciding the question of their eligibility for promotion is absolutely without authority of law and cannot be sustained. Consideration of sympathy in disregard of law cannot be sustained. In this connection, reference may be made to the Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar and Anr. : JT 1994 (2) SC 183, wherein Supreme Court has laid down as: The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration. No doubt Shakespeare said in Merchant of Venice: 'The quality of mercy is not strained .It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath it is twice blessed It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes. These words will not apply to all situations. Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered "law is the embodiment of all wisdom". Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. At this juncture, we may usefully refer to Martin Bum Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta : AIR 1966 SC 529. At page 535 of the Report, the following observations are found: A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect whether a Court likes the result or not. The Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregard of law, however hard the case may be, it could never be done. in the very case itself, there are Regulations and Instructions which we have extracted above. The Court below has not even examined whether a case falls within the scope of these statutory provisions. Clause 2 of Sub -clause (iii) of Instructions makes it clear that relaxation could be given only when none of the members of the family is gainfully employed. Clause 4 of the circular dated 20.1.1987 interdicts such an appointment on compassionate grounds. The Appellant Corporation being a statutory Corporation is bound by the Life Insurance Corporation Act as well as the statutory Regulations and Instructions. They cannot be put aside and compassionate appointment be ordered. Further, it is well -settled in law that no mandamus will be issued directing to do a thing forbidden by law. In Brij Mohan v. M.P.S.R.T. Corporation : AIR 1987 SC 29 it is stated as under: The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and in particular Sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders of permits including the State Road Transport Corporation from indulging in unauthorised trafficking in permits. Therefore, the agreement entered into by the Petitioner, unemployed graduate, with the State Road Transport Corporation to ply his bus as nominee of the Corporation on the route in respect of which the permit was issued in favour of the Corporation for a period of five years, was clearly contrary to the Act and cannot, therefore, be enforced. in the circumstances, the Petitioner would not be entitled to the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Corporation to allow him to operate his motor vehicle as a stage carriage under the permit obtained by the Corporation as its nominee. It is true that there may be pitiable situations but in that score, the statutory provisions cannot be put aside. In U.P. Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad and Anr. v. Alpana : JT 1994 SC 94, Public Service Commission refused to call the Respondents therein for interview. She filed the writ petition before this Court. This Court while entertaining the writ petition directed the Commission to interview her but withhold her result until further orders. She was accordingly interviewed by the Commission but her result was not declared. This Court disposed of the writ petition with the direction to the Commission to declare her result and if she is found successful to forward her name for appointment to the Government. It was further directed that if found necessary a supernumerary post be created to accommodate her. Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of this Court has laid down as under: The facts of this case reveal that the Respondent was not qualified to apply since the last date fixed for receipt of applications was August 20, 1988. No rule or practice is shown to have existed which permitted entertainment of her application. The Public Service Commission was, therefore, right in refusing to call her for interview. The High Court in Writ Petition No. 1898/91 mandated the Public Service Commission to interview her but directed to withhold the result until further orders. in obedience to the directive of the High Court, the Public Service Commission interviewed her but her result was kept in abeyance. Thereafter, the High Court while disposing of the matter, finally directed the Public Service Commission to declare her result and, if successful, to forward her name for appointment. The High Court even went to the length of ordering the creation of supernumerary post to accommodate her. This approach of the High Court cannot be supported on any rule or prevalent practice nor can it be supported on equitable considerations. in fact there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with the refusal of the Public Service Commission to interview her in the absence of any specific rule in that behalf. We find it difficult to give recognition to such an approach of the High Court as that would open up a flood of litigation. Many candidates superior to the Respondent in merit may not have applied as the result of the examination was not declared before the last date for receipt of applications. If once such an approach is recognised there would be several applications received from such candidates not eligible to apply and that would not only increase avoidable work of the selecting authorities but would also increase the pressure on such authorities to withhold interviews till the results as declared, thereby causing avoidable administrative difficulties. This would also leave vacancies unfilled for long spells of time. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the view of the High Court impugned in this appeal.;