K.N.Singh, J. - (1.) This petition is directed against the order of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, dated 7 May 1977, refusing to grant approval for the dismissal of three of the petitioners employees.
(2.) Moti Mahal Talkies, Kanpur, carries on the business of exhibiting cinematograph films. Ashfaq Hussain, Shah Mohammad and Nathoo, respondents 2, 3 and 4, respectively, were in the petitioners employment at the cinema. The petitioner has asserted that on 6 February 1976, the aforesaid three respondents were found gambling in the premises of the cinema house. Charges were framed against them and domestic enquiry was held and thereafter they were found guilty. The petitioner proposed termination of their service and submitted applications under section 6E(2)16) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for obtaining approval of the Tribunal as a dispute regarding bonus was pending before it. The Tribunal after hearing both the parties refused to grant approval by the order, dated 7 May 1977, on the ground that the domestic enquiry was biased and that there was no adequate material on record to prove the charges. Aggrieved, the petitioner has challenged the order of the Tribunal.
(3.) Section 6E of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, imposes restrictions on the employer in changing conditions of employment of workmen or in terminating their services, if any dispute between the workmen and the employer is pending adjudication before the Conciliation Officer, Labour Court or Tribunal. Sub-section (2) (b) contemplates dismissal of the workman for any misconduct unconnected with the dispute which may be pending before the Industrial Court after obtaining approval of the Industrial Court. The section itself does not prescribe scope and power the Industrial Court in considering the employers application for according approval but the Supreme Court has in several cases laid down the scope of the proceedings regarding approval. Section 6 E(2)(b) is pari material to section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central) Act, 1947. In Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its workmen, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 860 , the Supreme Court considered the scope of section 33 (2) (of). The Court observed that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court while ' considering the question of approval is limited one. The Court observed as under: "Do the Standing Orders justify the order of dismissal ? Has an enquiry been held as provided by the Standing Orders? Have the wages for the month been paid as required by the proviso ? and Has an application been made as prescribed by the proviso - The Court observed that if all there conditions have been fulfilled by the employer the Tribunal is not justified in refusing to accord approval to the action taken by the employer. If the above four requirements of law are complied with the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to refuse to accord approval to the action taken by the employer. In considering the question of approval the Industrial Court is not entitled to reappraise the evidence or to sit in appeal over the findings recorded at the domestic enquiry. Emphasising this aspect of the matter the Supreme Court observed : " Nor is it justified while holding the enquiry to assume powers of an appellate Court which alone is entitled to go into of all questions of fact. The question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a Court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate Court which is entitled to consider facts ; but these consideration are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as under section 33(2)(i).B And if the Tribunal assumes jurisdiction not vested in it by law, and consequently refuses to accord approval to the acting taken by the employer its order is patently erroneous in law." There is no dispute that the above principle laid down by the Supreme Court hold that field even today. In the present case, till Tribunal has recorded finding that the circumstances of the case are such that the suspicion of the framed up charge and the unbiased enquiry are not completely ruled out. The Tribunal has not recorded any positive finding that the charges were named up or that the enquiry was biased one. A mere suspicion of framed up charges or suspicion of biased enquiry cannot be a sufficient ground to hold the domestic enquiry vitiated. On the material on record the finding of the Tribunal is perverse. Respondents 3 and 4 made an application admitting their guilt. They also did not contest the proceedings before the Tribunal. Only Ashfaq Hussain contested the proceedings. The employers had produced copies of the statement of Shah Mohammad and Nathoo to support their contention. The finding regarding bias has been recorded by the Tribunal merely on the ground that the enquiry officer had written the charge sheet on the dictation of the manager of the petitioner. It is difficult to sustain this finding. Merely because enquiry officer wrote down the charges does not mean that he was biased. Tribunal further exceeded its jurisdiction in discarding the testimony of R.K. Chatterji, who was an independent witness to prove the charges against the Three workmen. The Tribunal acted like a Court of appeal in holding that the enquiry officer had not arrived at its conclusions in a reasonable manner. In substance the Tribunal reappraised the evidence like a Court of appeal in holding that the charges not proved and the enquiry was vitiated.;