N. D. Ojha, J. - (1.) THE petitioner was holding the office of Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha Bhaikuri, Pargana and Tehsil Sikandra Rao, Block Hsayan, district Aligrah. A motion of no confidence was moved against the petitioner and 28th September, 1983, was the date fixed for the consideration of the said motion. Subsequently, however, on verification it transpired that the motion had been signed by less than half of the members of the Gaon Sabha and since sub-rule (1) of rule 33-B of U. P. Panchayat Raj rules (hereinafter referred to as the rules/ prescribes that such a motion shall be signed by not less than one half of the total number of members of the Gaon Sabha, an order was passed on 20th September, 1983, cancelling the meeting scheduled for 28th September, 1983. About four days later another motion of no confidence was presented against the petitioner on 24th September, 1983. On its basis a meeting of the Gaon Sabha was convened for 22nd October, 1983, as contemplated by section 14 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In the meeting so convened 853 members of the Gaon Sabha participated, out of whom 596, voted in favour of the motion of no confidence and 257 against it. Since the motion was carried by a majority of more than two thirds of the members present and voting the petitioner was removed from the office of Pradhan as contemplated by section 14 (1) of the Act. It is this order which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.
(2.) IT was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the meeting scheduled for 28th September 1983, for consideration of the earlier motion of no confidence had been cancelled the subsequent meeting convened for 22nd October, 1983, was barred by section 14 (3) of the Act. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act contemplates that if the motion is not taken up for want of quorum or fails for lack of requisite majority at the meeting, no subsequent meeting for the removal of the same Pradhan shall be convened within a year of the date of the previous meeting. In the instant case, the meeting scheduled for 28th September, 1983, was not cancelled for want of quorum, nor did it fail for lack of requisite majority at the meeting. Apparently, therefore, subsection (3) of section 14 of the Act was not attracted. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no personal service of the meeting to be held on 22nd October, 1983, was effected on the petitioner and consequently the meeting held on that date was invalid. We find it difficult to agree with this submission either. Sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of this section, the procedure for the removal of a Pradhan, including that to be followed at such meeting, shall be such as may be prescribed. The term prescribed has been defined in section 2, sub-section (p) of the Act and according to that definition it means prescribed by the Act or rules made thereunder. Rules 33-B and 37 of the rules are relevant in this connection. Rule 33-B prescribes the procedure to be followed for removal of the Pradhan or Up Pradhan whereas rule 37 prescribes the mothod of notification of meeting of the Gaon Sabha. Rule 37 reads :- " 37. Meeting to be notified-(1) a notice to attend a meeting of the Gaon Sabha shall state the date, time and place of the meeting and shall be published by affixing it at conspicuous places in the area of Gaon Sabha. The announcement of the date, time and place of the meeting shall also be made by the beat of drum. (2) A notice of a meeting of a Gaon Panchayat shall be sent to each member through a chowkidar or a peon at least five days before the meeting and shall also be published by affixing copies of the notice at conspicuous places within the jurisdiction of the Gaon Panchayat." A bare perusal of rule 37 of the Rules indicates that the rule itself has made a distinction in the procedure to be followed in regard to notice of a meeting of a Gaon Sabha vis-a-vis notice of a meeting of a Gaon Panchayat, whereas sub-rule (2) of rule 37 of the Rules which deals with the notice of a meeting of the Gaon Panchayat prescribes that notice shall be sent to each member through a chowkidar or a peon at least five days before the meeting no such requirement is to be found in regard to a notice for a meeting of Gaon Sabha in sub-rule (1) of rule 37 of the Rules. In regard to a meeting of a Gaon Sabha the requirements of sub-rule (1) of rule 37 is that a notice to attend the meeting of the Gaon Sabha shall be given by affixing it at conspicuous places in the area of Gaon Sabha and by communication of date, time and place of the meeting by beat of drum. A counter affidavit has been filed in which it has been specifically stated that notice of the meeting scheduled for 22nd October, 1983, was given in the manner prescribed by sub-rule (1) of rule 37 of the Rules. In view of the clear language of rule 37 and the distinction in regard to the two sets of meetings contained therein we are of opinion that the proceedings of the meeting dated 22nd October, 1983 cannot be held to be illegal on the ground that no notice of the said meeting had been personally served on the petitioner. In this connection, it may be pointed out that a supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner on 7th November, 1983. Paragraph 3 of that affidavit speaks of the method of service of the order dated 20th September, 1983, referred to above, on the members of the Gaon Sabha. It states that the said order was communicated to the members of the Gaon Sabha by beat of drum and by affixing notice at important places in the village. Even according to the petitioner the order dated 20th September, 1983 had been sufficiently served on the members of the Gaon Sabha. It is settled law that principles of natural justice only require that reasonable opportunity shall be given to the person against whom some order prejudicial to his interest is likely to be passed. In the absence of any statutory rule notice has obviously to be served on the person concerned personally. It is also settled law that if there are statutory rules prescribing the mode of service of notice upon the person concerned insistence on personal service cannot be made. On compliance of the statutory requirement it shall be presumed that the requisite notice has been served on the person concerned. The distinction pointed out above between the procedure prescribed in sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 37 itself makes it clear that the intention of those who framed the rules was that even though personal service was necessary in regard to the meeting of a Gaon Panchayat, no such service was necessary in regard to the meeting of a Gaon Sabha.
(3.) IT was then urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings of the meeting held on 22nd October, 1983, were vitiated on account of malafides. After going through the writ petition, the supplementary affidavit dated 7th November, 1983, referred to above, and the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners we are of opinion that no case of malafides whatsoever has been established. The counsel for the petitioner has, in this connection, brought to our notice copy of an application by the Up Pradhan stating that he had no notice of the meeting held on 22nd October, 1983 and that he never made any application in that meeting. On its basis, it was urged that since there is a mention in the impugned order that an application had been made by the Up Pradhan on behalf of the Pradhan with a request to be permitted to be present at the time of voting, the proceedings were mala fide. We fail to see how any malafide conduct can be imputed on its basis on the authorities concerned. Whether or not such an application was made was, in our opinion, hardly relevant for the validity of the meeting. Lastly, it was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act was ultra vires. Suffice it to say that the law on the question of delegated legislation as laid down by successive decisions of the Supreme Court is clear by now. It is not possible for the legislature to make provision for every minutest detail and it is precisely for this purpose that recourse to delegated legislation is taken. The delegation of power in such circumstances has always been held to be valid except in those cases where there is an application of necessary legislative function and unguided power has been conferred on the delegate. Sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act in our opinion does not suffer from this vice.;