M.Wahajuddin, J. - (1.) THESE are five connected writ petitions directed against the same judgment and order of the appellate Court in the Urban Ceiling Proceedings. Four of these writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition Nos. 172, 387, 888 and 389 of 1982 have been filed by Pramod Kumar, Subodh Kumar, Virendra Kumar and Vinod Kumar, who are all brothers having 1/4th share each. The Writ Petition No. 15307 of 1981 has been preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The first and most important point that arises for consideration is whether for servants quarter in the dwelling house appurtenance and additional appurtenance are to be allowed separately in addition to appurtenance and additional appurtenance allowed for the residential dwelling unit itself. The learned counsel for the State relied upon the case of State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson : 1983 A.L.R. 610, reversing this Court's judgment in the case of L.J. Johnson v. State of U.P., 1978 (4) A.L.R. 848 :, 1978 A.L.J. 1222. It is urged on behalf of the other side that in the case of J.L. Johnson v. State of U.P. (supra), which reversed the matter whether any appurtenance or additional appurtenance for servants quarters is to be allowed was not in consideration, nor the case proceeded to decide that aspect, so the reversal of such judgment would be immaterial, Actually, this Court has to consider as to what are the principles for determining the area covered under ceiling as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. L.J. Johnson (supra). It is note -worthy to observe that actually the Supreme Court was not disposing of the single case of L.J. Johnson case (supra) but very large number of cases. So it would not be material what were the specific facts of Johnson's case itself. What would be material is the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the ratio of the ruling. I may further say that so far as Supreme Court is concerned even its obiter dicta is binding upon this Court. The position has been summed up in paragraphs 27 to 30 of the Supreme Court's judgment and a reading of these paragraphs and paragraph 24 makes it abundantly clear that what the Supreme Court has laid down is that the total area of the land of the land -holder is first to be determined where there is a building and dwelling unit the area beneath it has to be excluded. If there are any bye -laws requiring a portion of the land to be kept vacant, such area to the maximum of 500 Sq. metres is to be excluded and an additional area of 500 Sq. metres for the beneficial use and enjoyment of the building has to be excluded and then after leaving out the permissible limit, as the case may be regarding place concerned, the rest will be taken in ceiling as excess area. It is, further, borne out that the building consists of such portions also, viz., motor -garage, servants' quarters etc., that will also be part of the building and though the area beneath them may be excluded, any additional appurtenance to the same, independently for each of them or any additional appurtenance in the same is not to be excluded. The principles and summary and analysis is vital and that has to be examined and interpreted.
(2.) THE Writ Petition No. 15307 of 1981 filed by the State, therefore, succeeds and it is hereby directed that no appurtenance or additional appurtenance is to be allowed for servants quarter etc., in addition to the area allowed for the building as such. In the writ petitions filed by the individual parties aforesaid, it is next urged that actually some of the land beneath the building is the land of the Central Government and the aggrieved parties cannot be treated as land -bolder of the same within the meaning of the ceiling area. It was urged that under the terms and conditions of the deed under which the land was given by the Central Government it can always resume it after payment of compensation for the construction. Stress was also laid upon the definition of the word 'to hold' in the Urban Ceiling Act. I have considered the whole matter. Actually unless and until the land is reverted back to the Central Government, the individual concerned in the petition will be treated as holding that land when it is beneath their building and in their campus and when they are in possession and have not parted with the same. Of course, in the matter of option they would not be debarred from opting out for such land to be given in ceiling, when they are treated to hold the land.
(3.) IT is next urged that while the existing road by the side of the buildings of the private petitioners is 30 feet wide, under the master plan it is mentioned as 80 feet wide. The State Counsel urged that it is a question of fact and should have been raised before the appellate Court. It is being further urged that actually the buildings are just abutting the road, so there is no question of leaving any further land for the expansion of the road under the master plan. It is also being urged that the alleged width of the Abu Nala Road is also not given as alleged by the other side in the master plan. While I would not enter into question of facts in the writ petition, I feel that as the writ petition of the State is being allowed, some excess area may now fall under ceiling and the matter will be determined by the first appellate Court. So, I would observe that though I am dismissing the writ petitions Nos. 172, 387, 388 and 389 of 1982, it will bar the appellate Court to reconsider this aspect while determining the further area to be taken in ceiling and carving out the same. In the result. Writ Petition Nos. 172, 387, 388 and 389 of 1982 are dismissed. While the Writ Petition No. 15307 of 1981, preferred by the State, is allowed and the first appellate Court will determine any further excess area to be taken in ceiling, it will also take into consideration the observations in the connected writs made by this Court. The parties shall bear their own costs of all the five writ petitions.;