D. N. Jha, J. - (1.) THE petitioners have directed these petitions under Article 226 ot the Constitution feeling aggrieved by the order of suspension dated 13-12-83 passed by Surperintendent of Police, Hardoi.
(2.) WE provided opportunity to the State Counsel and operation of the order had been stayed vide order dated 9-4-84. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and we have no hesitation in observing at the outset that the petition deserves to be allowed. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that petitioner could only be suspended during the pendency of the departmental or judicial enquiry into the charge of misconduct. In the instant case since no charge sheet had been delivered, therefore, no departmental proceedings had commenced and, therefore, the suspension of the petitioners was manifestly erroneous. We find some force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, as in clause 496 of the Police Regulations it has been specifically provided that all police officers are liable to suspension during departmental or judicial enquiry into the charge of misconduct. The suspension of an officer may be ordered by the authority who has the power to give him any form of departmental punishment, e. g., the Superintendent of Police may suspend an Inspector even though he cannot dismiss him. Therefore, power to suspend exists in the Superintendent of Police but not before the commencement of the departmental proceedings. In the instant case there is nothing before us to show that departmental proceedings has commenced. No charge sheet has been prepared to be served on the petitioners. A perusal of the suspension order shows that it was in contemplation of an enquiry that the petitioners had been suspended. Such punishment is not envisaged under the Police Regulations which had been framed under the Police Act. Learned State Counsel vehemently argued that the case of the petitioner would be governed by U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. He placed reliance on Rule 49-A of the Rules to strengthen his argument that in contemplation of the enquiry, the petitioners could be suspended. It has been expressly provided in Rule 3 that the Rules would not apply to persons whose appointments and conditions of employment are governed by special provisions.
(3.) THE procedure provided in U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules would not therefore apply to departmental trial of a police officer under section 7 of the Police Act. THE submissions of the learned counsel for State, therefore, is devoid of merits. We are fortified in our view by decisions of this court in Mewa Ram Ram Charan v. United Provinces, AIR 1954 Alld. 487 and Muktiar Singh v. State, AIR 1959 Alld. 569. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. Order of suspension dated 13-12-1983 is quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly. Petition allowed.;