E. N. Mirsa, J. - (1.) IN this writ petition the dispute relates to plot Nos. 3396/1 and 4263/2 recorded in Khata No. 349 in the name of forest department. An objection was filed by the petitioner claiming that he is Sirdar of the said plots in dispute and is in possession over the same. It has further been averred in para 7 of the writ petition that the name of the petitioner was recorded in Clause 12 in Khatauni 1356 Fasli with a duration of two years and that in Khatauni 1359 Fasli with a duration of five years. It has further been averred that in Khatauni 1360 Fasli the name of the petitioner was recorded as Adhivasi and consequently in Khatauni 1362 Fasli the petitioner has been recorded as Sirdar by an order passed by the Compensation Officer on Z. A. Form No. 101 and since then the petitioner's name was being recorded as Sirdar on the said plots. All of a sudden without any order of the competent authority, the name of the petitioner was omitted from Khatauni 1366 to 1368 Fasli. It has been averred that in said Khatauni the name of the forest department is also not recorded on the 6aid plots. IN para 8 of the writ petition it has been averred that in the gazette notification filed on behalf of the forest department, the plots in dispute are not mentioned indicating them to have vested IN the forest department. However, the case of the forest department, opposite party no. 2, is that in the boundaries mentioned in the notification the disputed plots fall within the boundaries indicated in the notification, and, as such, these plots belong to the forest department.
(2.) THE Consolidation Officer, after taking evidence of the parties, allowed the objection filed by the petitioner vide order dated 30th October, 1975 and directed the plots in dispute to be recorded as Sirdar in the name of the petitioner who was found to be in possession. THE forest department went up in appeal against that order, but the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 1st November, 1976 and the order passed by the Consolidation Officer was confirmed. Still feeling aggrieved, by that order, the forest department filed revision, which has been allowed by the impugned order dated 19-2-1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda. THE case has been remanded to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for deciding it on merits after making spot inspection. This order dated 19-2-1979 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation has been challenged in this writ petition. In para 12 of the writ petition it has been averred that the revision filed by opposite party no. 2 was highly belated and deserved to be rejected as time barred. It has been mentioned that opposite party no. 2 had applied for the copy of the judgment and order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 5-12-1976, that is, after the expiry of thirty days limitation prescribed for filing revision. The copy was prepared and pasted on notice board on 30-12-1976. However, the revision was filed on 2-2-1977, that is, after the expiry of thirty days even from the date of receipt of the copy. It has further been averred in the writ petition that no application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved by the forest department nor any affidavit was filed explaining delay in filing the revision. Even no prayer was made seeking condonation of delay in the memo of the revision itself. Referring to these facts learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation acted illegally and with substantial irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in deciding the revision on merits without looking to the question of limitation and condoning the delay which was raised by the petitioner before him. In the counter affidavit the aforesaid facts stated with regard to the obtaining of certified copy of the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, have not been denied. It has, however, been mentioned that since the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 19-2-1979 is silent on the point of bar of limitation, and, as such, this is indicative of the fact that the point of bar of limitation was not raised before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It has been urged in para 18 of the counter affidavit that in these circumstances this plea that the revision was time barred and the Deputy Director of Consolidation should have dismissed it as such cannot be raised for the first time in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been asserted on behalf of opposite party no. 2 that since this plea of limitation was not raised before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, and, as such, the remand order passed by him, after considering the case on merits, cannot be interfered with. Having gone through the averments contained in the writ petition as well as in the counter affidavit I find much substance in what has been urged on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
(3.) IT is well settled that any person approaching any authority beyond time has to satisfy it by giving cogent reasons for his absence or the cause due to which he was prevented from filing appeal or revision in time. The concept of sufficient cause is well known. IT is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be construed liberally, but it cannot be given a go by otherwise the court of law shall cease to be court of law and shall become courts where instead of law the will of the authority shall prevail-See Ram Sunder Singh v. Ram Mohan Singh, 1981 ALJ 423. In Parsidh Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1979 ALJ /64 K. P. Singh, J., observed that when a remedy of party is barred by lapse of time, the other party gets valuable right and that right can be negatived only when sufficient cause has been shown in perferring the delayed revision petition. IT was further observed that it could not be presumed that the delay in perferring revision was condoned when the revision was allowed on merits by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. In the present case I find that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not at all applied its mind to the question of limitation and has allowed the revision by the impugned order. It has been urged on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 that since this question of limitation was not raised before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, and, as such, it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this writ petition. I am unable to agree with this contention.;