K. N. Singh, J. - (1.) This is a second appeal against the judgment of the District Judge, Dehradun, dismissing the appellants, appeal and allowing the objection of judgment-debtor filed before the Munsif, Dehradun in Execution proceedings of decree passed in suit No. 157 of 1967.
(2.) The Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd., plaintiff-appellant filed a suit No. 157 of 1962, against Hari Ram Sawhney defendant-respondent for recovery of money in the court of the Munsif, Dehradun. The suit was decreed in terms of a compromise arrived at between the parties and the compromise was made a part of the decree. The plaintiff-appellant was awarded costs and pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum to be charged on monthly rests and the payment of the decretal amount was required to be made in instalments. Hari Ram Sawhney, respondent-judgment-debtor, could not pay the decretal amount in accordance with the terms of the decree, whereupon the appellant-decree-holder put the decree into execution for arrest and detention of the judgment-debtor. The respondent raised objections that the execution application did not disclose the principal amount and that the court had no jurisdiction to award compound interest. The Munsif before whom the execution proceedings were pending upheld the objection of the respondent judgment-debtor. The learned Munsif held that in pursuance of Sec. 34, Civil Procedure Code, interest could be allowed only on the principal sum and pendente lite and future interest could not be allowed at compound rate, he allowed the judgment-debtors object on and directed the decree-holder to amend the applicant on for execution of the decree. The appellant decree-holder appealed before the learned District Judge, Dehradun. The appellate court by its order dated 18th February, 1970, dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the learned Munsif. Aggrieved, the decree-holder has preferred the present appeal before this Court challenging the orders of the courts below.
(3.) Learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the decree was passed in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties, the decree being consent decree was binding on the parties and no objection against that decree could legally be raised in execution proceedings. The principle that a consent decree is binding on the parties cannot be disputed. In Shanker Sitaram Sontakke v. Bal Kishan Sitaram Sontakke, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 352 , the Supreme Court held that a consent decree was as much binding on the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. A consent decree passed in a prior suit has the binding force of res judicata in subsequent suit in respect of the same subject-matter. In Sailendra Narain Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 346 , the Supreme Court laid down that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Thus the principle is well settled that a consent decree passed in pursuance of a compromise between the parties is binding like any other decree passed in a contested case. All consequences which ensue under a decree passed in a contested case are available to the parties under a consent decree. No doubt in Messrs Silver Screen Enterprise v. Devki Nandan Nagpal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 669 , the Supreme Court laid down that a consent decree is binding between the parties and even no appeal lay against such a decree. But the Court further observed that a consent decree can, however, be challenged in appeal on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation but in the absence of any such allegation the decree is binding on the parties. It is thus well established that a consent decree is as much binding between the parties as any other decree passed after contest.;