Gulati, J. - (1.) THE two petitioners are tenants on the first floor of the house in dispute, each having one room and a kitchen and each paying a monthly rent of Rs. 18.00. The first and the second respondents, who are related to each other as sisters-in-law, are the owners of the house. The remaining accommodation in the house is in their possession. They made an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic tion) Act for the release of the accommodation in possession of the petitioners. Their case was that they had partitioned the house between themselves and the accommodation in their possession had been divided as a result the accommodation in possession of the first respondent had become too short for her needs. Therefore, she needed the additional accommodation. This application was rejected by the prescribed authority on the ground that the partition of the house had not been proved and the accommodation in possession of the two ladies was quite sufficient for their needs. He also held that the petitioners were tenants since 1952 and 1954 and were persons of low income and if they were evicted they shall find it difficult to arrange for an alternative accommodation. The first respondent, namely, Shrimati Ramadevi filed an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur. The learned Judge held that on the evidence on record the partition had been amply proved. He also held that the accommodation in possession of the appellant consisting of two living rooms, store room, an open Sahan, a kitchen and a Chhajja was inadequate and her need for additional accommodation was genuine. He accordingly set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and directed the peti tioners to vacate the accommodation in dispute within two months. The petitioners are aggrieved and have approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the partition amongst the two respondents had not been proved inasmuch as there was no partition deed and the property also had not been separately mutated in their names. He also urged that the two ladies between themselves have sufficient accommodation. Now as to whether there was a partition or not is a question of fact and I am prepared to accept the finding of the learned Judge that there was a partition between the two ladies. I am also prepared to accept the finding that the needs of the first respondent for additional accommodation is genuine. Indeed, there was no necessity for the learned Judge to record such a finding because by virtue of clause (iv) of Explanation attached to Section 21 of the Act the law presumes that when a part of the building is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes it shall be conclusive proof of the fact that the remaining building is required by the landlord bona fide. But in my opinion the learned Judge has committed another manifest error of law as a result of which his order stands vitiated. A landlord, who is in occupation of a portion of a building can not succeed merely by showing that his need for the accommodation in possession of the tenant is genuine. As I have already mentioned above there is a legal presumption in his favour that he needs the tenant's accommodation bona fide. But there is another requirement of the law also and that requirement is that the need of the tenant has also to be considered and if on such comparison it is found that the need of the landlord is greater than the need of the tenant it is only then and alone that the landlord can be permitted to evict the tenant. In Capt. Ashok Kumar Kochhar and others v. The State of U. P. and others Civil Misc. Writ No. 5113 of 1971, decided on July 12, 1974. I have examined this aspect at length and have held that it is necessary to consider the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant in a case where the landlords wants to evict a sitting tenant on the ground that he needs additional accommoda tion. I have also laid down the principle as to how the relative hardships are to be considered. I have held that where the applica tion of a landlord, who wants additional accommodation in posses sion of his tenant, is refused, he may be put to inconvenience. But where a tenant is evicted and is thrown on the street and has no shelter, in such a case the hardship caused to the tenant will be far more greater than the inconvenience caused to the landlord and the application of the landlord for permission to evict a tenant must be rejected. That was a case decided under the U.P. (Temporary) Con trol of Rent and Eviction Act. There was a statutory requirement for the comparison of the need of the landlord and the tenant but the Supreme Court and thereafter this court repeatedly held that the comparison of the need of the landlord and the tenant is imperative before an application for release can be allowed. This requirement has now been given a statutory shape under the new Act. Rule 16 provide that while considering the application for release on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord the Prescribed Au thority shall take into account the likely hardship to the tenant as against the likely nardshir to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall also have regard to certain facts Clause (e) of that rule requires that one of the fact that has to be taken into consideration is that where there are a number of ten ants separately occupying a block of tenants and the landlord desires their eviction on ground of this personal need the prescribed autho rity shall consider whether suitable alternative accommodation is likely to be available to such tenants. Now in the instant case the Prescribed Authority has found that the petitioners are persons of very meagre means. They being labourers they will not find it pos sible to arrange for an alternative accommodation. The learned Dis trict Judge has completely ignored this aspect of the case. He has merely dealt upon the bona fide need of the landladies. In my opi nion, it was necessary for the learned District Judge to have consi dered this aspect before granting permission to the landladies to evict the petitioners. He should have considered the question as to whether there was a likelihood of the petitioners securing any alterna tive accommodation or whether the Rent Control Officer or the land ladies were in a position to offer them an alternative accommodation. The facts as stand show very clearly that whereas the first respondent may be put to a slight inconvenience for want of additional accom modation the petitioners will be thrown on the street and will be shelterless. They being man of very poor means cannot be expected to have a costlier accommodation. In the city of Kanpur it will be vertuilly impossible for them to find an accommodation on a month ly rent of Rs. 18.00. For all these reasons it is not possible to uphold the order of the learned Additional District Judge.
(3.) THE result is that the petitioner succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Additional District Judge dated November 2, 1973 (Annexures 2 and 3 to the writ petition) is quashed. The petitioners are entitled to costs.;