M. N. Shukla, J. - (1.) BECAUSE of a conflict between two single Judge decisions of this Court Raghubir Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1966 All LJ 686 and Bans Bahore V. State of U. P., 1969 All LJ 513 = (AIR 1970 All 353), this special appeal was refer red to a larger Bench and eventual came before for hearing. The following ques tion was referred to the Full Bench fox decision: "Whether under Section 341 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Re forms Act, Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable to a suit under Section 209 in the absence of any express provision in Section 341 making Section 6 applicable?" In the case of Raghubir Singh it was held by S. N. Singh, J., that the provisions of Section 6 of the limitation Act were not applicable to a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Re forms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) because Section 341 of the Act merely extended the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act but inasmuch the whole of the Limitation Act was made to apply, the provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Limita tion Act also became applicable with the re sult that Section 6 of the Limitation Act could not apply to proceedings under the Act. On the other hand, a contrary view was taken by K. N. Srivastava, J., in Bans Bahore's case. He relied on an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in Chhote v. Board of Revenue, U. P., Allaha bad, Civil Misc. Writ No. 768 of 1961, D.0028-8-1961 (AH). In the unreported decision the Bench after summing up the entire argu ment stated its conclusion in the following words: "We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners who has urged that two points arise in this petition. One point according to him is that Section 6 of the Limitation Act has been wrongly applied by the Board of Revenue to the suit of which the proceed ings went up before the Board. Section 341 lapse of the period prescribed by the first schedule should be barred but this general rule enacted in Section 3 is subject to the 'exception that in certain special circumstances, which have been defined in different pro visions of the Act a suit or other proceed ing, though instituted after the lapse of the period to prescribed, should not be time-barred. Section 6 is one of the provisions which extend the period of limitation laid down by the first schedule. The ground on which the extension is given is the disability of the person entitled to sue or apply. The clear effect of Section 341 of the Act is to press into service the provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act The difficulty, how ever, is presented on account of another pro vision in the Limitation Act, namely, Sec tion 29 which requires a careful scrutiny and seems to apparently restrict the applicability of the Limitation Act to local or special law to the extent of the sections enumerated in Section 29.
(2.) IT was contended on behalf of the appellants that even in the language of Sec tion 341'of the Act there was some indica tion that the intendment of the Legislature Was not to apply the Limitation Act in its entirety to proceedings under the Act. The foundation of this argument was the use of the expression "including Section 5 there of a Section 341 of the Act It was argued that if the Legislature had intended to apply the whole of the Limitation Act to proceed ings under the Act there would have been no need to refer expressly to Section 5 in Section 341. On the other hand, the omis sion of Section 6 of the Limitation Act in the aforesaid provision was consistent with the intention not to make Section 6 applic able to proceedings under the Act. This argument is untenable. Section 5 appears to have been specifically mentioned in Sec tion 341 of the Act only for the sake of em phasis and it cannot even remotely be con strued as having the effect of excluding the applicability of the other provisions of the Limitation Act In fact, it seems to have been added merely with a view to allaying the possible misgivings which might arise with regard to the applicability of Section 5. It appears that judicial interpretation of Sec tion 341, without containing any reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, could per haps sometimes arrive at the conclusion that Section 5 was not applicable to proceedings under the Act; by specific mention of this section, therefore, the possibility of the con struction has been ruled out The words "including Section 5 thereof were not to be found in Section 341 of the Act as it stood In 1952. The possibility of that interpreta tion is clearly reflected in the observations of R. Singh, J., in State of U. P. v. Pt B. M. N. Kaul, 1958 All LJ 119. In that case the argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable to a proceeding under the Act was repelled by the learned Judge only on the ground that the period of limitation provided under that Act fox filing second appeals did not differ from that pro vided under the Limitation Act and hence it was held that the provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act were not attracted. That decision illustrates the possibility of taking a view that Section 5 of the Limita tion Act would not be applicable in case the period of limitation prescribed under the Act differed from the one prescribed under the Limitation Act. That judgment was tender ed on 13-11-1957. The words "including Section 5 thereof were added to Section 341 of the Act by Section 82 of the Uttar Pra desh Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U. P. Act No. XXXVH of 1958) with effect from 7-11- 1958. The addition of these words, therefore, should not raise any doubt about the applicability of Section 6 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act Moreover, it is a well-settled prin ciple of judicial interpretation that the words "and include" and "or include" are expres sions of extension and not restrictive; they import addition. As pointed out by Sri Jag-dish Swarup in his book "Legislation and Interpretation' at page 170 (first edition). "The word "include" or "shall be deem ed to include" is very generally used in interpretation clause in order to change the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, or where it is in tended that while the term defined shall re tain its ordinary meaning its scope should be widened by specific enumeration of certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise so as to make the defini tion enumerative and not exhaustive and when it is so used, the words or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include." Therefore, when the words "including Sec tion 5 thereof are introduced in Section 341 of the Act they do not connote that the section would not retain its ordinary mean ing which it would have borne, bereft of those words.
(3.) THE learned Counsel for- the ap pellants sought support from a Division Bench thing of this Court in Chandra Pal V. Board of Revenue, 1957 All LJ 817 where after interpreting Section 29 of the Limita tion Act it was held that the benefit of the exception contained in Section 6 thereof could not be availed of in a suit under the U. P. Tenancy Act as Section 6 has been expressly withheld by the Legislature from persons proceeding under local and Special Acts. It may, however, be observed that in the U. P. Tenancy Act there was no provision analogous to Section 341 of the Act In the earlier Tenancy Law the Limitation Act was not applied to it, except so far as mentioned by it. In the U. P. Tenancy Act only Sec tion 5 of the Limitation Act was made ap plicable to proceedings under the former Act vide Section 253 thereof. It was, therefore held in the case of Chandra Pal (supra) that Section 6 of the Limitation Act did not ap ply to a suit under the U. P. Tenancy Act.;