SATISH CHANDRA, J. - (1.) FOR the assessment year 1957-58, the Sales Tax Officer passed an assessment order under section 7(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act on 23rd November, 1959. On appeal, this order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh assessment. Thereafter, an assessment order was passed on 29th September, 1965, determining the turnover of foodgrains at Rs. 75,673.93. This order was served on the dealer on 25th September, 1967. By a separate order of the same date, the Sales Tax Officer, determined the exemption fee payable by the assessee at Rs. 1,000. Since the dealer had till then deposited a sum of Rs. 400 towards the exemption fee, this order directed the dealer to deposit the balance of Rs. 600 within 10 days of the receipt of the order. This order was received by the dealer on 31st March, 1967. The dealer does not appear to have deposited the balance of Rs. 600; as a result, the Sales Tax Officer took up the matter again and passed a fresh assessment order on 14th September, 1967. He reconsidered the facts of the case as well as its past history and held that since the dealer has not deposited the balance exemption fee amounting to Rs. 600, the exemption application was liable to be rejected and the turnover of foodgrains, as originally assessed at Rs. 75,673.93 was liable to be assessed at the rate of 3 pies per rupee under rule 23. He assessed the tax at Rs. 1,181.73. As the dealer had deposited Rs. 400.00 towards the exemption fee, he directed the dealer to deposit the balance tax of Rs. 781.73 within 30 days of the receipt of the order. The order under rule 20-B levying the exemption fee of Rs. 1,000 was served on the assessee on 31st March, 1967. The other two orders were served on 25th September, 1967. The assessee felt aggrieved and filed three appeals. All the three appeals were filed on 30th September, 1967. The Judge (Appeals) dismissed the appeal (No. 1895 of 1967), which was directed against the exemption order. This appeal was dismissed as barred by time. The appeal against the assessment order was allowed on the finding that the correct turnover of foodgrains was liable to be reduced by Rs. 13,076 and after deducting this amount the taxable turnover of the assessee would come to Rs. 62,597.93. The third appeal against the order fixing exemption fee at Rs. 1,000 was also allowed in part and it was held that the dealer was liable to deposit Rs. 750 as exemption fee. The Sales Tax Officer was directed to make the necessary adjustments for the payments made by the assessee. The net result of the various appellate orders was that the turnover of foodgrains was reduced by Rs. 13,076. The exemption fee was reduced from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 750 and the Sales Tax Officer was directed to make the necessary adjustments from the excess tax of the balance exemption fee. Aggrieved, the State went up in revision against the order reducing the turnover of foodgrains and the exemption fee. The Judge (Revisions) held that the order of assessment and the order dismissing the application for exemption together constituted an order contemplated by rule 20-B(h). Therefore, service of the order under rule 20-B(h) would be complete only after both the orders of 29th September, 1965, had been served on the assessee. The assessment order was served on the assessee on 25th September, 1967, and, therefore, the appeal filed on 30th September, 1967, against that order would be within time and the same could not have been dismissed as barred by time. The Judge (Revisions) in the exercise of his suo motu powers set aside the order of the Judge (Appeals) dismissing the appeal of the assessee against the assessment order. On the merit he upheld the order that the turnover of foodgrains was liable to be reduced by Rs. 13,076 and that after taking into consideration this amount the exemption fee was liable to be fixed at Rs. 750. At the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax the revising authority has referred the following questions of law for the opinion of this court : "(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, when the suo motu powers have been specifically withdrawn with effect from 1st October, 1970, from the revising authority, vide Act No. 3 of 1971, the Additional Judge (Revisions) was justified in law in invoking that powers to set aside the dismissal of appeal against the exemption order ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Additional Judge, (Revisions) was justified in law in treating the appeal against the exemption order within time ?" We shall first deal with the second question. Under section 9(1) of the Act an appeal lies against any order passed by the assessing authority. The appeal can be filed within 30 days of the service of the order. Rule 20-B deals with exemption fee on the turnover of foodgrains. At first the assessing authority has to pass an order determining the turnover of the assessment year and finally fix the exemption fee payable thereon. In the present case, the Sales Tax Officer determined the turnover of foodgrains by an order passed on 29th September, 1965, and by another order of the same date he determined the amount of exemption fee payable by the assessee. Since the turnover of foodgrains had been determined, the order determining the exemption fee at Rs. 1,000 was the final order under rule 20-B. We are unable to agree with the Judge (Revisions) that this order determined the exemption fee provisionally. In the order the dealer was required to deposit the balance of the exemption fee within 10 days of the receipt of the same. Since the dealer defaulted, the Sales Tax Officer rejected the application for exemption fee and naturally proceeded to tax the total turnover of the foodgrains already determined. This was done by the order dated 14th September, 1967. This order could not have been appealed against as finally fixing the exemption fee because it did not determine the exemption fee. It assessed the tax. It was appealable on merits. This order was hence appealable within 30 days of the service thereof. The order was served on the dealer on 25th September, 1967, and, as such, the appeal filed by the dealer on 30th September, 1967, was within time. The revisional power was conferred in the following terms under section 10 : "10. (3)(i) The Revising Authority may, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order made by any appellate or assessing authority under this Act, in its discretion, call for and examine, either on its own motion or on the application of the Commissioner of Sales Tax or the person aggrieved, the record of such order and pass such order as it may think fit : Provided that no such application shall be entertained in any case where an appeal lay against the order but was not preferred .............." The U.P. Sales Tax (Amendment) Act (3 of 1971), which came into force on 1st October, 197, repealed and re-enacted section 10. It took away the power of the revising authority to pass orders suo motu. Hence-fourth the revising authority could deal with a particular order if it was the subject-matter of a revision application. In the present case, the State had filed two revision applications. The assessee had not filed any revision against the order dismissing its appeal as barred by time. This order was passed in a separate appeal. It was an independent order operating as such. That appellate order was passed on 26th October, 1968, long prior to the taking away of the suo motu power vested in the revising authority. Admittedly, the revising authority had no suo motu powers on the date when he decided the revision, namely, on 5th January, 1971. The question is whether, in such circumstances, the revising authority had jurisdiction to exercise or to employ its suo motu powers in respect of an order which was in the record of the case called for at the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax in connection with a pending revision, and which was passed when the suo motu revisional jurisdiction existed. Section 9 and 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, as they stood on 26th October, 1968, when the appellate order was passed, provided that appellate orders did not gain finality, because they were liable to be looked into by the revising authority in exercise of its suo motu power. In this view the question that requires consideration is : Would, by the subsequent taking away of the suo motu powers of the revising authority, such an appellate order gain finality and, if so, to what extent ? In Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas [A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1336], the Supreme Court held that if under law an order becomes final, its finality cannot be taken away by providing for a revision against similar orders by an amendment of the law made after the particular order had been passed, unless the amending law is retrospective in operation. It was also held that the question whether a court could, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside, modify or alter the decision of an appellate court was not a matter of procedure. Legislation with regard to such jurisdiction is not legislation in the matter of procedure and so such legislation will not by itself operate retrospectively. This decision is applicable to the present case. When the appellate order was passed on 26th October, 1968, it was subject to the suo motu revisional powers of the revising authority. The amending Act No. 3 of 1971 did not in terms operate retrospectively. The amendment taking away the suo motu revisional jurisdiction could not be characterised as a legislation in the matter of procedure. It would not automatically operate retrospectively. Since the appellate order dated 26th October, 1968, did not attain finality on the day when it was passed because it was subject to the suo motu revisional jurisdiction, it could not, in law, be said that it gained finality because of the effect of Amending Act No. 3 of 1971. Its status as an order which was subject to being revised continued. In relation to that order the revisional authority could exercise the suo motu revisional jurisdiction. In this view the Judge (Revisions) had jurisdiction to revise the aforesaid appellate order dated 26th October, 1968. In the result, we answer both the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. The fee of the learned counsel appearing for the department is, however, assessed at Rs. 100.;