JUDGEMENT
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(1.) One Shri Vidya Pujan Dwivedi took on rent a motor garage from Dr. Hridai Mohan Bhatnagar, the 4th respondent (hereinafter referred to as the landlord). The landlord filed an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation) of Rent, Letting and Eviction Act, 1972 for the eviction of Vidya Pujan Dwivedi on the ground that he needed the motor garage for his own use. This application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority, the respondent No. 1, on 14th June, 1973. Aggrieved, Mr. Dwivedi, filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Lucknow, under Section 22 of the Act. During the pendency of the appeal he died and his heirs and legal representatives did not make any application within the prescribed time for being impleaded in the appeal. Consequently, the District Judge dismissed the appeal as having abated and returned the papers to the Prescribed Authority for further proceedings. Before the Landlord could apply under Section 23 for the enforcement of the eviction Order, Keshaw Kumar Dwivedi, one of the sons of the deceased Vidya Pujan Dwivedi and the petitioner No. 2, moved an application before the prescribed Authority on 27th September, 1973 saying that he had no knowledge of the proceedings against his late father and he should be heard and further proceedings be stayed. On this application the Prescribed Authority issued a notice to the counsel for petitioner No. 2. It was argued before the Prescribed Authority that it was necessary that notice should be issued to all the legal representatives of the deceased. The Prescribed Authority being of the opinion that as the order under Section 21 of the Act had been passed, the tenant or any other person found in occupation of the accommodation in dispute could be evicted under Section 23 of the Act, it was not necessary to issue any separate notice to them. He accordingly passed an order on 15th November, 1973 directing that the possession be delivered to the landlord. The petitioners are aggrieved and have moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that order under Section 21 of the Act was passed against Vidya Pujan Dwivedi and the same could not be executed, after his death, against his legal representatives. According to him fresh proceedings should have been taken against the petitioner under Section 21 of the Act. I see no force in this contention. Vidya Pujan Dwivedi admittedly was a tenant against whom the order under Section 21 of the Act was passed. Had he died during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 21, it could legitimately be said that his legal representatives should have been brought on the record before passing order under Section 21. But once an order under Section 21 of the Act is passed, against a tenant and the same becomes final after appeal further proceedings under Section 23 are by way of execution proceedings and it is not necessary that proceedings under Section 21 should be taken de novo. As soon as an order under Section 21 is passed the tenant as also all other persons living with him or on his behalf can be ordered to be evicted without any notice to them. The view taken by the Prescribed Authority, in my opinion, is correct.
(3.) The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the Act has not been complied with and according to him Rule 25 is mandatory and, as such, the proceedings under Section 23 against the petitioner are invalid. It is necessary to reproduce Rule 25 :-
"25. Bringing legal Representatives on record :
Section 34(4) :
1. Every application for substituting the names of the heirs or legal representatives, the claimants or occupants or any person who was a party to any proceedings under the Act and died during the pendency of the proceedings shall be preferred within one month from the date of the death of such person.
2. The application shall contain the names and addresses and other details of the heirs or legal representatives and their relationship with the deceased and, be accompanied by an affidavit in its support, and thereupon, the application shall be decided after a summary inquiry by the authority concerned."
It is clear that this rule has been enacted to give effect to sub-section (4) of Section 34. Section 34(4) in terms reads :-
"34(4). Where any party to any proceeding for the determination of standard rent or for eviction from a building dies during the pendency of the proceedings, such proceeding, may be continued after bringing on the record :-
(a) in the case of landlord or tenant, his heirs or legal representatives.
(b) in the case of unauthorised occupant, any person claiming under him or found in occupation of the building".
Section 34(4) clearly contemplates a stage where proceedings for determination of standard rent or eviction of a person from a building are in progress. But in the instant case we are concerned with the proceedings under Section 23. Proceedings under Section 21 for eviction before the Prescribed Authority as well as before the Appellate Authority were over. Proceedings contemplated by Section 23 are not proceedings envisaged by Section 34(4), Section 23 provides for the enforcement of the eviction order and says :-
"23. Enforcement of eviction order :-
(1) The prescribed authority may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for evicting any tenant against whom an order is made under Section 21 or on appeal under Section 22, as the case may be, or against any other person found in actual occupation and for putting the landlord into possession."
Proceedings under Section 23 are not a part of proceedings for eviction. That provision merely contains a mode by which an eviction order can be enforced.;
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