Satish Chandra, J. - (1.) THE question of law referred for our opinion is 'whether the Tribunal is justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee as barred by limitation'. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner decided the first appeal on April 10, 1967. Copy of the Commissioner's order was served on Shri M.P. Singh, Char tered Accountant, who had appeared before the Commissioner as counsel for the assessee on April 28, 1967. The assessee filed a second appeal before the Tribunal through Shri M.P. Singh, Chartered Ac countant on July 27. 1967. The office of the Tribunal reported that the appeal was barred by time. The question that arose for considera tion was whether the service of the copy on Shri M.P. Singh was a valid communication of the order to the assessee.
(2.) THE appeal preferred before the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner was in the prescribed form. The column 'Address to which the notice may be sent to the appellants' was filled in by stating 'C|o M/s M.P. Singh and Co., 72, Hazratganj, Lucknow'. The Tribunal held that this was the address on which the assessee had indicated that the copy of the order be sent and since the copy of the order was served on Shri Singh, it was effective communication on the assessee. The time for the appeal before the Tribunal commenced to run from April 28, 1967 and so the appeal was barred by time. The Tribunal disbelieved the explanation given by the assessee for the delay and dismissed the appeal as barred by time. For the assessee it was submitted that the column in the pres cribed form for the memorandum of appeal requiring the appellant to furnish the address to which notices may be sent to the appellant was meant only for service of the notice of the appeal and not meant or intended as furnished the address to which the appellate order it self may be sent. We are unable to agree. The period of limitation for a second appeal commenced from the date of communication of the order sought to be appealed against. The date of communication of the order, which is sought to be appealed against is material. The provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 252 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 would indicate that the appeal filed before the Appellate Assis tant Commissioner will be deemed disposed of on the date of the communication of the order to the assessee. Thus, the communica tion of the order of the Appellate
(3.) ASSISTANT Commissioner to the as sessee is communication of the notice of the disposal of the appeal by him as well. The communication of such a notice could validly be done at the address furnished by the assessee for that purpose. The requirement that the memorandum of appeal should furnish the ad dress to which notices may be sent to the appellant would, in our opinion include the notice of the disposal of the appeal which in other words is communication of the appellate order to the assessee. The words 'furnished for communicating notices' would include the address to which the appellate order may be communicated to the assessee. In this view the appellate order will be deemed to have been communicated to the assssee on April 28, 1967, when it was served upon Shri M.P. Singh.;