- (1.) THIS petition has been moved under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for punishing the opposite parties for having committed the contempt of this Court. Besides the State of Uttar Pradesh through its Chief Secretary, Sri B. D. Sanwal and four other officers of the State Government were impleaded as opposite parties. The Court, however, issued notice to show cause only to respondents Nos. 6 and 4 viz. the State of Uttar Pradesh and Sri R. K. Kaul, Secretary, Griha Vibhag (Jails), and did not issue notice to other respondents. According to the petitioner the opposite parties committed contempt of this Court by not paying to the petitioner arrears of his salary even though the order of his dismissal from service had been quashed by this Court in the Writ petition filed by him. The facts giving rise to this case, briefly stated, are as follows: The petitioner was an employee of the State Government and was working as Jail Superintendent. On -27-3-1959 he was suspended and charges of misconduct were levelled against him. The matter was entrusted to the U. P. (Disciplinary) Proceedings Administrative Tribunal. One of the members of the Tribunal was the Deputy Inspector General of Prisons. According to the petitioner he was lower in rank to him and could not, therefore, participate in the enquiry. The petitioner on this basis withdrew from the enquiry. The enquiry proceeded in his absence and the Tribunal returned the finding that the charges against the petitioner had been proved. On the basis of this report the Slate Government dismissed the petitioner from service on 10-12-1960. The petitioner thereupon filed a writ petition in 1961. This petition was allowed on the ground that D. I. G. (Prisons), being not superior in rank to the petitioner, could not participate in the enquiry, and the consequential order of dismissal was set aside. The State Government filed a special appeal. During the pendency of the appeal an ordinance was issued to the effect that the D. I. G. Prisons was superior in rank to the Superintendent of Jail and would always be deemed to have been so. After this Ordinance the special appeal was allowed against the judgment of the learned single Judge and the case was remanded to him for decision of the writ petition on other grounds. Petitioner's application for leave to appeal to Supreme Court was rejected on the ground that there was no final order. The writ petition ultimately was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in 1970. The petitioner filed special appeal No. 828 of 1970, which was allowed mainly on the finding that the petitioner had not, in the circumstances of the case, received opportunity to show cause as contemplated by Article 311 of the Constitution. The order dismissing the petitioner was accordingly quashed. This order has become final. Thereafter the petitioner sent a memorial to the State Government for payment, of arrears of his salary. The question of his reinstatement did not arise as he had already retired on the basis of superannuation in 1969. The memorial did not bring any result in his favour in the sense that the petitioner was not paid the arrears of salary. In February 1974 the petitioner moved the present application under the Contempt of Courts Act. During the pendency of the application, on 16-7-1974, an order was passed by the State Government to the effect that as by the time the High Court quashed the dismissal order the petitioner had retired he was entitled to get only his pension. As regards the arrears of salary the State Government took the view that the conduct of the petitioner did not entitle him to the same, and finally refused to pay it on the ground that the claim had become time-barred.
(2.) A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Chief Standing Counsel to the effect that the contempt proceedings did not lie either against the State Government or its officers. The contention is that the State Government cannot be punished as it is not a 'person' who can deliberately commit contempt and the officers cannot be liable for punishment as the order was actually an order of the State Government. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that both the State Government and its officers are liable to be punished under the Aot. Reference, in respect of this controversy, has been made to two decisions, one of the Calcutta High Court and another of the Supreme Court. In the Calcutta case, Tarafatullah v. S. N. Maitra , although the Court came to the conclusion that no contempt had been committed, the two learned Judges constituting the Bench took different views about the liability of the State Government to be proceeded against for disobedience of the order. In this case certain interim orders of injunction had been issued by the High Court which were said to have been disobeyed. Chakravarti, J. took the view that punishment for contempt could be asked for even against the government. The relevant observations are in the following terms: I do not say that in fit cases a writ for contempt may not be asked for against a corporation itself, or against a Government. In what form, in such a case, any penal order, if considered necessary, is to be passed and how it is to be enforced are different matters which do not call for decision in this case. In England there is a specific rule providing for sequestration of the corporate property of the party concerned, where such party is a corporation, I am not aware of any similar rule obtaining in this country, but I do not consider it impossible that in a fit case a fine may be imposed and it may be realised by methods analogous to sequestration which would be a distress warrant directed against the properties of the Government or the Corporation.
(3.) P. B. Mukerji, J. took the following view: A State cannot as such be said to commit contempt. In the case of the State the allegation must be against a particular officer of the State.;