ASTHANA, J. - (1.) ASTHANA, J. This is a plaintiffs appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil judge of Farrukhabad, dated 2-6-1953, dismissing his suit for a declaration that the resolution of the District Board, Farrukhabad, dismissing him and certain orders passed by it were illegal, uttra vires, unjust and without jurisdiction and for recovery of a certain amount of money as salary and other allowances and increments earned by him.
(2.) JAGDISH Prasad Pradhan who is the plaintiff appellant in this Court was appointed as an Engineer in the District Board. Farrukhabad, which is defendant-respondent in this appeal, some time in March, 1943. The appointment of the appellant was made by the Administrator who was administering the affairs of the Board as it stood superseded. When a new Board was elected in 1948, the supersession ceased. It was alleged by the plaintiff-appellant that he received an order of suspension in October, 1948 and thereafter received a letter, dated 4-4-1949 from the defendant Board intimating that the Board in its meeting held on 30th March, 1949 had dismissed the plaintiff from its service. The case of the plaintiff further was that on 5th May, 1949, he filed an appeal against the order of dismissal to the Government which was allowed by the Government by its order, dated 1st March, 1950, and his dismissal and suspension orders both were set aside and the defendant Board was directed to allow him to resume charge of his duties with full pay from the date of his suspension to the date of his reinstatement it was also alleged by the plaintiff that after the passing of the said order of the Government, the defendant Board avoided reinstatement of the plaintiff on some pretext or the other and the Board referred the matter to the Government for reconsideration. It was then alleged, by the plaintiff that on the aforesaid reference by the defendant Board the Government modified its previous order passed on his appeal and by a communication, dated 15th July, 1950, directed the Board to take fresh proceedings against the plaintiff and further directed that the plaintiff would he deemed under suspension from the date on which he was originally suspended. It was alleged that in pursuance of the order of the Government the President of the Board served upon the plaintiff a fresh charge-sheet calling upon him to submit an explanation within a month and without giving him a proper opportunity to reply to the charges, the defendant Board by its resolution, dated 30th November, 1950, communicated to in the plaintiff by an order, dated 8th February, 1951 that the defendant Board had dismissed him, from its service. It appears that when the Board did not allow the plaintiff to resume his duties after his appeal had been allowed and dismissal was set aside, he filed a suit (Suit No. 21 of 1950) for an injunction against the Board which suit was also tried along with the suit giving rise to this appeal, but we are not concerned in this appeal with the merits of that suit. The suspension order, dated 11/16th October 1948 was attacked by the plaintiff on the ground that it was ultra vires of the District Board and was without jurisdiction. The validity of the resolution of the Bard, dated 30th March, 1949, was also questioned on various grounds but it is not necessary to mention them as the said resolution was set aside by the Government on appeal by its order, dated 1st March, 1950, and the plaintiff took his stand upon the finality and binding nature of this order of the Government. It was pleaded that the defendant Board or its President had no right to make any representation against this order or cal! for its review from the Government and the Government in its turn had no jurisdiction to entertain the representation or application for review of the defendant Board and review its previous order. The second order of the Government, dated 15th July, 1950 revising or reviewing its previous order, according to the plaintiff, was without jurisdiction. The plaintiffs case was that the second enquiry held in pursuance of the illegal order of the Government was without jurisdiction and the resolution of the Board, dated 30th November, 1950, dismissing hint was ultra vires. The latter resolution of the Board, dated 30th November, 1950 was attacked on merits also substantially on the ground that no opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff to meet the charges framed against him. The validity of the resolution itself was attacked on the ground that it was not a special resolution and could not, in law, effect the dismissal of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff the order of the Government, dated 1st March, 1950, was a final order and was binding on the defendant Board and the plaintiff would never be deemed to have been suspended and would always be deemed to have been in service as an Engineer entitled to his pay and allowances which his post carried. Accordingly the plaintiff claimed a decree for Rs. 13,842-12-0 with interest pendente lite and future. The particulars of this claim were explained in the plaint.
(3.) IN its written statement the defendant Board while admitting that the plaintiff was appointed as an Engineer in the Board in March, 1943, and further admitting the various orders and resolutions referred to in the plaint denied all other allegations of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that the suspension order was rightly passed and the resolution suspending the plaintiff as well as the second resolution dismissing the plaintiff were proper and valid resolutions and were passed after giving full opportunity to the plaintiff to show cause against the charges framed against him and there was no violation of any principle of natural justice. It was also pleaded that the original suspension order was a legal order and continued operative throughout till the plaintiff was dismissed by the resolution of the Board, dated 30th November, 1950. It was also pleaded by the defendant Board that the order of the Government, dated 1-3-1950 allowing the appeal of the plaintiff was passed on a misapprehension and when true facts were brought to the notice of the Government by the defendant Board, the Government modified its previous order and that such a modification or revision was within the powers of the Government under the law. Certain legal pleas were also raised in regard to the maintainability of the suit and questioning the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try the suit. It was also pleaded that the Government not being made a party to the suit, it was bad for not impleading the necessary parties.;