V. Bhargava, J. - (1.) This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by three petitioners, praying for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order dated 26th September, 1961, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation purporting to act in exercise of his powers under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as it stood at that time and prior to the subsequent amendments by which the language of Section 48 of that Act was altered.
(2.) The ground, on which the writ is sought, is that, under Section 48 of the Act, a Director was empowered to interfere with an order made by any officer other than an arbitrator if, after calling for the record, the Director found that in the case decided or proceedings taken by the officer he had exercised jurisdiction not vested in him or had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him or had acted in exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial irregularity. This language used in Section 48 of the Act came up for interpretation in various cases before some Single Judges of this Court and it was held that the scope of Section 48 of the Act was co-extensive with the scope of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so that the Director, under Section 48 of the Act, could exercise jurisdiction and powers only under the same circumstances under which a High Court could exercise powers of revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A learned Single Judge, before whom this writ petition came up, was of the view that those decisions required re-consideration because, in his opinion, those decisions did not take into account fully the nature of the proceedings out of which revisions under Section 48 of the Act could arise and could be brought before the Director. He particularly referred to proceedings where the only question before the subordinate officers might be of allotment of chaks and adjustment being made of the plots at the time of allotment between the various allotees. He felt that, in such circumstances, Section 48 should not be given the same narrow meaning as has been given by treating it as analogous to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure because, by the very nature of the proceedings out of which the revisions would arise, Section 48 of the Act would not be capable of being invoked at all in cases of this type.
(3.) We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are unable to accept the view which is to be inferred from the referring order of the learned Single Judge that Section 48 of the Act should be held to have a wider scope than that already given to it in decisions of this Court. The language of Section 48 of the Act is almost identical with the language of Section 115, C.P.C. The only difference is that Section 48 of the Act, when giving powers of interference inter alia, refers to 'substantial irregularity', while Section 115, C.P.C. use the expression 'material irregularity.' It seems to us that the words 'substantial' and 'material', as used in the two different enactments, cannot make any difference in the scope of this section. Interference in revision by a Director under Section 48 of the Act must, therefore be confined to those very cases which are similar to cases in which the High Court can interfere in exercise of its revisional powers under Section 115, C.P.C.;