DESAI,C.J. - (1.) JUDGEMENT This is a petition for certiorari for the quashing of two assessment orders passed by an Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Aligarh, under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, one for the assessment year 1960-61 and the other for the assessment year 1961-92 and two more assessment orders passed by the same officer but under the Central Sales Tax Act, one for the assessment year 1960-61 and the other for the assessment year 1961-62, and mandamus directing the Sales Tax Officer and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. not to recover from the petitioner the amounts of the sales tax imposed under the impugned assessment orders. The petition came up for hearing before our brother Manchanda before whom there arose the question whether one petition for certiorari for the quashing of district assessment orders passed for two years and distinct assessment orders passed under two Acts was maintainable or not. It may be mentioned that the court-fee payable on a petition for certiorari is Rs. 50/- and that the court-fee paid on the petition by the petitioner is Rs. 50/-; it has not paid court-fee of Rs. 200/- as it would have paid if it had filed separate petitions for certiorari for the quashing of each of the assessment orders. Our learned brother considering the matter to be of importance has referred the following question to a Bench for its decision :- "Whether more than one assessment order can be challenged by means of a single writ petition under Art. 220 of the Constitution; and in the circumstances of this case whether in respect of the Sales Tax assessments for the year 1960-61 and 1961-62 a single writ petition can he filed in respect of the assessments both under the U.P. Sales Tax and under the Central Sales Tax Act where the points of challenge are the same ?"
(2.) WHEN certiorari is sought for the quashing of two or more assessment orders the following are the possible combinations. - (1) the assessment orders may relate to the same assessee and the same taxing statute but relate to different assessment years (2) they relate to the same taxing statute and the same assessment year but relate to two or more assessees (3) they relate to the same assessee and the same assessment year but relate to two or more taxing statutes, (4) they relate to the same assessee, the same taxing statute and the same assessment year but are passed by different authorities, for example an assessing authority, an appellate authority and a revisional authority and (5) a combination of any two or more of the above. The question framed by our learned brother is wide enough to cover any of the abovementioned combinations but we must answer it only with regard to the facts of this petition. We, therefore, proceed-to decide whether one petition can be filed for the quashing of two assessment orders passed against an assessee under one taxing statute by one authority but in respect of two assessment years and two assessment orders passed against the same assessee and by the same authority and in respect of the same two assessment years but under another taxing statute. We are not concerned with any other combination in this case. This Court has framed rules to govern the proceeding in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, vide Chapter XXII of Rules of Court, 1952, but they do not contain any rule regarding filing of one petition against two or more orders. Sri Hari Swarup contended that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution and that order II Rule 3 of the Code permits the joinder of reliefs such as in the present petition. In the alternative he contended that even if the Code is not applicable the analogy of Order II Rule 3 of it should be applied by this Court in its discretion and it should entertain the petition.
(3.) ORDER II Rule 3 is to the effect that a plain, tiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly and that where causes of action are united the jurisdiction of the Court as regards the suit shall depend on the amount or value of the aggregate subject-matters. There is Rule 6 in Order II laying down that when it appears to the Court that any causes of action joined in one suit cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, it may order separate trials. The first question is whether; the Code of Civil Procedure governs a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution or not and our answer is "no." No statutory authority other than Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure was cited in support of the contention that the Code applies. What is laid down in Section 141 is that the procedure laid down in the Code in regard to suits is to be followed, so far as it can be, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. A High Court when exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be said to be a Court of civil jurisdiction. There is considerable conflict about the nature of the jurisdiction conferred upon a High Court under Article 228; some High Courts take the view that it is civil jurisdiction, some take it to be civil or criminal according to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the inferior Court or tribunal or authority passing the impugned order and others take the view that it is neither civil nor criminal. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it is not ordinary jurisdiction and is extraordinary jurisdiction; this observation may mean that it is neither civil nor criminal. Ordinary jurisdiction is capable of being divided into civil and criminal jurisdiction but not extraordinary jurisdiction. ;