J.SAHAI, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant tenants second appeal and arises out of a suit filed against him by the plaintiff-landlord on the basis of permission granted by the State Government under S. 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereafter called the Act) for the ejectment of the appellant from a shop situate in the city of Bareilly. The District Magistrate refused to grant the permission under S. 3 of the Act and the landlords revision application before the Commissioner, Bareilly, failed. Thereafter he filed a revision application before the State Government which succeeded and the permission was granted. On the grant of the permission a writ petition was filed in this Court challenging the order of the State Government and the right of the plaintiff landlord to file a suit on its basis. That petition was dismissed by Bishambhar Dayal, J. and a special appeal against his decision was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mukerji and Wanchandai JJ. On a reference by a learned Single Judge the second appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench which referred the following two questions of law to this Full Bench : "1. Whether a landlord can file a suit for the ejectment of his tenant upon permission granted by the State Government under S. 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act ?
(2.) WHETHER a decision, given by a Bench of this Court in a special appeal arising out of a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the question whether the State Government does or does not have the power to grant permission to a landlord to sue a tenant for a ejectment operates as res judicata in a second appeal subsequently filed in this Court ? "The whole case is not before us and we are only called upon to answer the two questions referred to us. We will take the questions seriatim, (2) It has been contended by Mr. S.N. Misra, on behalf of the defendant-tenant, that S. 3(1) of the Act clearly provides that "no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation" and the effect of these words is that no permission can be granted either by the Commissioner or by the State Government and assuming that such a permission is wrongly granted by either of them the Civil Court cannot take notice of it and cannot entertain a suit on the basis of such a permission. It was submitted that all that the Commissioner and the State Government can do is to issue directions to the District Magistrate to grant the permission or revoke one already granted. It would contribute to a clear understanding of the provisions of S. 3 of the Act if its legislative history was given in brief. The Act was enforced in 1947. At that time there was no provision for a revision application to the Commissioner or one to the State Government. Section 3 of the Act as it then stood, read : "3. No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodations, except on one or more of the following grounds :- (a) .............. (b) .............. (c) .............. (d) .............. (e) .............. (f) .............. Explanation ............" The Act was amended in 1952 by means of U.P. Act XXIV of 1952. Section 3 of the principal Act was renumbered as Sub-S. 3 (1) and the words "Subject to any order passed under Sub-S. (3)" were inserted before the words "no suit shall ...." Further the following three clauses were added to that section : - "(2) The party aggrieved by the order of the District Magistrate granting or refusing to grant the permission referred to in Sub-S. (1) may, within 30 days from the date of the order or the date on which, it is communicated to him whichever is later, apply to the Commissioner to revise the order. (3) The Commissioner shall, as far as may be, hear the application within six weeks from the date of its making and if he is satisfied that the District Magistrate has acted illegally or with material irregularity or has wrongly refused to act, he may confirm or set aside the order of the District Magistrate.
(3.) THE order of the Commissioner passed under Sub-S. (3) shall subject to any order passed by the-State Government under S. 7-F be final." At the same time S. 7-F was introduced in the Act. It reads :- "7-F. Revision to State Government. The State-Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in S. 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under S. 7 or directing a person under S. 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under S. 7-A and may make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice." The Act was again amended in 1954 by means of U.P. Act No. XVII of 1954. Clause (a) of Sub-S. (1) was radically changed and another sub-clause i.e. Cl. (g) was added. Besides, Sub-Ss. (2), (3) and (4) of S. 3 were recast in their present form. After the 1954 amendment the section now reads : - "3. Restriction on eviction - (1) Subject to any order passed under Sub-S. (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds : - (a) ............ (b) ........... (c) ............ (d) ............ (e) ............ (f) ............. Explanation ......... (2) Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant the permission the party aggrieved by his order may, within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, apply to the Commissioner to revise the order. (3) The Commissioner shall hear the application made under Sub-S. (2), as far as may be within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him alter or revise his order or make such other order as may be just and proper. (4) The order of the Commissioner under Sub-S. (3) shall, subject to any order passed by the State Government under S. 7-F be final." (Underlined (here into ) by us.) From what we have stated above it is clear that originally (in 1947) there was no provision for the hearing of a revision application by the Commissioner or by the State Government and the words "subject to any order passed under Sub-S. (3)" with which S. 3(1) of the Act opens did not find place there. The position, therefore, was that it was only the District Magistrate who could grant permission for filing a suit and neither the Commissioner nor the State Government could do so. That explains why the section mentioned the permission of the District Magistrate alone. Sub-Section (2) of S. 3 of the Act, as it stands on the statute book at present clearly provides for a revision application being Bled against the order passed by the District Magistrate either granting or refusing to grant permission under Sub-S. (1) of S. 3 of the Act. Sub-Section (3) casts a duty upon the Commissioner to hear the application as far as may be within six weeks from the date of making it and he has been authorised to pass any order which he considers just and proper including the one altering Or revising the order passed by the District Magistrate. Under Sub-S. (3) the Commissioner can interfere not only on the ground of jurisdictional or legal error but as would appear from the words underlined also if he considers that the order passed by the District Magistrate was not correct and proper or that the proceedings before him were not regular. There cannot be any manner of doubt that the powers conferred upon the Commissioner are of the widest amplitude and there is nothing which the District Magistrate can do and he cannot do. In this connection it would also be noticed that the scope of Sub-Ss. (2) and (3) of S. 3 of the Act has been very much widened by their recast in 1954. It is clear that whereas originally under Sub-S. (3) the Commissioner could interfere on the ground of the District Magistrate having acted "illegally or with material irregularity" or having "wrongly refused to act," he can now interfere "if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him." Again it is noticeable that whereas formerly the words were "he may confirm or set aside the order of the District Magistrate", the words now used are "alter or revise his order, or make such other order as may be just and proper." Two conclusions clearly follow from the deliberate changes the legislature has made in S. 3 of the Act : (1) that the Commissioner has been given a power to revise the order of the District Magistrate and (2) that the power now vested in the Commissioner is of the widest amplitude. (4) An analysis of S. 7-F of the Act also shows that the State Government has been specifically conferred the power to "call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in S. 3" and of making "such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice," There are no restrictions on the powers of the State Government also. In fact there can be no escape from the conclusion that the powers of the Commissioner and the State Government are co-extensive with that of the District Magistrate, See Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal, AIR 1941 SC 51 and Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi, AIR 1952 SC 319 (322). See also Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner Hills division, AIR 1958 SC 398 referred to below. It makes no difference that they have been, described as revisional and not appellate powers. (See AIR 1958 SC 398). The question, therefore, that. requires consideration is whether in spite of the legislative changes and in spite of the existence of Sub-Ss. (2), (3) and (4) of S. 3 and S. 7-F of the Act, it can still be said that neither the Commissioner nor the State Government can grant permission for filing a suit for the eviction of a tenant and that it is the District Magistrate alone who can do so and further that if the Commissioner or the State Government did grant such a permission that cannot provide a basis for a suit in the civil Court. Having given the matter our anxious consideration we have no doubt that the submission is without any substance. We are not impressed with the submission made by Mr. Misra that even though the language of Sub-S. (3) of S. 3 and of S. 7-F of the Act is of the widest : amplitude, the provisions must be so read as to authorise the Commissioner and the State Government not to grant any permission or to revoke one granted by the District Magistrate, but only to direct him either to grant one or revoke the permission already granted by him. Such a submission completely militates against the clear, express and unambiguous language of S. 3(3) and S. 7-F of the Act. No reasons have been brought to our notice which may impel us to, ignore the clear language of these provisions or give to the words used meanings which they cannot bear. There is no justification for holding that even though the legislature has used the language of widest amplitude we should give the words used artificial and arbitrarily restricted meanings. It is well settled that when the text is explicit, the text is conclusive and the first and foremost rule of interpretation of statutes is that "if the words of the statute are in themselves, precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than, to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature." (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, XIth Edition page 2). See also Commr. for Special Purposes of the Income-tax v. J.F. Pemsel, 1891 AC 531 at p. 543, River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson, (1877) 2 AC 743 at p. 778 and Jugal Kishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., (S) AIR 1955 SC 376.;