- (1.) JUDGEMENT The petitioner challenges the order of the Taking Officer of the Court, dated March 5, 1963.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition are these : under the provisions of the Town Improvement Trust Act read with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the Town Improvement Trust Agra acquired some land of the petitioner in connection with its Raja Ki Mandi street scheme. The compensation for the land was determined by an award on October 24, 1953. The petitioner was not satisfied with the compensation awarded to him. It appears that the question of compensation was referred to the District Judge under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. While the proceedings were pending before the District Judge, the Town Improvement Trust Act was repealed, and its place was taken up by the Nagar Mahapalika Act. The question of compensation was then referred to the Tribunal constituted under the Nagar Mahapalika Act for determination. The new Tribunal gave its decision on June 2, 1962. The decision did not come up to the expectation of the petitioner. Accordingly he filed a first appeal from the decision under S. 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Act (hereinafter called the Act). In the appeal he claimed a higher compensation than the one awarded to him by the Tribunal. In the memorandum of appeal the valuation of the appeal is shown as Rs. 8,325. On the memorandum he affixed a court-fee of Rs. 5 only. The Stamp Reporter reported on October 15, 1962 that the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was deficient by Rs. 992.70. On October 18 counsel for the appellant objected to the report of the Stamp Reporter. He maintained that the court-fee already paid was sufficient. The matter was then referred to the Taxing Officer for decision. By his order, dated March 5, 1963 the Taxing Officer held that the court-fee paid was deficient by Rs. 992.70. He directed the petitioner to make good the deficiency by April 10, 1963. He has also directed that the first appeal from order should be re-registered as a first appeal. The deficiency was not made good within the time granted by the Taxing Officer. But on August 16, 1963, counsel for the petitioner made an application to the Taxing Officer for referring the question of court-fee to the Taxing Judge. The application was rejected by the Taxing Officer on October 8, 1963. On November 1, 1963, the office reported that the deficiency in the court-fee has not been made good by the petitioner. On December 3, 1963, the Joint Registrar allowed two weeks for making good the deficiency in the court-fee. The petitioner still did not pay the deficient court-fee, and consequently on January 8, 1964, the Court rejected the memorandum of appeal as deficiently stamped. Two and half months thereafter the present petition was filed on March 23, 1964. Counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued before me that the memorandum of appeal was sufficiently stamped and that the decision of the Taxing Officer is manifestly erroneous. Before I enter into the merits of the case it is necessary to deal with two preliminary matters. Firstly, the petitioner has suppressed a material fact from the Court; secondly, the petition is inordinately belated. As already stated the memorandum of appeal was rejected as deficiently stamped on January 8, 1964. Although the petition was filed two and half months thereafter on March 23, 1964 the petition is absolutely silent about it. It is nowhere mentioned in the petition that the memorandum of appeal has already been rejected as deficiently stamped. It appears to me that the suppression of this fact is material, and the petition is liable to be dismissed in limine for that reason.
(3.) THE impugned order of the Taxing-Officer was made on March 5, 1963. The petition was moved in Court on March 23, 1964 that is more than a year after the impugned order. The petition is, therefore, undoubtedly inordinately belated. The petitioner has tried to explain the delay in moving the petition. If has been alleged that the impugned order was passed behind the back of the petitioner and his counsel and that neither of them was informed of it by the office. Likewise it is alleged that the petitioner and his counsel were not informed by the office of the Taxing Officers order of October 8, 1963, dismissing the petitioners application for referring the question of court-fees to the Taxing Judge. It is said that the petitioner came to know of that order only in February 1961. The reference to the order in paragraph 6 of the petition in that connection appears to be wrong. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in those circumstances the delay in filing the petition was sufficiently explained and that it should accordingly be condoned. I do not agree.;