- (1.) HEARD Sri Suyash Agarwal, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri B.K. Pandey, learned standing counsel for the respondent.
(2.) C .T.R. No. 497 of 2014 relates to assessment under the U.P.Value Added Tax Act, 2008 for the A.Y. 2008 -09 and C.T.R. No. 499 of 2014 relates to assessment under the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007 for the A.Y. 2008 -09. The assessment of entry tax has been made on the quantity of coal determined in the assessment order passed under U.P. VAT Act and, as such, both the revisions are being heard together. Both the revisions are admitted on the question of law no. (i) as framed in Revision No. 497 of 2014 and question of law no. (i) as framed in Revision No. 499 of 2014. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties both the revisions are finally heard.
(3.) BRIEFLY stated the facts of the present case are that the assessee is engaged in manufacture and sale of bricks. It runs a brick kiln. For the assessment year 2008 -09 the assessee disclosed firing period of 73 days in the first season from 1.4.2008 to 12.6.2008 and in the second season firing of 58 days from 17.12.2008 to 12.2.2009. Thus total firing period was disclosed 131 days. The assessing officer increased the firing period of the first season from 73 days to 76 days and of the second season from 58 days to 106 days. The first appellate authority reduced the firing period of second season to 74 days. The Tribunal, by the impugned order; has set aside the order of the first appellate authority and restored the firing period as determined by the assessing officer. The only dispute pressed by the learned counsel for the revisionist in this revision is with regard to determination of firing period in the second season at 106 days as against the disclosed firing period of 58 days and consequential determination of the production and sale of bricks and consumption of coal. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the assessing officer has not recorded any valid reason. He rejected the disclosed firing period merely on the basis of surmises and presumption and without any evidence on record for firing in the brick kiln beyond the period disclosed by the assessee. The first appellate authority has correctly reduced the firing period. The Tribunal passed the impugned order without recording any reason either for agreeing with the firing period determined by the assessing officer or for disagreement with the firing period determined by the first appellate authority. He, therefore, submits that since the Tribunal is the last fact finding authority and was bound to record its own finding with regard to the factual aspects of firing period and, as such, the failure of the Tribunal to record any finding with regard to the fixation of firing period, renders the order of the Tribunal to be illegal.;