Sudhir Agarwal, J. - (1.) THIS revision has been preferred with a delay of 223 days therefore is barred by time. In a very casual fashion, delay has sought to be explained, inasmuch as, it is admitted that order passed by Tribunal dated 13 -2 -2013 was received by Department on 23 -2 -2013 but thereafter first step was taken on 24 -4 -2013 by Deputy Commissioner -State Representative, Commercial Tax, Varanasi, who requested Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Sector -7, Varanasi vide letter dated 24 -4 -2013 to send typed copy of the assessment order, first appellate order and order of Tribunal. The Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Sector 7, Varanasi sent typed copy along with letter dated 5 -6 -2013. After one month, Deputy Commissioner -State Representative, Commercial Tax, Varanasi sent the matter to Joint Commissioner, Commercial Tax (High Court Works), Allahabad vide letter dated 9 -7 -2013 with the request to file revision and Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Allahabad vide letter dated 25 -7 -2013 returned the file in original to Deputy Commissioner -State Representative, Commercial Tax, Varanasi to contact Standing Counsel. Then Deputy Commissioner - State Representative, Varanasi vide letter dated 19 -9 -2013 handed over documents to the deponent of affidavit to file revision and then this revision has been filed after more than three months even thereafter. It is true that when State is a party, and file appeal/revision, as the case may be, with some delay, it may deserve some leverage for official hierarchical steps for permission etc. but a wholly unexplained, reckless and negligent approach of delay running in seven months and more cannot be overlooked particularly when it is not the case of applicants that they have taken any action against erring individual.
(2.) THE expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of [Limitation] Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, : 1987 (2) SCC 107 : 1987 (28) E.L.T. 185 (S.C.), the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non -deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. In the matters where action is brought by Government, no person is individually affected and in ultimate analysis it is the public interest which suffers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristic of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation though is equal and apply at par to both private individual and Government but where the Government makes out a case of sufferings to public interest owing to acts of fraud and bad faith on the part of its officials and agents, and also, the intention of Government not to allow such officers of doubtful integrity to go scot free, the Court should also come forward to do justice in the interest of public at large, but, a mere eye wash kind of explanation, without any honest intention of State authorities to proceed against tainted officers, or, those who have acted in a bad faith, or, those who have worked negligently, the explanation that delay must be condoned in public interest would be superficial and lacking bona fide, hence difficult to be accepted by Court.
(3.) IN G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, : AIR 1988 SC 897, in para 8 of the judgment, the Court said: "8............Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red -tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning -of course, within a reasonable limits -is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law -officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of these cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government.";