Sudhir Agarwal, J. - (1.) THIS application under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C.") has been preferred with a sole prayer that Courts below be directed to consider bail application of applicants, on the same day, pursuant to first information report dated 10.10.2012 (Case Crime No. 217 of 2012) under Section 120B, 302, I.P.C.) registered at P.S. Rajabpur, District Amroha, in the light of decision of this Court in Smt. Amarawati and Anr. v. State of U.P., : 2004 (57) ALR 390 : (2005 CriLJ 755 (All) as approved by Apex Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., : 2009 (3) ADJ 322 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2178). I am required to consider whether such an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. with the prayer, as aforesaid, is entertainable. The scope of Section 482, Cr.P.C., as is evident from a bare reading of aforesaid provision, can be culled out from the provision itself, which reads as under: "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." (Emphasis added)
(2.) THE power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in a routine manner, but it is for limited purposes, namely, to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Time and again, Supreme Court and various High Courts, including ours one, have reminded when exercise of power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. would be justified, which cannot be placed in straight jacket formula, but one thing is very clear that it should not preempt a trial and cannot be used in a routine manner so as to cut short the entire process of trial before the Courts below. If from a bare perusal of first information report or complaint, it is evident that it does not disclose any offence at all or it is frivolous, collusive or oppressive on the face of it, the Court may exercise its inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. but it should be exercised sparingly. This will not include as to whether prosecution is likely to establish its case or not, whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained, or the other circumstances, which would not justify exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. I need not go into various aspects in detail but it would be suffice to refer a few recent authorities dealing all these matters in detail, namely, State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : (AIR 1992 SC 604), Popular Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police, : (2006) 7 SCC 296, Hamida v. Rashid alias Rasheed and Ors., : (2008) 1 SCC 474 : (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 361), Dr. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. : (2008) 8 SCC 781 : (AIR 2008 SC 2781), M.N. Ojha and Ors. v. Alok Kumar Srivastav and Anr., : (2009) 9 SCC 682 : (AIR 2010 SC 201), State of A. P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and Ors., : JT 2010 (6) SC 588 : (2010 AIR SCW 4386) and Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Incorporated and Ors., : 2011 (1) SCC 74: (AIR 2011 SC 20). In Lee Kun Hee and others v. State of U.P. and others, : JT 2012 (2) SC 237 : (AIR 2012 SC 1007), it was reiterated that Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate evidence, if any, available on record. Interference would be justified only when a clear case of such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled interference even at the preliminary stage by High Court may result in causing obstruction in the progress of inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in public interest. It, however, may not be doubted, if on the face of it, either from the first information report or complaint, it is evident that allegation are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair -minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding, in such cases refusal to exercise jurisdiction may equally result in injustice, more particularly, in cases, where the complainant sets the criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint.
(3.) IN the present case, fortunately and interestingly it is not the allegation of applicants that there is any non -compliance of order passed by Court under Cr.P.C. or that there is any abuse of process on the part of Court or that there is any failure or travesty of justice on the part of Court below. The learned counsel for the applicants stated during course of argument that applicants are ready to surrender and apply for bail but it is admitted by learned counsel for the applicants that till date no such application has seen the light of the day. This Court does not know whether such an application would actually be filed or not. But what applicants require from this Court, to do, is that an application, which has yet to see the light of the day, should be directed to be decided by Court below and that too, on the "same day" so as to command the Court below to dispose of an application on the day it is presented before it, without exercising its discretion, which has been permitted by law by conferring a discretion upon it, looking to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.;