S.P.PANDEY, j. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal under Section 331(4) of the UPZA & LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), preferred against the judgment and decree dated 19-8-1995, passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi, in appeal No. 3/9 of 1993-94/Jalaun, dismissing the same and confirming the judgment and decree dated 23-12-1993/30-12-1993, passed by the learned trial Court in a suit under Section 229-B of the Act.
(2.) BRIEFLY stated, the facts, giving rise to the instant second appeal are that the plaintiff, Hari Ram instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the Act against the Gaon Sabha etc., defendants for declaration of his rights as bhumidhar in possession of the land, in dispute with transferable rights, which was obtained through a patta from the then zamindar in 1354 F on a rent of Rs. 20/- and continued in possession, as yet and since the plaintiff is an illiterate person, he was under the impression that his name is continuing even after the abolition of zamindari as well as after the close of the consolidation operations. The cause of action arose, when in 1991, he came to know that his name does not find place in the revenue records. On notice, the Gaon Sabha, concerned contested the suit of the plaintiff, denying the allegations. The learned trial Court, after completing the requisite trial, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, vide its judgment and decree dated 23-12-1993 against which he went up in appeal before the learned Additional Commissioner, who has also dismissed the same, vide his judgment and decree dated 19-8-1995 and therefore, it is against these judgments and decrees, passed by the learned Courts below that the instant second appeal has been preferred by him before the Board. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also perused the record on file. Assailing the impugned judgments and decrees, the main thrust of contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant are - firstly, that since the land, in suit, was outside the purview of the consolidation scheme, as found by the learned trial Court itself, the bar of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is not at all attracted and therefore, the learned Courts below, have committed manifest error of law in holding otherwise; secondly, that since the lease, granted by the then zamindari in favour of the plaintiff was proved to the hilt, the learned Courts below without considering this material aspect of the matter in question as well as the evidence on record, both documentary as well as oral, have grossly erred in taking a contrary view in the matter, in question; thirdly, that since the name of the plaintiff was recorded in the extracts of khasras 1366, 1370 and 1372 F, striking of his name without any authority of law is of no consequence and therefore, since the suit of the plaintiff was partly decreed by the learned trial Court on 20-12-1993, there had been no occasion for it to dismiss the same thereafter and as such the impugned judgments and decrees, being illegal, perverse and without jurisdiction, cannot, at any stretch of imagination, be allowed to sustain and this second appeal very richly deserves to be allowed. In support, reliance has been placed on the case law, reported in 1967 RD 426. The learned Counsel for the respondent, in reply, urged that in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the learned Courts below were perfectly justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, as the same was clearly barred by Section 49 of the UPCH Act after the close of the consolidation scheme and therefore, this second appeal, having no force, very richly deserves dismissal, outright.
(3.) I have closely and carefully considered the arguments, advanced before me by the learned Counsel for the parties and have also scanned the record on file. As a matter of fact, the claim of the plaintiff is based upon an alleged patta, executed by the then zamindar in his favour. The learned Courts below, have dealt with this patta, at length and have concurrently come to the conclusion that the same must have been granted for a limited specified period because had it been a permanent lease, it ought to have been registered and duly attested, as required by law. There is no proof for the payment of rent, as specified in this alleged patta, to the then zamindar as well. Moreover, it still remains a mystery as to why the mutation on the basis of this alleged patta did not take place and why the plaintiff also did not take any steps for effecting the same for such a long period of 40 years. The crux of the matter, in question, is whether or not the suit of the plaintiff, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, is barred by Section 49 of the UPCH Act. It is also an admitted case of the parties concerned that the village concerned had undergone consolidation operations. But it is also not known as to why he kept mum and did not file any objection before the consolidation authorities, as required by law. As a matter of fact, at present, the land, in dispute, is recorded as Usar, Banjar and Marghat. Both the learned Courts below have, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, held the suit of the plaintiff barred by Section 49 of the UPCH Act. They have, in fact, given a positive finding in this respect after dealing with the matter, in question through and through, at length, in correct perspective of law. Their findings are saturated in themselves, which have been arrived, at after due and proper appreciation of evidence on record with which no interference is called for, by this Court, at this stage. As stated above, when the plaintiff failed to file any objection before the consolidation authorities, his suit is clearly barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the UPCH Act and therefore, the contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant, who has miserably failed to substantiate his claim, are rather untenable for the same reason. I am, therefore, fully convinced that no illegality or material irregularity has either been committed by the learned Courts below, in the exercise of their jurisdiction and as such, this second appeal, having no force, very richly deserves dismissal, outright.;