- (1.) M. Katju, J. This first appeal and other first appeals which are listed at Serial Nos. 24 to 79 in todays Cause List involve a common question of law and relate to the acquisition of land in the same Village. Hence they are being disposed off by this common judgment.
(2.) HEARD Sri A. K. Misra learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Pankaj Mittal for the respondents. One of the counsels for the respondents in this case and some connected cases in shown in the cause list to be Sri V. P. Rai, Advocate who has sent as illness slip. However, it appears that in many of these cases Sri Pankaj Mittal is also counsel alongwith Sri V. P. Rai and we have heard Sri Pankaj Mittal in this bunch of cases. We are not inclined to adjourn these cases despite the illness slip sent by Sri V. P. Rai because the point involved is covered by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal No. 251 of 1997 Moradabad Development Authority v. Chidda and others, [since reported in 2004 (1) JCLR 920 (All) connected with First Appeal Nos. 253 of 1997 and 254 of 1997 decided on 3- 3-2004. In fact in First Appeal No. 251 of 1997 written submissions were submitted jointly by Sri Pankaj Mittal and Sri V. P. Rai, Advocates Sri V. P. Rai is not present in Court but Sri Pankaj Mittal is present and we have heard him. Sri Raju Sultan an advocate of Moradabad District Court has appeared before us today and has stated that he is holding the brief of Sri V. P. Rai. Sri Raju Sultan first requested that these appeals should not be heard by this bench and they have been wrongly listed before us. We pointed out that the cause list is printed under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, and moreover this is the regular bench hearing land acquisition cases as nominated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Sri Sultan then requested that the case be adjourned for one month but we refused to adjourn the case particularly since a similar earlier case being First Appeal No. 251 of 1997 had already been decided by us on 3-3-04 and these bunch of cases appeared to us to be covered by that decision. Sri Raju then requested for adjournment on the ground that the records of these cases have not been sent for. We refused this request also because in our opinion sufficient material was before us for deciding the case and the paper book had already been filed in the leading case and in most of the other cases also. It may be mentioned that S. L. Ps. had been filed before the Supreme Court against the interim orders passed in several of these appeals e. g. S. L. P. No. 22431 of 2003 alongwith connected S. L. Ps arising from the order of this Court on 18-4-03 in F. A. No. 456 to 463 of 1997. In these S. L. Ps. , the Supreme Court observed: - "the High Court is requested to dispose off the pending appeals as expeditiously as is conveniently possible as the matter appears to have been pending for the last several years. " Thus the prayer for adjournment by Sri Raju Sultan Advocate was only delaying tactics, and we refused to accept it. In all these cases the compensation which was fixed at the rate of Rs. 80 per square meters by the S. L. A. O. has been raised to Rs. 270 per square meters by the Court below. On identical facts we had allowed First Appeal No. 251 of 1997 Moradabad Development Authority v. Chidda and others on 3- 3-04. [since reported in 2004 (1) JCLR 920 (All)]. In that decision we referred to the earlier decision of this Court in First Appeal No. 522 of 1993 Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Khushi Ram and others, decided on 26-2-2004 and the decisions of the Supreme Court e. g. Union of India v. Zila Singh, 2003 (10) SCC 166, where it has been held that an exemplar of small plots should not be relied upon when the land acquired is of much larger area. In our decision in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Khusi Ram and others (supra) many of the decisions of the Supreme Court have been referred to. In Moradabad Development Authority v. Chidda and others (supra) we observed that even the SLAO has awarded excessive compensation because he has taken the view that the exemplar granting the highest rate of compensation should be adopted. In fact there is no such principle of law that the exemplar of the highest rate should be accepted. However, in view of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act we cannot reduce the compensation awarded by the SLAO.
(3.) FOLLOWING the decision of this Court in Moradabad Development Authority v. Chidda (supra) and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Khusi Ram this appeal and connected appeals are allowed and the impugned judgments are set aside. In Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Sri S. O. Tumari, AIR 1995 SC 840 (vide para 22) the Supreme Court held that the burden is on the claimant to show that the SLAO did not award the proper compensation or that the claimant was entitled to higher compensation. In the present case the claimants (respondents) have not been able to show that the SLAO did not award the proper compensation. In the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court the award of the Land Acquisition Officer was affirmed. We are also inclined to affirm the award of the SLAO in the present case as the claimants have not been able to show that they are entitled to higher compensation than what was awarded by the SLAO. In fact we are of the opinion that the SLAO has awarded excessive compensation but in view of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act we cannot reduce the said compensation awarded by the SLAO. The award of the SLAO is hence restored.;