- (1.) S. U. Khan, J. Raghunandan Prasad father of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed a suit for ejectment against tenant- petitioner before J. S. C. C. Etah being S. C. C. Suit No. 79 of 1975. During the pendency of suit Raghunandan Prasad died and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 his sons were substituted at his place as plaintiffs. In the suit recovery of arrears of rent was also prayed for.
(2.) DURING the pendency of the suit plaintiffs had transferred the property in dispute to Moti Lal and others through sale deed dated 28-3-1978. Transferees applied for their substitution/impleadment in the suit. Their application was rejected by the Trial Court (according to the judgment of the Revisional Court application was rejected on the objections of the plaintiffs.) Trial Court held that notice was served upon the tenant petitioner and he was in arrears of rent. However, under issues No. 3 and 4, it was decided in favour of the tenant petitioner that his defence was not liable to be struck off and he was entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as entire arrears of rent etc. had been deposited on the first date of hearing. It was further held that as plaintiff had sold the house in favour of Moti Lal and others on 28-3-1978 hence decree for ejectment could not be passed in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was held entitled for decree of recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was decided on 31-10-1980. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed revision before District Judge, Etah being S. C. C. Revision No. 4 of 1981. 1st Additional District Judge, Etah through judgment and order dated 21-10-1982 decided the said revision. The tenant has filed the instant writ petition against the aforesaid revisional order. In paragraphs 15 and 16 of the writ petition it has been stated that, Moti Lal and others again sold the property to Sudhir Kumar and Mohini Devi on 20-1-1981 and Moti Lal and others after purchasing the property accepted rent from the petitioner and thereafter Sudhir Kumar and Mohini Devi after purchasing the property from Moti Lal and others accepted the petitioner as their tenant and received rent from him. 5. The Revisional Court held that the impleadment' intervention of transferees from landlord in the suit was necessary. In the third paragraph of its judgment the Revisional Court has held as follows: "in my opinion so far as the tenant is concerned the said order is only an interlocutory order which can be attacked by the defendant in the revision. The defendant is not bound by the in- action of the interveners who kept quite after the dismissal of the application. " 6. The Revisional Court further held that as new parties had become owner of the property they could waive the notice and declare in Court that they did not want to eject the tenant and that "the version of the interveners should have been clearly obtained on the point as to whether they wanted the defendant to continue as tenant in the disputed premises. " Consequently, revision was allowed and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for re-trial after adding the purchasers as defendants in the suit. 7. Revisional Court did not decide as to whether findings of the Trial Court holding the tenant to be entitled to the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act was legally sustainable or not. Purchasers neither challenged the order of the Trial Court rejecting their substitution' impleadment application nor filed any revision against the final judgment and decree of JSCC. Respondents No. 2 and 3 did not challenge the order of the Trial Court rejecting impleadment/substitution of transferees pendente lite. In the writ petition order of the Revisional Court allowing impleadment/substitution of transferees has been challenged by the tenant. From this stand of tenant petitioner in the writ petition it may safely be inferred that before the Revisional Court where tenant was respondent he did not challenge the order of the Trial Court rejecting impleadment/substitution application of transferees. In any case when transferees themselves did not approach the Revisional Court for setting aside the order of the Trial Court rejecting their impleadment/substitution application or challenging the ultimate judgment and decree of the Trial Court, it was not open for the Revisional Court to allow their impleadment/substitution in the suit and remand the matter to the Trial Court for having their version. The Revisional Court should have first decided the question of benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act. In case Revisional Court had agreed with the Trial Court on this aspect then there would have been nothing left for the Revisional Court to decide. 8. In normal course the proper procedure for this Court would have been to remand the matter to the Revisional Court for deciding the question of benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act. However, in view of the facts that matter is quite old, inspite of sufficient service under Chapter VIII, Rule 12 of the High Court Rules no one has appeared for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have not filed any writ petition against judgment and order of the Revisional Court, I have myself examined the decision of the Trial Court extending the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act to the tenant petitioner. The suit was filed on 24-9-1975 and the date in the summons was fixed as 10-12-1975, which was adjourned on the application of the defendant to 26-3-1976. Thereafter, the suit was adjourned to 18-4-1976. Written Statement was filed on 26-3-1976 and the entire amount, as required by Section 20 (4) of the Act, had been deposited one day prior to that i. e. on 25-3-1976. The first date of hearing is the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind. No date prior to the date on which written statement is filed can be taken to be the date of first hearing. Respondents No. 2 and 3 did not dispute that the entire amount as required by Section 20 (4) of the Act had been deposited by the tenant. They only asserted that 10-12- 1975 date fixed for summons shall be taken to be the first date of hearing. Stand taken by respondent Nos. 2 and 3 was not legal. The date fixed in the summons can not necessarily be the first date of hearing (vide A. I. R. 2002 S. C. 2520 ). 9. Accordingly, I hold that there is no error in the judgment of the Trial Court holding the tenant petitioner to be entitled to benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act. In view of the above findings I do not consider it necessary that the Trial Court or the Revisional Court must decide the question of effect of transfer of property pendente lite. 10. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court is set aside. Judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court is restored. Petition allowed. .;