S. U. Khan, J. - (1.) These three writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioner T. P. Mehta against the same order dated 7-7- 1994 by the same authority i. e. Prescribed Authority/civil Judge, Jhansi in the same case regarding the same property against the same landlord respondent No. 2 Meghraj. Filing of three writ petitions against same order by the same person is misuse of the process of Court. The first two writ petitions were filed on the same date i. e. 12-7-1994. In the first two writ petitions there is absolutely no difference except that in the first writ petition paragraph stating that petitioner has got no other remedy is missing while the said paragraph is their as last but one paragraph in the second writ petition. In the first two writ petitions, operation of the impugned order was stayed on 15-7-1994. In the third writ petition the only difference is that in para 34 it is mentioned that petitioner has already instituted a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22255 of 1994) against the impugned judgment on 15-7-1994. In the said paragraph stay order dated 15-7-1994 was quoted. All the three writ petitions have been filed by the same learned counsel.
(2.) LANDLORD respondent No. 2 Sri Meghraj filed release application against tenant petitioner D. P. Mehta under Section 21 of U. P Act No. 13 of 1972. In the said proceedings according to para 3 of the first two writ petitions "however, on intervention of common friends, the parties entered into a compromise. According to the terms of the compromise, the petitioner was to vacate the premises in dispute within three months. " The release application was registered as P. A. Case No. 132 of 1982. The compromise was filed on 21- 2-1983 copy of which is annexed to each of the writ petitions. In the compromise it was stated that opposite party conceded the bona fide need of the applicant and that opposite party was ready to vacate the premises within three months. Release application was decided in terms of the compromise. It has been held by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1993 S. C. 1449, that release application can be allowed on the basis of compromise if tenant admits therein bona fide need of landlord. The property in dispute was not vacated by tenant petitioner hence execution application under Section 23 of U. P Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by landlord respondent No. 2 in the year 1992 i. e. after about 9 years of the compromise order. Application was registered as P. A. Case No. 25 of 1992. Tenant petitioner filed objections in the said compromise. The tenant in his objections asserted that a fraud was played upon him and in fact he never entered into compromise. The prescribed authority rejected the contention of fraud raised by the tenant on the ground that the tenant was a Government servant and well versed with English hence it was not expected of him that he would sign on blank papers. Prescribed Authority further held that on the order sheet of the release application in the order dated 14-2-1983 the prescribed authority noted that the tenant Sri T. P. Mehta was present alongwith his counsel. The compromise was also accepted by the prescribed authority on 21-2- 1983 after verifying and signing the same and the compromise was signed by tenant Sri T. P. Mehta as well as his counsel. In any case this point need not be pursued further as in para 3 of the first two writ petitions itself it has been admitted that on intervention of common friends, parties entered into compromise. Writ petitions have been sworn by Sri T. P. Mehta himself. Prescribed authority ultimately by impugned order dated 7-7-1994 allowed the execution application of landlord respondent No. 2 and rejected the objections of tenant petitioner. In the writ petition plea of limitation has been raised. During argument also plea of limitation was raised. If Limitation Act does not apply then application for execution under Section 23 of the Act can be filed at any time. If Limitation Act applies then Article 136 of the schedule of Limitation Act providing period of 12 years for execution of decree is applicable as application under Section 23 of the Act is nothing but execution application. The execution application was filed within 12 years hence it cannot be termed to be beyond limitation.
(3.) IT has also been stated in the writ petition and argued that after the alleged compromise and before filing of execution application tenant enhanced the rent, which operated as estoppel against the landlord to execute the order of eviction passed on the basis of compromise. No such plea was taken in the objections filed by the petitioner before the prescribed authority numbered as Misc. Case No. 45 of 1992. In any case, even if it is assumed that rent was enhanced by mutual consent it will not amount to waiving the right of getting possession in execution of compromise order. The learned counsel for petitioners has cited the following authorities: (1) AIR 1977 S. C. 282 (2) AIR 1964 S. C. 1336 (3) AIR 1952 Allahabad 900 (4) (2000) 2 SCC 672 and (5) 2001 (1)ARC 168.;