- (1.) ANJANI Kumar, J. Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
(2.) THE petitioner-landlord, by means of present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenges the order dated 18th January, 1988, passed by the appellate authority, copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-'4' to the writ petition, whereby the appellate authority has allowed the appeal filed by the tenant-respondent and set aside the order dated 8th May, 1986 by which the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, filed by the landlord-petitioner was allowed by the prescribed authority. In short, the facts of the present case are that the petitioner-landlord filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, here-in-after referred to as the 'act', before the prescribed authority for the release of the accommodation in question, which is under the tenancy of the tenant on the ground of that the accommodation in question is bona fide required for personal use of the landlord. The prescribed authority on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced before it, vide its order dated 8th May, 1986, copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-'iii' to the writ petition, arrived at the conclusion that the need of the landlord is bona fide and also comparison of the hardship tilt in favour of the landlord. The prescribed authority, therefore, allowed the application of the landlord. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority as contemplated under Section 22 of the Act. The appellate authority vide its order dated 18th January, 1988, copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-'iv' to the writ petition, allowed the appeal of the tenant- respondent and rejected the application for release under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act filed by the landlord. The appellate authority has dealt with all the materials or record and while dealing with the matter has observed that the need of the landlady and her relations for additional accommodation is bona fide and genuine, but on comparison, the appellate authority came to the conclusion that the tenant will suffer comparatively more hardship than the landlord. Apart from above, the appellate authority has recorded a finding "in view of the foregoing discussions I have come to the conclusion that the need of the landlady and her relations for additional accommodation is bona fide and genuine, but the tenanted accommodation being not fit and sufficient to fulfill the need and requirement of the landlady, the need for particular accommodation is not found to be genuine and bona fide. In view of this, the grant of release in respect of the tenanted accommodation was not justified with the result the appeal is to be allowed. "
(3.) LEARNED Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-landlord submitted that once the appellate authority found that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine, it was not open to the appellate authority to arrive at the conclusion that the tenanted accommodation, release whereof is sought for, would not be sufficient to meet the need of the landlord and therefore, the rejection of the application of the landlord on this ground is wholly erroneous. It is this part of the order, which is particularly challenged apart from the findings recorded by the appellate authority. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-respondent relied upon a decision reported in 2001 All. CJ, 1141, Ashok Kumar and others v. Sita Ram by which the apex Court has dealt with the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India while interfering with the findings of fact. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the tenant-respondent has relied upon paragraphs 10 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment, which read thus: " (10) The position is too well settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final Court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take a different view on the material on record ". (17) The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the appellate authority. The order passed by the appellate authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where order passed by the statutory authority vested with power to act quashi judicial is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case ";