R. K. GULATI, J. - (1.) This is a sales tax revision filed under section 11 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for short "the Act" ). It is directed against an order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Dehradun Bench, Dehradun. The dispute pertains to assessment year 1984-85. Against the ex parte assessment order that was made for the year in dispute the assessee preferred an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) which was dismissed as barred by time. The second appeal before the Sales Tax Tribunal also met the same fate. The assessee still feeling aggrieved has preferred this revision. The short question which falls for determination is whether on the facts obtaining on the record, the order dismissing the appeal as barred by time could be sustained. Section 9 of the Act, inter alia, provides that any dealer aggrieved by an order made by the assessing authority may within thirty days from the date of service of a copy of the order, appeal to such an authority as may be prescribed. Sub-section (6) of section 9 of the Act states that section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to appeals or applications made under that section. The reference to section 5 of the Limitation Act would show that it provides for extension of prescribed period in certain cases and says, inter alia, that any appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies to the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. It is evident from these provisions that it empowers the appellate authority to admit an appeal after expiry of the period of 30 days mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 9 if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within the prescribed period in that behalf. The only condition that is to be fulfilled is that the appellate authority must be satisfied about the existence of sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within time. The assessment order appealed against was served on the assessee on March 27, 1989. An appeal against that order should have been filed on or before April 26, 1989, but the same was filed beyond 22 days from the due date. In order to seek condonation of delay the assessee filed a medical certificate to the effect that he was seriously ill between April 22, 1989 and May 17, 1989 as a result of which he could not prefer the appeal an time. The assessee also filed a personal affidavit to the same effect. The factum of ailment and the period during which the assessee claims to have been ill, was not disputed. The appeal was, however, dismissed as barred by time considering the fact that the assessee had moved an application under section 30 of the Act for setting aside the ex parte order on April 29, 1989. Such an application could be made within thirty days of the ex parte assessment order, the limitation being the same within which the appeal against the assessment order could be preferred. It may be noticed that under the Act against an ex parte assessment two remedies are provided to an aggrieved assessee, one to approach the assessing itself to set aside the ex parte assessment on the ground that no notice for hearing was received or the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing on the date fixed. The other remedy is to appeal against the assessment. The two remedies available to an assessee against an ex parte assessment order are independent of each other. Availing of one remedy does not bar to have recourse to the other remedy. The Sales Tax Tribunal took the view that if the assessee could file the application under section 30 of the Act on April 29, 1989, it could as well as file an appeal by that time and therefore, the appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation as the assessee took no steps to file the appeal on or about the same date when the application under section 30 was filed. We shall revert to this aspect of the matter at its appropriate place little later. The expression "sufficient cause" has not been defined. It is not possible nor it would be desirable to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute "sufficient cause". However, it may safely be stated that the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate negligence on the part of the appellant seeking indulgence in taking necessary steps which he could have or should have taken. Here again it would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case as to what would be such necessary steps and each case will have to be decided by the authority concerned on the facts and circumstances of the case. The question whether there is sufficient cause to admit an appeal filed out of time is purely a matter for determination in exercise of the discretion of the authority seized of the matter, but that discretion has to be exercised judiciously. Where there is no exercise of discretion at all or it is exercised arbitrarily or irrationally it would be a case of failure to exercise jurisdiction or illegal exercise of it. In such a situation the decision of the authority is liable to be interfered with. In other words the power of the appellate authority to condone the delay, though discretionary, must either way show application of mind that discretion was exercised fairly and equitably. The expression "sufficient cause" by now has been the subject-matter of consideration in several cases by the Supreme Court as well as by other courts. The judicial opinion is that the court should take a pragmatic view in the matter of condonation of delay. The inclination must be towards excusing delay rather than scuttling proceedings. The courts have held that legislation is adequately elastic to enable a court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts and the words "sufficient cause" ought to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. Now reverting to the facts of the case again it may be observed that the assessee did give an explanation of the circumstances in which the application under section 30 of the Act came to be filed. It was explained that certain papers and documents, such as, form No. 14 and an application under section 30 are normally filed by counsel and in the instant case also application under section 30 was filed by the counsel of his own accord. Further, the assessee also stated that on memory under some misapprehension and by a bona fide mistake a wrong date of service of the assessment order was conveyed to the counsel which also contributed to the late filing of the appeal. The application under section 30 which was filed on April 29, 1989 was, also beyond time by three days of the prescribed period. The question for consideration before the Sales Tax Tribunal was whether the assessee had any sufficient cause in not preferring an appeal between April 29, 1989 to May 17, 1989 or the assessee was negligent in that behalf. As observed earlier the ailment of the assessee between April 22, 1989 to May 17, 1989 was not questioned. The medical certificate filed by the assessee was to the effect that the assessee was advised complete bed rest and was not allowed to move. There is no finding of the Sales Tax Tribunal that the ailment of the assessee was not such which could have prevented him from filing the appeal earlier than on the date actually filed. In absence of such a finding the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal refusing to excuse the delay, cannot be upheld, only on the ground that in point of time the application under section 30 of the Act was filed earlier inasmuch as that did not disqualify the assessee to explain the further delay on the strength of his ailment. The assertion of the assessee that the application was filed by the counsel of his own accord, has also not been disputed. It is pertinent to mention that by the assessment order under challenge the assessee was subjected to a disputed tax liability of Rs. 1,08,000. Looking to the stakes involved, it is difficult to believe that the assessee should have failed to file the appeal within time for the circumstances as beyond his control. In such matters monetary stakes involved and the importance of the issue raised, in my opinion, are not totally irrelevant considerations, that may also be taken notice of along with other relevant circumstances, in exercise of judicial discretion vested with the court or an authority in dealing with the question for condonation of delay. The court or authority is to strike a just and equitable balance between the rights secured by the respondents as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and deprivation of the appellant in seeking adjudication of his grievance on merits of the appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control. It is more so in the fiscal statutes where the provisions relating to appeal, etc. , can hardly be equated to lis or dispute as arises between the parties in a civil litigation. In the context of Limitation Act, the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 66 STC 228; AIR 1987 SC 1353, has pointed out that in the matter of condonation of delay the courts should adopt liberal approach. It was observed that ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. Further when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for other side cannot claim to have vested right in an injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. It was ruled that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when the delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a case would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. There is no presumption that the delay is occasioned deliberately on account of culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. On consideration of facts obtaining in the case and the material that existed on record, I am of the considered opinion that the assessee had made out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. There was no lack of bona fide on his part nor any laches could be attributed to him. In the circumstances, the delay in filing the appeal ought to have been condoned. The view taken to the contrary by the Sales Tax Tribunal cannot be sustained. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .;