R. A. Sharma, J. - (1.) APPELLANT was elected as Pradhan of village Aswar, Tahsil Mohammadabad, District Ghazipur in 1988. He was suspended on 6-1-1992 by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mohammadabad. Ghazipur (hereinafter referred to as the S.D.O.) under section 95 (1) (gg) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A charge sheet dated 7-2-1992 under 95 (1) (g) of the Act was served on him and he was called upon to show cause as to why he should not be removed from the office of the Pradhan, The S.D.O., after considering the material on record and the representation of the appellant, filed, in reply to the charge sheet, by a reasoned order dated 16-2-1992 held that the appellant was not guilty of the charges levelled against him and reinstated him accordingly. The respondent No. 4, who is up-Pradhan of the same village, submitted an application dated 25-3-1992 before the SDO for cancelling the aforesaid order dated 16-2-1992. The grievance of the respondent No. 4 was that the order dated 16-2-1992 was passed by Sri Baitullah Ansari, who was S.D.O., Ghazipur and, on the basis of the order of the District Magistrate, Ghazipur dated 4-2-1992, was acting as S.D.O., Mohammadabad and as such, was not competent to pass the above order under the Act. The S.D.O. after considering the respective oases of both the parties and the rulings cited by them, vide order dated 8-4-1992 held that Sri Baitullah Ansari was fully competent to pass the above order dated 16-2-1992. With that finding the representation of respondent No. 4 was rejected. Respondent No 4 again made a representation against the same order dated 16-2-1992 before the SDO, who vide order dated 18-4-1992 suspended the appellant. The appellant filed representation against the above order dated 18-4-1992 The SDO after considering the material on record, vide order dated 21-4-1992, recalled the order of suspension dared 18-4-1992 and reinstated the appellant. Against the above order dated 21-4-1992, respondent No. 4 appears to have made some representation before the District Magistrate, Ghazipur, who on 24-4-1992 suspended the aforesaid order dated 21-4-1992 for fifteen days. The District Magistrate subsequently vide order dated 26-5-1992 restored the order of the S.D.O. dated 21-4 1992, with the result the appellant was reinstated. The District Magistrate was again approached for action against the appellant, but he, vide bis order dated 8-7-1992 declared that there is no necessity for any farther inquiry. Subsequently the S.D.O. by order dated 24-10-1992 again suspended the appellant under section 95 (1) (gg) of the Act on the ground that the order dated 7-2-1992 (serving the charge sheet on the appellant) and the orders dated 16-2-1992 (of reinstatement), 18-4-1992 (of suspension of the appellant) and 21 4-1992 (cancelling the order of suspension) were not passed by a competent authority and as such, are without jurisdiction. Against the above orders the appellant filed writ petition before this Court, which has been dismissed by a learned Single Judge on 10-2-1993 on the pound that the order of suspension' is an administrative order and there is no bar against reviewing the same Hence this special appeal by the appellant.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant has made two submissions in support of the appeal, namely, (1) the S.D.O. has no power to review his earlier orders and the impugned order dated 24-10-1992 is as such, without Jurisdiction; and (II) the impugned order has been passed .without giving any opportunity of being heard to the appellant. LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 4 has on the other hand submitted that the .earlier orders were not passed by the competent authority and as such, the S.D.O. was justified to suspend the appellant again and In his support, reliance has been placed on the decision of Full Bench of this Court in Kashi Nath Singh v. District Magistrate, 1970 RD 471. The S.D.O, Mohammadabad, within whose jurisdiction the village of the appellant, of which he is the Pradhan, falls, had gone for training on account of which the District Magistrate, Ghazipur vide order dated 4-2-1992 appointed Sri Baitullah Ansari, who was already working as S.D.O Ghazipur as S.D O. Mohammadabad for doing the Govt, work, till the regular incombent Joins. The power under section 95 (1) (g) to remove a Pradhan as well as the power under clause (gg) of the same section to suspend the Pradhan against whom proceedings under clause (g) are pending or contemplated, belong to the Government. Government in exercise of power conferred on It by section 96-A of the Act, has delegated those powers to the S.D.O. of the Division. As Sri Baitullah Ansari was aothorised by the District Magistrate to act as S.D.O , Mohammadabad, he was fully competent to pass orders under the Act. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that unless there is 'an order by the District Magistrate expressly authorising Sri Baitullab Ansari to pass orders under section 95 of the Act, he is incompetent to take any decision or pass any order under the Apt, cannot be accepted. It is true that the order dated 4-2-1992 of the District Magistrate, appointing Sri Baitullab Ansari to work as S.D.O. Mohammadabad for discharging the Governmental functions, does not expressly say that he may pass the order and take decision under the Act. But it is not necessary that in the order of appointment, the District Magistrate should enumerate separately all the powers, which the S.D.O. has to exercise under various laws. It is sufficient, if the power is conferred in general term so as to enable the concerned officer to perform all the powers and discharge all the duties under various laws. Once the authorisation is for doing the Govt, work, S.D.O. can exercise all powers and do all work pertaining to the Governmental functions. As mentioned hereinbefore, the power to suspend and the power to remove a Pradhan under section 95 of the Act vests in the Government As the Government has delegated those powers to S.D.O., the S.D.O., who has been authorised to do the Governmental work is quite competent to pass appropriate orders under the above provisions of the Aot, Sri Baitullab Ansari was, as such, fully competent" to take decision and pass appropriate order under clauses (g) and (gg) of subsection (1) of section 95 of the Act. The decision of the Full Bench In the case of Kashi Nath Singh (supra) is not of any help to respondent No. 4. In that case the question, which was considered by the Full Bench, was as to whether power of the Government under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act, which was delegated under section 96-A to the S.D.O., can be exercised by the Additional S.D.O. also. As section 2 (ss) of the Act provides that Sub-Divisional Officer' includes the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer designated or appointed as such by the appropriate authority', the Full Bench held that Additional S.D.O., unless designated or appointed as such the appropriate authority to exercise the power of the S.D.O. under the Act. has no jurisdiction to exercise the power of the S.D.O. under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act. Controversy In the Instant case is different, inasmuch as the question is not whether the Additional S.D.O. can discharge the power of S.D.O. without authorisation by appropriate authority. The question is whether an officer, who has been authorised to act as S.D.O., Mohammadabad can pass appropriate orders under section 95 of the Act. That was not a question, which was decided by the Full Bench. As the delegation of power by the Government is in favour of the S.D.O., the person, who is authorised, to work as S.D.O. for doing Governmental work, can exercise all those powers.
(3.) IN fact the S.D.O. in his earlier order dated 8-4-1992 while rejecting the claim of the respondent No. 4, has expressly held that Sri Baitullab Ansari was, in view of the order' of the District Magistrate dated 4-2-1992, folly competent to work as S.D.O, Mohammadabad and to pass the order dated 16-2-1992, whereby the proceedings under section 95 of the Act against the appellant were dropped and he was reinstated Respondent No. 4, even after the order dated 8-4-1992, kept on challenging the order dated 16-2-1992 before the S.D.O. and the District Magistrate. But both the S.D.O. and the District Magistrate rejected the claim of the said respondent by their orders dated 21-4-1992 and 26-5-1992. When approached again, the District Magistrate vide his order dated 8-7-1992 held that there is no necessity for any farther INquiry against the appellant. The S.D.O. however, vide his order dated 24-10-1992 declared all the above orders as without jurisdiction and suspended the appellant again This order of the S.D.O. Is absolutely without jurisdiction for atleast four reasons, namely, (i) Sri Baitullah Ansari, as held above, was fully competent to pass the order dated 16-2-1992, holding the appellant as not guilty of the charges levelled against him under section 93 (1) (g) of the Act, (ii) as the Act does not confer the power of review on the S.D.O, he has no power to review the orders passed under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act. The order dated 16-2-1992, holding the appellant as not guilty of the charges levelled against him, was an order under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act. The power under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act is a quasi judicial in nature and order passed thereunder cannot be reviewed unless the Act has conferred such a power, (iii) the Impugned order was passed without giving any opportunity of being beard to the appellant, who was a person directly affected by that order. INasmuch as the earlier orders, which have been reviewed, were in his favour, and (iv) when the District Magistrate has himself, vide his order dated 8-7-1992, directed the closure of all INquiry against the appellant and the S.D.O. himself has passed a reasoned order on 8-4-1992, holding that Sri Baitullah Ansari was competent to pass order under section 95, It was not open to the S.D.O. to take action again against the appellant on the same charges by setting aside all the earlier orders Such an act on the part of the S.D.O was highly improper, apart from being illegal The position would have been different, if any new material had come to the notice of the S.D.O. on the basis of which he could have initiated fresh proceedings against the appellant by Issuing a fresh charge sheet But that was not the case. The S.D.O. acted arbitrarily and without any authority of law when he set aside all the earlier orders without even notice to the appellant. Such and action was absolutely unwarranted under the law and cannot be sustained. The view of the learned single Judge that the order of suspension Is an administrative order and there is no bar against reviewing the same, cannot be accepted in view of the facts and circumstances of this case.' This is not a case of simple suspension. The suspension was passed on 6-2-1992 and after considering the material on record and the explanation of the appellant, the proceedings under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act were dropped as no case was made out against the appellant and he was consequently reinstated- The appellant having been exonerated on merit by the competent authority could not have been charge sheeted on the same charges and consequently could not have been suspended. The position would have been different, if no order under section 95 (1) (g) of the Act was passed, holding the appellant not guilty of the charges levelled against him. In such a case, there is no bar in reviewing the order of suspension. But in the instant case, as mentioned above, a judicial order was passed under section 95 (1) (g) on 16-2-1992 declaring that the appellant is not guilty of the charges levelled against him. After having been exonerated on merit, it was not open to the S.D.O. to suspend the appellant again on the same charges and on the same grounds.;