R. M. Sahai, J. - (1.) IN this landlord petition against order passed by the Munsif permitting opposite party to deposit rent at his own risk under section 30 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred as Act) as petitioner had refused to accept the same the short question that arises for consideration is if the jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of here could be excercised only after deciding the dispute raised by petitioner that opposite party was not his tenant.
(2.) FROM facts averred in the affidavits filed by parties in this court it appears one Baldeo Das Agarwal was the tenant. After his death his son shifted to Delhi. But the premises are in occuption of opposite party no. 3. According to petitioner he is unauthorised occupant whereas according to opposite party the tenancy devolved on him. In 1979 petitioner moved an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act against opposite party and son of Baldeo Das. During pendency of this application opposite party filed the application under section 30 for deposit of rent. It was objected and petitioner claimed that opposite party was not his tenant. The Munsif however allowed the application. Revision against this order was dismissed as not maintainable. It has been argued that on analogous provision under U. P. Act II of 1947 it was held by this court in Fateh Chand v. Bal Swamp Goel, 1967 ALJ 979 that if in proceedings for deposit of rent dispute is raised that depositer was not the tenant then no order could be passed by the Munsif without deciding this issue. Reference has been made to Haji Abdul Karim v. Mohd. Ismail, 1979 U. P. Rent Control Cases 791 as well. Learned counsel further urged that Section 30 does not contemplate conditional deposit. According to him the order of the Munsif permitting opposite party to deposit the rent at his own risk was contrary to law. Reliance has been placed on Savitri Devi v. Prescribed Authority, 1980 Allahabad Rent Cases 88. Support is drawn from Chottey Lal v. /// Additional District Judge, 1982 U.P. Rent Control Cases 508 to urge that in any case the Munsif should have passed a reasoned order. Learned counsel urged that the Munsif while exercising jurisdiction is not to act merely as post office. His order operates as res-judicata as is clear from observation made by this court in Raj Kumar v. Gopi Nath, 1971 AWR 295 on 7E of Act III of 1947 a similar summary provision as Section 30 of the Act. It is also urged that application for deposit should have been made in Form E. None of the submissions appear to have any substance. There is no provision in Section 30 which permits the landlord to file objection requiring Munsif to decide and adjudicate the dispute about the claim whether person who was seeking to make deposit was a tenant of not. The only notice contemplated is under sub-section (4) of Section 30 permitting landlord to withdraw amout deposited. This notice is subsequent to deposit being made under sub-section (1). In other words it does not contemplate any adjudication or decision before any deposit is accepted from person claiming to be tenant. Moreover sub-section (1) of Section 30 is positive departure from rule 6 of Act III of 1947. It now permits a person claiming to be tenant to deposit the rent. From widening of the Section it is apparent that the Legislature being conscious of the difficulty that arose under earlier Act deliberately extended the benefit even to those persons who claimed to be tenant so that the landlord by his own conduct of refusal to accept the rent may not create a situation by not permitting the claimant to deposit in court and subsequently even if the person is found to be tenant to turn to his advantage by claiming default in payment for this period. It is true that before accepting the deposit the Munsif who is conferred with the jurisdiction under sub-section (3) of Section 30 to accept the claim has to be prima facie satisfied but the satisfaction is only of the fact that the person who made application was a person claiming to be a tenant of the building. The law does not require anything further. At least it does not contemplate adjudication. And how is the order prejudiced to the landlord. If the person claiming to be tenant deposits it but ultimately it is found that he is not the tenant then he does not become so by order under this Section. Benefit of sub-section (6) shall be available only to a person who is found to be tenant. An order which is passed without hearing or even notice obviously cannot operate as res judicata. In Haji Abdul Karim's case this aspect has been brought elaborately. Distinction between nature of jurisdiction exercised under section 7E of old Act and in rule 6 was also pointed out. It was held that no assistance could be derived from Raj Kumar's case to establish that order under Section 30 operated as res judicata. Nor can the order be said to suffer from infirmity of not being a reasoned order. By very nature of jurisdiction exercised the order is not required to be detailed like a judgment. It must exhibit application of mind. To that there appears to be no doubt.
(3.) STRESS has been laid on non-filing of the application for deposit in Form E. True sub-section (1) of Section 30 permits deposit to be made in the manner prescribed details of which are mentioned in rule 21. But very nature of provision leaves hardly any room for doubt that it is more a matter of form than substance. Convenience and facility appear to be its basis. Details of building, rent, landlord, reason for deposit etc. are required to be mentioned. If these are furnished by separate application instead of prescribed Form E it would not render the deposit invalid. Normally manner prescribed should be followed. But failure to adhere to Form could not result in invalidating the deposit if the details as required are furnished specially when there is no provision indicating that the deposit in manner prescribed is mandatory. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.;